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 This dissertation aims to analyze, clarify, and reconstruct the concept of class 
consciousness by developing a dialectical account of political agency at work in the concept. I 
defend a dialectical account of agency, that includes both the way in which individuals come 
together to form groups, but also the capacity of a collective to transform social conditions. I 
argue that this account of political agency is necessary in order to understand the possibility of 
social transformation or change. I trace the development of the relationship between 
consciousness and agency in the early tradition of Western Marxism, focusing primarily on the 
account of class consciousness given by Georg Lukács in History and Class Consciousness. 
Against his account of the world historical agency of a unified proletariat, however, I defend 
Theodor Adorno’s insistence on nonidentity, and the importance of unreconciled groups in 
capitalist society. In order to understand these groups, such as the vanguard, party, or proletariat, 
we must understand the way in which individuals form groups, as well as their inherent 
collectivity.  
My account of the political agency at work in the concept of class consciousness is 
broadly speaking pluralist. I argue that a multiplicity of methodologies is needed in order to 
arrive at a complete picture of the concept. I defend an account of class consciousness that is 
neither reductive nor deflationary with respect to other dimensions of social domination. This 
class forward approach seeks to build intersectional political coalitions in order to undertake 
revolutionary action. Successful revolutionary social transformation is never guaranteed in 
advance; however, the concept of class consciousness, reconstructed through the lens of political 
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 The relationship between class consciousness and political agency is an important 
question not only in the tradition of Marxist scholarship, but also our contemporary historical 
moment. I argue that class consciousness is more than just an awareness of one’s individual or 
class position in capitalist society. It also involves political agency – in particular the kind of 
agency capable of social transformation. In this dissertation, I develop an account of agency that 
includes both the way in which individuals come together to form groups, but also the capacity 
of a collective to transform social conditions. The concept of class consciousness includes both 
epistemic and agential components, making it a useful concept for political organization and 
action. 
 Recent critical theorists have looked to more traditional Marxist concepts and categories 
in order to rework them for contemporary society. Axel Honneth (2008),1 for example, has 
revived interest in the concept of reification. Rachel Jaeggi (2016)2 has done the same for the 
concept of alienation. In a similar vein, the purpose of the present work is to offer a conceptual 
reconstruction of class consciousness, focusing on the kind political agency entailed by it. To do 
this, I will consider the development of the relationship between consciousness and agency in the 
early Marxist tradition, and offer a criterial approach following the tradition of Frankfurt School 
critical theory. In order to do this, I will draw on resources from both the analytic and continental 
philosophical traditions. Broadly speaking, I will take a methodological pluralist approach. 
 
1 Honneth, Reification: A New Look at an Old Idea 
2 Jaeggi, Alienation 
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 The role of class consciousness in the traditional Marxist theory of revolution goes 
roughly as follows. Workers in a capitalist economic system are alienated from their labor and 
exploited by the owners of the means of production. Life as a worker is miserable, and as more 
individual workers become aware of this misery, they also become aware of the fact that they 
have the political and economic capacity to change their conditions. Once enough workers come 
together, they organize as a class – the proletariat – in order to overthrow the capitalist system 
altogether. They abolish private property relations and establish a classless society. To Karl 
Marx in the second half of the 19th century, this revolution was imminent; the proletariat had 
nothing to lose but its chains, and unprecedented social change was on the horizon.  
 While the social, political, and economic landscape changed drastically during the 20th 
century, the global communist revolution did not unfold as Marx had predicted. Specifically, the 
mass of workers did not come together in the name of the Communist revolution. Instead, 
nationalist and fascist movements emerged around the globe, and by the middle of the century 
even those countries who remained officially committed to Communism had strayed from 
Marx’s insights. In the two decades of the 21st century we have witnessed a rise of populist 
movements in response to the global economic recession. Today, capitalist economic structures 
continue to exploit and alienate workers, even if their form has changed considerably since 
Marx’s day.  
 The fact that a unified, global proletariat has not arisen to overthrow these structures puts 
this traditional view of class consciousness into question. In order to consider the relevance of a 
Marxist analysis of society today, we must be able address, at the very least, possible reasons 
why class consciousness, and especially the political agency at work, did not develop in 
industrialized nations in the way Marx initially expected. Such an account will need to attend to 
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the ways in which society has changed, as well as the different political groups by whose action 
those changes occur. The position needs to be able to account both for the possibility of 
revolutionary change, as well as for why it does not occur. The aim of this dissertation is to 
address this question by developing a ‘dialectical’ account of agency at work in the concept of 
class consciousness. I argue that such an account of class consciousness must emphasize class as 
distinctive feature of contemporary capitalism, but also allow for other forms of social 
domination and oppression. Thus, I defend an account of class consciousness that is neither 
reductive nor deflationary with respect to class.  
 The motivation for the present project comes in no small part from my own feeling of 
political powerlessness in the face of the monolithic political and economic institutions of 
present-day capitalism. As an individual it is easy to sink to a level of quietism or helplessness. 
The capitalist economic system has so much momentum that from the individual perspective, 
political action can appear pointless. Nevertheless, I argue that an analysis of the agency of 
groups offers new ways of thinking of political action that go beyond the mere aggregation of the 
capacities of individuals. Together, we can do things that we could not do separated from each 
other. Perhaps this is naive, and the systems in place are in fact too powerful to be changed. Still, 
I argue that a reconstruction of the political agency at work in the concept of class consciousness 
offers new ways of thinking about group organization and structure, in order to better understand 






A Note on Methodological Pluralism 
 This dissertation cover thinkers from different traditions who do not always agree on one, 
unitary methodology. For the present purposes, I will adopt an open, methodological pluralism 
that I claim can draw insight from multiple methodologies, incorporating them in order to come 
to a deeper and wider understanding of the social phenomena under interrogation. I maintain that 
despite or even because of their differences, incorporating these methods allows the present work 
to include insights that might otherwise be overlooked. I am not claiming here to establish an 
overarching meta-methodology that is capable of unifying all these methods under one 
methodological roof. Rather I take the often-contradictory stances these traditions take to 
indicate the one-sidedness of their position and reveal the inability of any one of them on their 
own to give a complete account of class consciousness, political agency, or any other social, 
political, or economic concept. I do not claim to offer a complete account of class consciousness 
or political agency in the present account; however, I do claim that the use of multiple 
methodologies allows for insights that a more narrowly focused, closed methodology might miss. 
This broadly pluralist account remains open to new discoveries, both theoretical and practical. 
 By pluralism, I do not simply mean to employ different methodologies side by side, but 
rather take insights from one and apply them to the other. While the present work is divided into 
four chapters, each with roughly its own orienting methodology, it is my hope that the insights of 
one methodology also bleed into the discussions in other chapters. I argue that methodologies 
from different traditions have much to offer the others – looking at an old concept or idea from a 
new perspective can shed light on aspects that might have otherwise been overlooked. The 
organization of the present work into four distinct chapters groups together analyses that focus 
on similar thinkers and traditions for the sake of clarity, but it is my hope that the connections 
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across traditions are clear as well. While such an approach offers its own unique set of problems, 
on the whole I argue that it is more beneficial than detrimental to the aims of the dissertation as a 
whole.  
 Roughly speaking each chapter has an orienting methodology. Chapter 1 looks at thinkers 
from the early Marxist tradition, who all adhere to a dialectical, historical materialism. This 
method understands social phenomena as the material unfolding of history. While the thinkers in 
this chapter fall broadly under this methodological category, their approaches often differ 
greatly. What unites them is a commitment to revolutionary social transformation, as well as the 
intellectual and conceptual tools required to carry out such social transformation. Chapter 2 looks 
at the negative dialectics of Theodor Adorno. While certainly committed to social 
transformation, he develops a methodology more in line with his own nonrevolutionary social 
conditions. Adorno has the benefit of historical hindsight and takes into account the failures of 
revolutionary action in Russia and Germany to establish Communist regimes that stayed true to 
Marxist principles. Broadly speaking, the theorists I will discuss in these two chapters could be 
understood as in some way responding to Hegelian dialectics, although their criticisms of Hegel 
differ widely. Mediation is another shared theme, as well as a vehement rejection of mechanistic 
or positivist opportunism.  
 Chapter 3 turns to contemporary analytic philosophy and focuses on thinkers committed 
to some form of methodological individualism broadly construed. In general, they maintain that 
group agency is determined by the agency of individual members, as well as the relations 
between those members. They argue convincingly that attention must be paid to the differences 
between members as well as their different relations in order to understand the agency of the 
group in question. I hold that this is a necessary aspect of understanding group agency; however, 
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it is not sufficient for a wider account of agency I wish to develop. In Chapter 4, I consider 
figures from contemporary continental philosophy, specifically thinkers who draw on resources 
from French theory. Broadly construed, these thinkers adopt some form of methodological 
holism that emphasizes that methodological individualism provides a scope that is too narrow to 
account for the diversity of collective political action. They argue convincingly that an 
understanding of the collective that is irreducible to the sum of its parts is also required in order 
to understand group political agency. Drawing on resources from both traditions, I argue that 
what is needed is an account of group agency that incorporates insights from both these 
traditions. For the purposes of the present work, I call this account of agency a ‘dialectical’ 
account of group agency, since it emphasizes neither individual nor group, but rather the relation 
or mediating forces between them. This dialectical account follows broadly the methodological 
insights from the theorists from Chapters 1 and 2. I argue that this methodological pluralism is 




 Chapter 1 traces the history of the relationship between consciousness and agency in the 
early Marxist tradition. Following Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, I argue that while the agency 
of the individual worker is limited under capitalism, an analysis of class struggle shows that the 
proletariat retains a different kind of agency as a class. Next I look at Rosa Luxemburg and V.I. 
Lenin’s practically orientated approach. Finally, I turn to Georg Lukács’ position in History and 
Class Consciousness in order to reconstruct his argument for class consciousness. I argue that 
already in Lukács’ work there is an understanding of agency entailed by class consciousness. 
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 Chapter 2 reconstructs Adorno’s critique of Lukács that emphasizes nonidentity and the 
unreconciled elements of society. I argue that Adorno’s critique is not a rejection of Lukács’ 
account, but rather deepens his materialist position. For Adorno, breaking the spell of capitalist 
ideology remains possible; however, liberation is not guaranteed, and social transformation can 
also lead to total disaster. Through an analysis with his friend and mentor Max Horkheimer, I 
show that one element of their own society this is missing is a properly functioning Communist 
Party. In the absence of the party, revolutionary action appears impossible. While the social 
conditions of their time inhibit revolutionary action, this does not stop them from sending 
messages to future generations whose social conditions might be different from their own. 
 Chapter 3 develops an account of three important social groups: the vanguard, the party, 
and the proletariat. I argue that we can use the conceptual resources from contemporary analytic 
philosophy to better understand the agency of these groups. The vanguard, as it is understood by 
Lenin can be described as a plural subject. The party, as it appears in the Communist Manifesto 
can be understood as a group agent. While the proletariat might not have agency in a narrower 
sense, I argue that we can identify with it as a collective through the use of we-narratives.  
 Chapter 4 develops an approach to political agency in a wider sense then Chapter 3. I turn 
to conceptual resources from contemporary continental philosophy, specifically in the French 
tradition in order to understand the capacities of the collective to engage in political action. I 
focus on Jodi Dean’s account of the crowd as a collective political subject. Her position shows 
that the crowd, in so far as it is always changing and splitting itself, has certain capacities that are 
irreducible to those of its constituent members. For Dean, the process of separating someone 
from the crowd is part of the ideological process of individualization. I also discuss Judith 
Butler’s embodied account of precarity to complicate the distinction between action and 
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conditions of action. On Butler’s view, vulnerability, as a capacity to be affected, not only helps 





AGENCY AND (CLASS) CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE EARLY MARXIST TRADITION 
 
 In this chapter, I will trace out the history of the development of the relationship between 
consciousness and agency in the early Marxist tradition. Certainly, this history predates Karl 
Marx and Friedrich Engels; Hegel clearly discusses this relationship in both the Phenomenology 
of Spirit and the Philosophy of Right. I choose to begin here, however, and not with an extended 
exposition on Hegelian thought, because it is Marx and Engels who insist that the phenomenon 
of consciousness is rooted in the material conditions and mode of production of society. The debt 
to Hegelian dialectics should be clear throughout – from the early so-called ‘humanist’ writings 
of Marx, through the practically oriented though of V.I Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg, and to 
Lukács’ own early Marxist writings. While this dialectical tradition is no longer as fashionable as 
it once was, I argue that its methodology is still useful today. While the insights of these early 
Marxist thinkers may not constitute a fully developed position on what constitutes this 
relationship between consciousness and agency, they provide conceptual tools we can use to 
expand on their thought. If there is in fact a dialectical relationship between theory and practice, 
as these thinkers maintain, then no theoretical work from the past can provide a ready-made 
theoretical solution to the practical problems of today. Rather, it our job as theorists to continue 
to develop this relationship between theory and practice, so that our thinking is grounded in the 
material conditions of our present-day society, rather than the society over one hundred years in 
the past. 
 Lukács, at the beginning of History and Class Consciousness, offers a helpful 
clarification with respect to Marxist methodology. This first essay is entitled “What is Orthodox 
Marxism” and develops an account of Marxist methodology that can serve as useful orientation 
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for uniting the thinkers discussed in this chapter. Lukács wants to challenge those so-called 
Marxist thinkers who raise up Marx’s insights to near religious belief. He wishes to rescue the 
term ‘Orthodox Marxism’ even in the event that all of Marx’s theories, predictions, and 
interpretations are somehow disproved empirically. Rather than accepting Marx’s work as 
received wisdom, Lukács argues that “Orthodox Marxism, therefore, does not imply the 
uncritical acceptance of the results of Marx’s investigations. It is not the ‘belief’ in this or that 
thesis, nor the exegesis of a ‘sacred’ book. On the contrary, orthodoxy refers exclusively to 
method.”1 Adopting this method – the method of dialectical and historical materialism – does 
not, in itself, commit one to any theoretical or practical positions in advance. To determine such 
a position in advance entails taking a one-sided view. Rather, on this understanding of orthodox 
Marxism, the point is not to take this side or that side, but rather to understand the relation 
between them, i.e., the mediating force at once separating and conjoining them. I will return to 
this theme below – both in Chapter 2, which will use Theodor Adorno’s own negative dialectics, 
as well as the way in which I hope to think through the relationship between chapters 3 and 4 on 
group agency.  
 The present chapter is composed of three sections. The first section covers early work by 
both Marx and Engels concerning the relationship between consciousness and agency. First, I 
discuss Marx’s theory of alienated labor, and the role it plays in understanding what a materialist 
account of agency might look like. Then, I look at Marx and Engels’ argument for the material 
and social basis of consciousness. Finally, I turn to a more practical example Marx gives through 
his analysis of the events in France during the 1850s. This section shows that while Marx and 
 
1 Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, p. 1.  
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Engels may not have a fully developed account of the relationship between consciousness and 
agency, they are, from the start, concerned with questions about how the proletariat come 
together, what their class interests are, and how and why they engage in political struggle and 
revolutionary action. Already in these texts, it is necessary to go beyond an individual 
perspective, and think the relations between different parts of society. 
 The second section covers both Lenin and Luxemburg’s arguments about the practical 
aspects of political organizing, including the relationship between class consciousness, agency, 
and the role of the vanguard party. The first part of this section develops Lenin’s critique of 
spontaneity. While Lenin is concerned about leadership blindly following the spontaneous 
masses, I argue that he does not advocate a completely top-down approach. Material conditions 
are for him still part of the equation, and even the most dedicated cadre of professional 
revolutionaries consciously intervening according to the best, and most advanced Social-
Democratic theory could not generate a revolution absent a revolutionary situation. The second 
part of this section develops Luxemburg’s critique of centralization. Her worry is that separation 
between the masses and party leadership risks blind obedience to those in power, and would 
ultimately lead to the reproduction of existing, problematic power relations. She holds onto the 
revolutionary kernel of the masses, arguing that we should not forget who in fact has the power 
to change society. 
 The third section covers Lukács’ account of the concept of class consciousness. I develop 
a reading of this concept such that it includes not only an epistemological dimension, but an 
agential dimension as well. The first part presents his account of class consciousness, showing 
how and where he draws on both Lenin and Luxemburg for insight. The second part explores the 
concept of class consciousness in more detail through a comparison between bourgeois and 
  
 11 
proletarian class consciousness. I show that proletarian class consciousness is superior 
epistemologically, since it opens onto the possibility of going beyond its own immediacy. The 
third part draws a distinction between a thick and thin notion of class consciousness. A thin 
notion of class consciousness would include merely the epistemological dimension – a thick 
notion would also include the agency to change society. I argue that Lukács’ account is already a 
thick notion, and that to best think through the relationship between consciousness and agency, 
we must further develop this thick notion of class consciousness.  
 The purpose of this chapter is not to defend explicitly the views of any one of these 
particular thinkers, but rather to use this history as a jumping off point for my discussion of class 
consciousness and political agency. Methodologically, I will draw on the resources of this 
chapter throughout the rest of the dissertation. In Chapter 2, I follow Adorno’s further 
development of these ideas, neither accepting them uncritically, nor dismissing them out of hand. 
 
Introduction to Marx and Engels 
 While Marx and Engels might not provide pre-packaged a fully developed account of 
political agency, their work provides a fertile foundation from which to begin thinking through 
these issues. Against the backdrop of Hegel’s dialectical idealist method, Marx and Engels 
develop their own materialist dialectics, rooted in an analysis of the real, material conditions of 
society. Like Hegel, Marx and Engels develop a deeply historical account of the possibility of 
social change. Unlike Hegel, however, they argue that it is not spirit, or Geist that drives history 
forward, but rather the struggle between existing classes within society. Ideas or values, while 
perhaps an important part of the description of transformative change, do not cause it 
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independently of the material conditions of society. The expression of what an individual or class 
can do is thus tied to these material conditions – there is no agency on their view to be 
understood independently from society. Hegel, and his subsequent followers, ascribed to such a 
view, which Marx and Engels reject as ‘ideology.’ This concept of ideology will return later in 
this chapter, as well as in Chapter 2, but for now let us turn to the contents of this subsection. 
 All three subsections discuss texts from the earlier part of Marx and Engels’ life. Often 
referred to as the ‘humanist’ writings, these texts focus more closely on the experiences of life 
under capitalism. Some thinkers, such as Louis Althusser, contend that there is a break or gap 
between these ‘humanist’ writings and the later, ‘scientific’ writings. My choice to focus on the 
early writings is not intended to take a stance on this debate. However, I will note in passing that 
it is interesting that these early texts are when Marx and Engels talk most about agency. First, I 
discuss Marx’s early thinking on agency in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 
1844. Here Marx develops his account of alienated labor, which I argue constitutes an account of 
the diminished agency of the worker under capitalism. Next, I discuss the relationship between 
agency and consciousness in The German Ideology. I argue that the inherently social nature of 
consciousness plays an important role in their account of ‘communist consciousness.’ Finally, I 
use the 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte as an example in which Marx develops a dialectical 
account of the relationship between individuals and groups during the political upheaval in 
France during the 1850s. I hope to show that Marx and Engels are thinking about the relationship 
between agency and consciousness (individual and collective) even if they do not provide a fully 





Agency and Alienation in the 1844 Manuscripts 
 In order to think through a Marxian account of agency, we must first start with the 
concept of alienation. In the early work of The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 
1844, Marx is working with a broadly Hegelian conception of labor.2 As Hegel explains in the 
Philosophy of Right, the process of labor involves externalizing oneself in the object.3 Within 
this Hegelian framework, what is alienated during the process of labor is returned – 
reconciliation between subject and object happens in spirit. For Marx, however, such a 
reconciliation for the actually existing worker never occurs. Rather than constituting the self-
expression of spirit, labor under a capitalist system reduces the worker to the level of the 
commodity. Marx argues that this process ultimately restricts the agency of the individual.  
 Turning now to the 1844 Manuscripts, Marx argues that the alienation of labor not only 
produces goods that can be bought and sold, but also the worker herself as something bought and 
sold. “Labor produces not only commodities: it produces itself and the worker as a commodity – 
and does so in the proportion in which it produces commodities generally.”4 When the worker 
produces something, she puts a part of herself into the object. Under a capitalist system, the 
worker sells her labor time, so that when she puts that part of herself into the object, she sees it 
returned to herself as something foreign, as something estranged from herself. This relation, 
Marx argues, thus produces not only the commodity, but also the worker as a commodity. The 
 
2 For Marx’s own critique, see Marx, “Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right” in Marx Engels Collected Works. 
Vol 3. 
3 Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right. The first section of Abstract Right (paragraphs 41 – 71) talks about the 
concept of property. Interestingly, the third part of this section is on “The Alienation of Property.” A longer 
discussion of the similarities and differences between these two accounts of alienation, while interesting, is 
unfortunately outside the scope of the current work.  
4 Marx, 1844 Manuscripts, p. 71; see also “The Fetishism of the Commodity and its Secret” in Capital, p. 163-177. 
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more value that is placed on the world of things, the less value is placed on the world of human 
beings. The more value produced by the worker, the less valuable she is. 
 Marx shows that this relation of the worker to the object of production is an inversion of 
the way we might normally think about it. Since the worker is only able to continue existing 
because she receives the means of subsistence by selling her labor, she is primarily understood as 
worker, and only secondarily understood as a subject. “The extremity of this bondage is that it is 
only as a worker that he continues to maintain himself as a physical subject, and that it is only as 
a physical subject that he is a worker.”5 Any subject within a capitalist system who doesn’t work 
(and who also does not own the means of production or capital), will not be able to continue to 
exist. Thus, we exist in order to produce, and it is only as a producing subject, allowed to exist. 
Marx compares this condition to the status of machines – like machines, workers under 
capitalism are valued according to what they produce. The more the worker produces, the more 
machinelike she is.  
 In his account of the four modes in which labor is alienated under capitalism, Marx gives 
a description of how the worker’s capacity to act is also diminished. Through being alienated 
from the process of production, for example, the worker feels like she is only human when she is 
not at work. Marx argues that the kind of beings we are, our “species-being” is to engage in free, 
conscious activity. When we sell our labor under capitalism, however, we act only as a means to 
life. We engage in wage labor merely to satisfy need, i.e., to continue physical existence. This is 
contrary, Marx argues, to the kind of beings we are. Human beings engage in “conscious life-
activity” and “produce universally.”6 Thus under a system of capitalism, human beings are not 
 
5 Marx, 1844 Manuscripts, p. 73. 
6 Ibid., 76-77. 
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able to be the kind of beings that they are, and are turned into machines, producing not freely or 
consciously for themselves, but forced to produce at the will of their employer.  
 The process of the alienation of labor, which is at the heart of the capitalist process of 
production, diminishes the human aspects of this activity, forcing it to appear as a mere means to 
life, rather than life for itself. This certainly restricts the capacities of the individual to act; or at 
the very least generates in the worker certain barriers or roadblocks to action. Speaking 
concretely, there are a whole host of barriers imposed on the worker. For example, working a 
wage-labor job often includes manual labor, or requires the worker to be on her feet for the 
entirety of her shift. After work, the worker has little to no energy to engage in other endeavors 
or pursuits. In more abstract or theoretical terms, the worker is presented with a worldview in 
which changing social position seems impossible, or where it appears possible, but that it is the 
worker’s own fault for not advancing in society. While at work, the worker has sold her labor 
time, and is obligated (even in most instances legally required) to engage in the kind of projects 
she has been told to do. Here, certainly, it is clear that her agency is restricted – diminished such 
that her actions take on a mechanistic quality.   
 Despite this seemingly pessimistic outlook on human society, Marx does identify the 
possibility of overcoming this system in the emancipation of the working class, arguing, “not that 
their emancipation alone was at stake but because the emancipation of the workers contains 
universal human emancipation…”7  The fact of alienated labor under capitalism does not 
foreclose the possibility of emancipation, even though those who are supposed to carry out this 
 
7 Ibid., p. 82. This requires further explanation, because it seemingly supports a reductive view of emancipation, vis. 
a view that argues all existing suffering or oppression can be explained through the commodity relation, the 
alienation of labor, and economic underpinnings of capitalist economics based in private property. This is not the 
view I am defending.  
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social transformation are precisely the ones whose agency is diminished by the system. This is, 
at least in part, because of the inherently social nature of labor. “Activity and consumption, both 
in their content and in their mode of existence, are social: social activity and social consumption; 
the human essence of nature first exists only for social man.”8 For Marx, human beings are social 
critters all the way down. As we will see below, this social nature opens new possibilities for 
workers and the working class.  
 It is important to note the universality of the emancipation in question. First this is 
important because emancipation arises not from the actions of the worker as an individual, but as 
we will see below, through workers as a class. What is at stake is not the emancipation of this or 
that worker from the bondage of capitalism, but rather the emancipation of society as a whole 
from private property. Second, the emphasis on universality is important because the 
emancipation of the workers is not isolated to the economic sphere. Emancipation entails not 
only the end of economic servitude (via wage-labor), but also all other relations of servitude as 
well. The political form is expressed through the emancipation of workers, but Marx’s point here 
is that the alienating relations of capitalism infect all spheres of life, not just the economic. This 
is to say, the economic restrictions of the worker narrowly construed translate to diminished 
agency in aspects outside of the economic sphere, strictly speaking 
Class Agency and ‘Communist Consciousness’ in the German Ideology 
 While the German Ideology still focuses on the powers or capacity of the individual, 
Marx and Engels begin a shift to a focus on the formation of a class (over and against another 
class). Importantly, they argue that the interest of the class in the subordinate role (the 
 
8 Ibid., p. 104. 
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proletariat) is itself generated by the capitalist system itself, as specifically through the class 
struggle with the dominate class (the bourgeoisie). Further, Marx and Engels discuss 
consciousness formation, and open the possibility of a revolutionary or communist consciousness 
that appears to be applicable to a class as a whole, not just an individual within that class. They 
defend the position that German idealism, particularly the dialectical Hegelian modes, must be 
“turned on their head,”9 meaning that the material conditions of society (including the modes of 
production) influence the ‘higher’ level phenomena of society such as politics, religion, and 
philosophy. 
 Marx and Engels argue that the first premise of human history is not an abstract 
understanding of the individual or even society as a whole, but rather, “the real individuals, their 
activity and the material conditions of their life, both those which they find already existing and 
those produced by their activity.”10 While the individually existing human being constitutes this 
first premise, it is important to note that Marx and Engels include their activity and material 
conditions. Methodologically, these conditions in part constitute, and in part are constituted by 
these individuals and the relations between them. Abstracting away the individual as an entity 
existing solely apart from these conditions makes no sense. There is a bidirectional relation, then, 
between the conditions in which individuals in society find themselves, and the activities or 
actions of these individuals. Individual action produces the material conditions, which in turn 
conditions the way in which individuals act in society. 
 
9 Marx, The German Ideology, p. 42. Marx and Engels use the analogy of a camera obscura, arguing that German 
philosophy as ideology inverts the relations of its object(s) in a manner similar to the inversion on the retina.  
10 Ibid., p. 36-37. 
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 Employing this materialist, as opposed to idealist methodology, Marx and Engels argue 
that the activities of individuals and their material conditions at least in part determine or 
condition the ideas produced by, and which can be found in, society. “Morality, religion, 
metaphysics” are not independent from the material relations of society, but are in fact grounded 
in the real, existing activity of society. These forms of ideology and ideological thinking, 
according to Marx and Engels, have no history or development. Actually existing human beings, 
however, in “developing their material production and their material intercourse, alter, along 
with this their actual world, also their thinking and the products of their thinking.”11 For Marx 
and Engels, thought is not an independent entity over and above the material or bodily elements. 
Rather, thinking is a material process related directly to the material conditions (of the society) in 
which it finds itself. At its core, the problem with ideological thinking is that it attempts to 
completely separate consciousness from life and the material life processes around it. It is not the 
case (as Hegel seems to imply in the Phenomenology of Spirit) that thinking understands life as 
grounded in conscious activity completely independent from the material conditions of existence. 
Rather for Marx and Engels, “it is not consciousness that determines life, but life that determines 
consciousness.”12 The kind of ideation or abstraction of German ‘ideology’13 thus misses this 
vital relation between individual and individual, and individual and the material conditions in 
which she finds herself. Any attempt to understand consciousness independent from these 
relations will be at best incomplete, at worst a complete misunderstanding.  
 
11 Ibid., p. 42. 
12 Ibid. 
13 By this Marx and Engels mean, in the work of Hegel himself, or in the work of his representatives like Feuerbach, 
Bauer, Stiner, or other members of the Young Hegelians. 
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 Through an analysis of four historical moments or aspects of human progression, Marx 
and Engels show that consciousness is an inherently social product. They argue that the “history 
of humanity” is not merely a secession of different ideas, but also involves the material relations 
of production and reproduction of society.14 This history is, at least in part, determined by the 
needs and modes of production of the individuals in society. These needs and modes of 
production, Marx and Engels argue, are themselves inherently social. Relations between 
individuals conditions the material conditions and modes of production of a society, and thus 
human beings qua individuals (as opposed to mere animals) cannot exist outside of society. 
“Consciousness is, therefore, from the very beginning a social product, and remains so as long as 
men exist at all.”15 Marx and Engels trace the development of this consciousness from a ‘herd-
consciousness’ into ‘national consciousness’. At each stage of this development, the production 
of this consciousness is tied to the division of labor of the society in question, and the modes of 
production that typify it. Here Marx and Engels are not making the strong claim that 
consciousness cannot or does not affect the modes of production or material conditions of 
society; only the claim that consciousness is not a thing apart, independent from the real, 
material conditions of life, but rather in a dialectical relation with these conditions.  
 Take the concept of general or mutual interests16 as an example of this kind of relation.17 
Marx and Engels argue that there is a contradiction within the capitalist mode of production 
between the interest of separate individuals and the common interest of a collective of 
individuals. They argue that, “this common interest does not exist merely in the imagination, as 
 
14 Marx, The German Ideology, p. 49. 
15 Ibid., p. 49-50. 
16 I will return to general interest as it relates to the Communist Party below in Chapter 3.  
17 Cf. Marx’s discussion of common interests of those under the domination of capital in Marx, The Poverty of 
Philosophy, p. 187-191. 
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the ‘general interest’, but first of all in reality, as the mutual interdependence of the individuals 
among whom the labor is divided.”18 This imaginary ‘general interest’ appears in capitalist 
society as though it is in opposition to the particular interest of the individual. The actually 
existing common interest, generated through mutual interdependence, however, does not take on 
this characteristic. Whereas general interest is presented as something independent and alien with 
respect to particular interest, common interest is in a dialectical relation with the actually existing 
individuals in society. Further, the same can be said about the social power or reproductive force 
generated by the division of labor. Individuals see this social power as something alien and 
independent from them, rather than something they themselves are in part creating.19  
 In order to liberate themselves from this alienating force, individual members of the 
proletariat must come together as a class,20 and through practical, revolutionary action (rather 
than ideal criticism) overthrow the existing state of society.21 Marx and Engels are clear that 
criticism by itself will not change the established order. They state, “that not criticism but 
revolution is the driving force of history,”22 and that, “it is absolutely immaterial for practical 
development whether the idea of this revolution has been expressed a hundred times 
already…”23 Establishing theoretically the concept or idea of revolution does not, in itself, 
further the practical development of a revolutionary situation.  
 
18 Marx, The German Ideology, p. 52. 
19 Ibid., p. 53, 89. 
20 Marx and Engels discuss the development of a class in the German Ideology, p. 68-69. See also Marx’s discussion 
of the historical role of the proletariat in Marx and Engels, The Holy Family or Critique of Critical Critique, p. 51-
53.  
21 See also: Marx, The German Ideology, p. 57: “Communism is for us not a state of affairs which is to be 
established, an ideal to which reality will have to adjust itself. We call communism the real movement which 
abolishes the present state of things. The conditions of this movement result from the now existing premise.” 
22 Ibid., p. 61. 
23 Ibid., p. 62. 
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 This means that the fundamental task is not to merely alter the consciousness of the 
proletariat, but rather altering the circumstances of society.24 This point is made clearer through 
an analysis of the relation between the ruling material force and the ruling intellectual force of a 
particular society. “The ruling ideas,” Marx and Engels argue, “are nothing more than the ideal 
expression of the dominant material relations, the dominant material relations grasped as 
ideas.”25 Since, in capitalist society, the ruling material force is the bourgeoisie, it follows that 
the dominant or ruling ideas would express these material relations. It is for this reason, for 
example, that the laws of bourgeois economy are presented as eternal, unchanging laws of 
nature. It is not enough, Marx and Engels argue, to simply criticize these ruling ideas; one must 
also confront them on the practical, material level as well. Put differently, changing hearts and 
minds without changing the underlying conditions or structures of society is not sufficient.  
 Beginning, then, from an understanding of the mutual interdependence of individuals, as 
well as the dialectical relation between these individuals and the material conditions of their 
society, Marx and Engels argue that  
separate individuals form a class only insofar as they have to carry on a common 
battle against another class…the class in its turn assumes an independent 
existence as against the individuals, so that the latter find their conditions of life 
predetermined, and have their position in life and hence their personal 
development assigned to them by their class…26  
Here we see the way in which class is constituted through a common battle or class struggle, 
against another class. This class gains independence over and against the separate individuals so 
long as the class struggle exists. Under the conditions of class struggle, individuals within a class 
 
24 Ibid., p. 64. 
25 Ibid., p. 67. 
26 Ibid., p. 85. 
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experience their life and possibilities curtailed or limited by their class position. This class 
position, however, also opens up new possibilities not afforded to bourgeois consciousness.27  
 The proletarian class, as representative of the common interests of not only their own 
class, but of society as a whole, struggle for the universal emancipation of human society. 
Historically, the revolutionary class presents its own interests as the common interests of all 
members of society. “The class making a revolution comes forward from the very start, if only 
because it is opposed to a class, not as a class but as the representative of the whole of society, as 
the whole mass of society confronting the one ruling class.”28 Marx and Engels argue that with 
each new revolutionary project, the basis on which the new class achieves domination becomes 
more and more broad. Eventually, once this basis becomes so broad so as to encompass all of 
society, the complete abolition of class becomes possible, that society is able to emancipate itself 
universally.29 This universality, Marx and Engels argue, is what conditions the possibility of 
abolishing classes altogether. As long as society is divided into classes, these classes will have 
their own separate, contradictory interests, and will thus impose their (common) interest as the 
supposed (imaginary) general interest of society. It is only through the abolition of classed 
society, and the establishment of a classless society that separate individuals can be emancipated 
from the contradictions inherent between these individual and collective interests. Further, only a 
class that can act world-historically,30 such as the proletariat, has the capacity for this universal 
 
27 See the section below on Lukács and the standpoint of the proletariat.  
28 Marx, The German Ideology, p. 68-69. 
29 For example, see Ibid., p. 54-57: “…Only with this universal development of productive forces is a universal 
intercourse between men established, which on the one side produces in all nations simultaneously the phenomenon 
of the ‘propertyless’ mass (universal competition), making each nation dependent on the revolutions of the others, 
and finally puts world-historical, empirically universal individuals in place of local ones.” 
30 Again, see Marx, The Holy Family, p. 51-53. 
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emancipation, because it abolishes the material conditions that ground these contradictions, and 
thus can establish the foundations of a society in which these contradictions31 do not exist.  
 This process of practical, revolutionary action is taken up by the proletariat as a class. 
The proletarian class is the most revolutionary, Marx and Engels argue, because it is the class 
that feels the sharpest contradiction of the capitalist mode of production. It must bear all the 
burdens of society, while enjoying none of its advantages. It is a class that, “forms the majority 
of all members of society, and from which emanates the consciousness of the necessity of a 
fundamental revolution, the communist consciousness, which may, of course, arise among the 
other class too through the contemplation of the situation of this class.”32 It is important to note 
that this communist consciousness ‘emanates’ from the class – not that the consciousness 
determines or constitutes it. What is emanating is a consciousness of the necessity of 
fundamental revolution, i.e., that the foundation of society must change, and that this change is 
necessary.33 Here Marx is not arguing that revolution is inevitable – only that for the 
contradiction of society to resolve, the mode of production and material conditions of society 
must radically change.  
 Further, ‘communist consciousness’ is something that is generated by and in the 
proletariat, however it is not something restricted to members of that class. By contemplating 
 
31 To be clear, the abolition of the particular classes inherent to capitalism would overcome the particular 
contradictions inherent to the capitalist system. While Marx and Engels imply that a classless society would follow, 
they never contend that post-capitalist society would be completely without contradiction. For a longer discussion of 
this point, see Chapter 2.  
32 Marx, The German Ideology, p. 60. 
33 We might say necessary in a moral, rather than physical sense. Marx’s own position with respect to the question 
of the ‘necessity of the revolution’ is unclear, and his been interpreted in many different ways. For example, some, 
such as certain members of the Second International, develop a mechanistic view of revolutionary action. A longer 
discussion of the differences between dialectical and vulgar Marxism is unfortunately outside the scope of the 
present work.  
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their situation, and presumably understanding the fundamental contradictions of society that 
produces the proletariat as a class, members of another class can also arrive at this 
consciousness.34 It is unclear here whether the class as a class could achieve this understanding, 
although it would appear not. This, then, suggests that the ‘communist consciousness’ is an 
individual phenomenon, since only members of a class, and not a class as such (besides perhaps 
the proletarian class), can achieve it (whatever the conditions of achievement are).35 
 For Marx and Engels, it is clear that a class can do something that individual members of 
that class cannot. This class agency is expressed in its consciousness. Consciousness is not 
something that floats about the class, independent from the individuals within society or its mode 
or process of production. Rather, it is something generated by the real relations of society. 
Starting with their rejection of idealist methodology, Marx and Engels develop an account of 
consciousness that is inherently material as well as social. The communist consciousness that 
becomes aware of the necessity of revolutionary action cannot (or ought not) be isolated through 
formal abstraction but rather is tied to the material conditions of society out of which it arises. 
Class agency in general, and proletarian class agency in particular, is thus directly related to the 
expression of this consciousness. 
Dialectics in the 18th Brumaire 
 In The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, Marx provides an empirical case study in 
which he applies the dialectical method of historical materialism to the events of the attempted 
revolution in 1848 and its immediate aftermath. This text echoes the position Marx lays out in 
 
34 Cf. Lenin, What is to Be Done? p. 37: “Marx and Engels themselves belonged to the bourgeois intelligentsia.”  
35 Achievement or non-achievement may not be the best terms to describe the becoming conscious of a class (or of 
an individual for that matter).  
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the 1844 Manuscripts and the German Ideology, arguing for a position that accounts for both the 
individual and collective actions of the participants, as well as the material conditions and modes 
of economic relations in which they find themselves. In the preface, Marx explains that his 
position focuses not solely on the individual or material conditions, but rather the class struggle 
(as the relation between them). The class struggle, as a relation, reveals the capacities of the 
varying individuals and classes.  
 Marx begins the 18th Brumaire by indicating the methodology he will use to give his 
analysis of the events in France. “Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as 
they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under 
circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past.”36 Here Marx shows 
explicitly the way in which he understands the movement of history. He grounds the process of 
historical movement in the capacities of human beings to affect change on a transformational 
level. They have the power to make their own history, but with a catch. They do not make it ex 
nihilo, but rather by and through their contemporary material conditions. We do not choose the 
past, or the society we inherit from previous generations. However, this does not mean that the 
present or future are determined by that past or those conditions. Rather, we take up the 
conditions of the society we encounter, and act upon that society in order to engage in 
revolutionary action. 
 Marx distinguishes his position from two texts about the same events: Hugo’s Napoléon 
le Petit, and Proudhon’s Coup d’Etat. On Marx’s view, Hugo’s work focuses exclusively on the 
 
36 Marx, The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, p. 15. 
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actions of Louis Bonaparte as a singular individual.37 According to Marx, this ascribes to him too 
much power. “He [Hugo] does not notice that he makes this individual great instead of little by 
ascribing to him a personal power of initiative such as would be without parallel in world 
history.”38 By neglecting the material conditions out of which the individual acts (as well as the 
social relations that condition the possibility of such action), Hugo ascribes a capacity for action 
that is unwarranted. No individual acts in a vacuum, not even a despotic tyrant. On the other 
hand, Marx also distinguishes his position from the more objectivist view of Proudhon. 
“Proudhon, for his part, seeks to represent the coup d’état as the result of an antecedent historical 
development.”39 While avoiding Hugo’s problem of granting an unwarranted capacity to the 
individual, Proudhon makes the opposite mistake, and unwittingly turns the preceding historical 
development into a defense of Bonaparte’s actions. If the historical conditions all by themselves 
produced his actions, then it would be difficult, if not impossible, to see the events in France as 
happening otherwise.   
 These two positions exemplify opposite, one-sided accounts of the historical facts. On the 
one side, Hugo’s individualism posits the actions of the individual as independent from historical 
material conditions. On the other side, Proudhon’s objective historicism denies the generative 
capacity of individuals (and by extension, the relations between those individuals), which 
amounts to a materialist determinism. Marx takes these two dialectically opposed viewpoints and 
defends a position that overcomes their contradictions. “I, on the contrary, demonstrate how the 
 
37 Here I follow Chad Lavin’s argument in “Postliberal Agency in Marx’s Brumaire.” Lavin argues that Marx goes 
beyond the liberal account of agency and connects his work in the 18th Brumaire with Judith Butler’s account of 
performativity. For example, see p. 448: “Like Marx, Butler is unsatisfied with the conventional alternatives of 
liberal voluntarism and structural determinism.” For my own discussion of Butler, see Chapter 4 below.  




class struggle in France created circumstances and relationships that make it possible for a 
grotesque mediocrity to play a hero’s part.”40 According to Marx, Hugo is not wrong to blame 
Bonaparte for his mediocrity – the material conditions did not determine or necessitate his 
actions. The individual (and by extension their relations) are not deterministically necessitated by 
a particular social situation. Neither is Proudhon wrong to look at the objective and material 
conditions that made such a coup possible. In the absence of the conditions, or in different 
conditions, new or other possibilities would have arisen. Marx’s point here is that to understand 
how both these sides can be held together in dialectical tension, one must focus on the way in 
which the class struggle played out just before and during the events in question, as well as how 
that struggle at times opened onto the possibility of revolutionary action, and at times foreclosed 
its possibility. Class struggle, as a conceptual lens through which to understand historical events, 
must be capable of incorporating both of these aspects. 
 As an example of the centrality of the class struggle for Marx’s analysis, consider the 
relationship between the Legitimists and Orleanists. The Legitimists backed the House of 
Bourbon, while the Orleanists backed the house of Orleans. On the surface, it would appear that 
the differences between these two major groups of the royalist coalition (party of Order) were 
ideological; each fraction supported a different family to be the royal family of France, and so 
the tensions between them appear as independent from the material conditions or modes of 
production in French society. Marx, however, argues that in fact this division was directly tied to 
a contradiction between differing modes of production – specifically between big landed 





thus represented the political expression of hereditary ownership of land. The House of Orleans, 
on the other hand, represented large-scale industry and trade, and thus represented the political 
expression of capitalism and ‘free market’ trade.  
 These two interests, while still bourgeois interests, constituted conflicting and divided 
interests of the groups represented. “If each ide wished to effect the restoration of its own royal 
house against the other, that merely signified that each of the two great interests into which the 
bourgeoisie is split – landed property and capital – sought to restore its own supremacy and the 
subordination of the other.”41 Without understanding this divided interest of the party of Order, 
Marx argues that one misunderstands the ideological differences between them. This 
contradiction between landed property and free-market capitalism may sow division amongst the 
ranks of the bourgeoisie, however it does not stop the coalition of royalists, under the banner of 
the party of Order, from engaging in class warfare against those with opposing material interests 
(in this particular instance, what Marx calls the “so-called” social-democratic party).  
 Understanding the difference between these different kinds of tensions, is crucial to 
understanding the way in which class struggle plays out. Whether these tensions are within a 
class, or between classes, the material conditions and interests at stake are (in part) a determining 
factor of their political, social, or economic expression. However, the nature of these tensions 
also (in part) determine the way in which the representatives of these interests relate to one 
another. Ultimately, the royalist representatives of differing bourgeois interests banded together 
under the banner of the party of Order in order to further the interests of the bourgeoisie as a 
class. Further, the so-called social-democratic party, while provisionally a coalition of the 
 
41 Ibid., p. 48. 
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workers and petit bourgeoisie, fought from the weakening of the antagonism between labor and 
capital rather than doing away with it entirely. This party’s position was that the special 
conditions of its emancipation are actually the general conditions, and thus by fighting the 
tyranny of the royalists, modern society can be saved, and the class struggle avoided.42 The class 
struggle, of course, cannot be avoided in this way. As a part of the bourgeois mode of 
production, the interests of individual shopkeepers or other “self-employed” entrepreneurs do not 
always materially line up with the working class. When they do, their collective expression 
resists the established order. More frequently, however, when material interests divide the party, 
these representatives of the petit bourgeoisie capitulate to the established order, and the resulting 
coalition either disintegrates or ceases to be revolutionary.43   
 While Marx may not provide necessary and sufficient conditions for an account of the 
political agency in the 18th Brumaire, he sets out the scope and framework for thinking about 
how political agency functions within a given society. He emphasizes the relations between 
individuals, as well as the material conditions that produce, and are produced by, those relations. 
He sets up an account of consciousness that is inherently social, and dependent on the historical 
and material developments in which they arise. Applying this methodology to his contemporary 
events in France, he shows that a focus on class struggle reveals the material interests of the 
individual actors and groups in the political arena, and grounds the capacities of those 
 
42 Ibid., p. 50. 
43 We might see an apt political analogy in our contemporary historical moment, with the Republicans as the party 
of Order, and the Democrats as the so-called social-democratic party. The analogy certainly holds for the 
Democratic Party, which appears as a coalition of working class and petit bourgeois interests. The analogy with 
Republican Party, however, might be less similar, since it seemingly includes a large fraction of the working class, 
particularly the so-called ‘white working class.’ Later in the 18th Brumaire, Marx argues that Bonaparte claims to 
speak for the lumpenproletariat, which may also be an apt analogy for the populist politics of Donald Trump (Marx 
calls Bonaparte a “princely lupenproletarian” ibid., p. 85). A more nuanced comparison of the relevant similarities 
and differences between these historical moments, while interesting, falls outside the scope of the current section.  
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individuals and groups in the material conditions of their society, without determining their 
actions in advance. The capacity of the proletarian class to engage in revolutionary action, as we 
have seen, is tied to the possibility of that class to engage in revolution universally. For Marx, the 
emancipation of the working class would constitute the emancipation of human labor as such, 
and thus the emancipation of humanity in general. 
Conclusion 
 Even absent a fully developed account of agency and consciousness, the early Marx and 
Engels clearly see a relationship between the two concepts. The alienation of the worker under 
capitalism diminishes her agency – she is not able to do the things she wants. Even while the 
capacities of the individual are diminished, the capacities of the class are different. Aspects of 
consciousness or ‘spirit’ like interest or desire can be expressed on multiple registers. These 
conscious aspects are not independent, operating separately from the material conditions of 
society. Rather, they are interwoven into these conditions, such that any Marxian account of 
consciousness must itself be tied to these conditions.  
 This initial discussion of the relationship may be unsatisfying in its lack of definition. In 
the section that follows, I will should how this relationship gets taken up by two of the most 
important Marxist intellectuals and activists of the turn of the 20th century: Vladimir Lenin and 
Rosa Luxemburg. Each thinker, both theoretically and practically, picks up on this discussion of 
the relationship between agency and consciousness sketched out by Marx and Engels. Finally, in 
the third section, I will show how Lukács continues this discussion, uniting the thought of all 




Introduction to Lenin and Luxemburg 
 Both Lenin and Luxemburg are important figures in the history of Marxism – both as 
theorists, but also as revolutionaries engaged in the political struggles of their time. While both 
agreed on the major insights developed by Marx and Engels, their approaches to revolutionary 
action and the development of class consciousness differ in important ways. Following the 
insights from Marx and Engels in the section above, both thinkers employ a dialectical, historical 
materialism. Their concern with the relationship between political agency and class 
consciousness follow’s the broadly Marxist aim of proletarian revolution. Their main point of 
contention concerns the practical relationship between party leadership and the proletarian class. 
While I will return to the question of party organization in Chapter 3, this section will focus 
primarily on the differences between Lenin and Luxemburg with respect to the development of 
class consciousness, and the kind of agency involved. It is important to stage this encounter 
before engaging with Lukács’ account of class consciousness below, since he references both 
thinkers with respect to the development of his own account. 
 Lenin’s account stresses the importance of conscious intervention in the political 
situation, warning against blindly following the spontaneity of the masses in revolt. His proposal 
is the establishment and development of a vanguard of professional revolutionaries, armed with 
Marxist theory, in order to best direct political action. The first section develops this account, 
relating class consciousness to the agency of this vanguard. On his view, we must guard against 
the loss of agency to the spontaneous masses. Luxemburg’s critique of Lenin, on the other hand, 
warns against centralizing power in an elite few. She emphasizes that the capacity for 
revolutionary action arises out of political and economic struggle and separating the party 
leadership from the masses in turn cuts them off from this revolutionary potential. On her view, 
  
 32 
blindly following an elite vanguard of professional revolutionaries is at least as dangerous as 
blindly following the spontaneous masses. The second section looks at this critique, focusing the 
relevance of experience of class struggle to the development of class consciousness. On her 
view, we must guard against the loss of agency to an elite few, who might not act in the best 
interest of the proletariat, even if they are trying to. Again, while these thinkers share quite a bit, 
I emphasize their differences so as to better understand the way in which Lukács’ account of 
class consciousness brings them together.  
Lenin and the Agency of the Vanguard 
 In What is to be Done? Lenin argues that the Social Democratic party should play a 
central role in the revolutionary action in Russia. He argues that this small, but dedicated group 
of professional revolutionaries play a necessary role on the development of class consciousness, 
as well as the development of the material conditions necessary for a communist revolution. This 
small group must incorporate Marxist and Social Democratic theory into its practice, while 
always keeping the class interest of the proletariat in mind. Later, in Chapter 3, I will return to 
Lenin’s account of the vanguard party. In this section, I will rather focus on the relationship 
between agency and what he calls ‘Social-Democratic’ consciousness. While ‘trade-union’ 
consciousness – consciousness of the economic struggle only – is an important aspect, it is 
ultimately not yet political, and only in an embryonic form. Ultimately for Lenin, what is 
important is that the vanguard intervenes consciously, and with full knowledge of the situation 
understood through Social-Democratic theory.  
Lenin presents the following dilemma concerning the task set out before the vanguard of 




But the crux of the question is, how is one to understand the statement that the 
mass working-class movement will ‘determine the tasks’? It may be interpreted in 
one of two ways. Either it means bowing to the spontaneity of this movement, 
i.e., reducing the role of Social-Democracy to mere subservience to the working-
class movement as such…; or it means that the mass movement puts before us 
new theoretical, political and organizational tasks, far more complicated than 
those that might have satisfied us in the period before the rise of the mass 
movement.44  
Lenin clearly defends the second approach, arguing that the first approach lends itself to 
opportunism. While listening to the spontaneous uprising of the mass movement and being in 
correct relation to it is a necessary part of revolutionary action, merely following along (as a kind 
of rear- rather than vanguard) is at best ineffectual, and at worst takes advantage of the struggle 
for one’s own ends. It is important to note here that Lenin is not dismissing the experience of 
workers in the mass movement; rather, he is indicating that the role of the mass movement is to 
provide new tasks for revolutionary action, whether they are theoretical, political, or 
organizational. The relation, then, between mass movement and organizational leadership, must 
be complex and bidirectional. While one may be tempted to read what follows as Blanquist45 or 
as a “top-down” organizational model, it is crucial to note Lenin’s insistence on the experience 
of workers’ struggle during mass movements. Giving in to the spontaneity of the movement 
entails giving over what agency one has.  
Lenin argues that achieving societal transformation and developing the agency of the 
working-class must involve Social-Democratic Marxist theory: “Hence our task, the task of 
Social-Democracy, is to combat spontaneity, to divert the working-class movement from this 
 
44 Lenin, What is to Be Done? p. 55-56. 
45 Louis Auguste Blanqui (1805-1881) was a revolutionary socialist during the time of the Paris Commune. The 
political view often attributed to him is that a successful revolution can be carried out be a small group of highly 
dedicated and organized group of secret conspirators. An in-depth discussion of actual political views, while 
interesting, is unfortunately beyond the scope of the present work.  
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spontaneous, trade-unionist striving to come under the wing of the bourgeoisie, and to bring it 
under the wing of revolutionary Social Democracy.”46 Combating spontaneity, in this context, 
does not entail its opposition, absolution, or dismissal. Rather, it is a force, instantiated 
materially and socially, which can be used and harnessed politically. Lenin’s use of the word 
‘divert’ indicates that spontaneity is not something to be induced in the working class. Diversion 
here indicates a kind of guidance, vis., guidance toward the political forces at work defending, 
maintaining, and furthering the interests of the working-class. It is this capacity for guiding, not a 
power for domination, that Lenin argues must be developed.  
Lenin is primarily interested in the political, rather than purely economic or social, 
expression of working-class consciousness.  The consciousness of the working-class can be 
expressed in many forms, on many levels or aspects; it is often expressed in conflicting or 
contradictory ways. The task of Social-Democratic theory is to raise this consciousness among 
the working class, elevating it beyond its purely economic form. Lenin argues that the 
spontaneous element found in the riots and strikes of the mass movement involve a kind of 
consciousness in its “embryonic form.”47 These trade-unionist struggles, in their economic 
expression are “…not yet Social-Democratic struggles. They testified to the awakening 
antagonisms between workers and employers, but the workers were not, and could not be, 
conscious of the irreconcilable antagonism of their interests to the whole of the modern political 
and social system, i.e., theirs was not yet Social-Democratic consciousness.”48 Lenin is not 
 
46 Lenin, What is to Be Done? p. 49. The use of the first-person plural here is interesting, and an important signifier 
throughout Lenin’s work. ‘Us’ here almost certainly refers to a revolutionary vanguard party rather than the 
collection of proletariat workers. Making this a clear and dividing distinction, however, is unwarranted, since Lenin 
also encourages the promotion of working-class proletarians to the ranks of the revolutionary vanguard, especially 
those workers with a lot of trade-unionist experience, or experience, in the class struggle in general. 




denying the revolutionary kernel or potential of these strikes; rather, he is pointing out that those 
engaged in struggle are not yet aware of the impossibility for capitalism to resolve its internal 
and inherent contradictions, and thus are engaged in a struggle for the amelioration of their own 
circumstances, not the complete overthrow of capitalist bourgeois society. This distinction is 
important because Lenin is not denying that the workers are experiencing these antagonisms, or 
that they have no access to their own alienation. Surely, the workers have some sense of (even if 
they do not fully, or consciously understand) these antagonisms as well, or even better, than the 
theorist. Lenin’s point here is that the expression of these strikes does not yet take a fully 
political or theoretical form, and thus are missing crucial aspects of the struggle. In order for one 
to have any agency within this movement, one cannot merely bow to the spontaneous outbursts 
of the masses.  
It is in the context of this discussion concerning the relationship of class consciousness in 
its trade-unionist or embryonic form to a class consciousness in its full or Social-Democratic 
form that Lenin makes his famous claim that Social-Democratic consciousness can only be 
brought to the working class ‘from without.’49 Lenin points out that historically the theory of 
Socialism was generated not by the spontaneous movements of the working class, but by 
educated representatives of the bourgeois intellectuals in the form of Marx and Engels.50 This 
 
49 With respect to class consciousness, Lenin’s point is that political consciousness must be brought from outside the 
economic struggle narrowly defined, not from those outside of the working class itself. Cf. (Lenin, What is to be 
Done? p. 98: “Class political consciousness can be brought to the workers only from without, that is, only from 
outside of the economic struggle, from outside of the sphere of relations between workers and employers.” This is 
not a Blanquist call for the revolution to be carried out by the elites, but rather an argument against reduction of the 
political struggle to its economic dimension.  
50 The Communist Manifesto makes this point clearly. Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels, “Manifesto of the 
Communist Party” in The Marx-Engels Reader, p. 481: “Finally, in times when the class struggle nears the decisive 
hour, the process of dissolution going on within the ruling class, in fact within the whole range of society, assumes 




merely descriptive fact about the history of ideas guides Lenin’s position on the role of Social-
Democratic theory, as well as its practitioners. It is for this reason that he polemically argues that 
intellectuals are faced with the choice of either bourgeois or socialist ideology.51 In a footnote on 
the same page, Lenin clarifies that his position does not exclude the working class from the 
activity of theorizing. He does, however, contend that when workers take part, they do so not as 
workers, but as ‘social theoreticians.’ His position thus advocates for greater political education 
of the working class in socialist theory, not less. The point is to raise workers up to the level of 
theoreticians, rather than reduce theory to what intellectuals expect workers to be able to 
understand. 
Agitation, then, must not merely explain class interests to a befuddled working-class, but 
educate workers about new tools that help them to see how the alienation of their labor affects 
society, and how it manifests itself in their own lives on a personal, family, civic, religious, etc., 
level.52 It is according to the multiplicity of these levels or registers that Lenin rhetorically asks: 
“…is it not evident that we shall not be fulfilling our task of developing the political 
consciousness of the workers if we do not undertake the organization of the political exposure of 
the autocracy in all aspects?” Focusing on and exposing concrete examples, such as factory 
abuses, are necessary for the activity of agitation. Far from defending a position wherein Social-
Democratic theory is to be kept separate and independent from the mass movement of the 
working class, the relation between the two constitutes a key aspect of Lenin’s revolutionary 
 
class, the class that holds the future in its hands. Just as, therefore, at an earlier period, a section of the nobility went 
over to the bourgeoisie, so now a portion of the bourgeoisie goes over to the proletariat, in particular, a portion of 
the bourgeois ideologies, who have raised themselves to the level of comprehending theoretically the historical 
movement as a whole.” 
51 Lenin, What is to Be Done? p. 48. 
52 Ibid., p. 70-71. 
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theory. Indeed, exposure of the working class to the comprehensive political struggle is 
necessary for the raising of political consciousness, as well as their training in revolutionary 
activity.53 
  In order to do this, Lenin argues that professional revolutionaries are necessary. He states 
that “the organizations of revolutionaries must consist first, foremost and mainly of people who 
make revolutionary activity their profession.”54 These revolutionaries can be from any class in 
society, although it would stand to reason that they come primarily from the working class, 
and/or be intellectuals well versed in socialist theory and strategy. It is important to note here 
that any distinctions between the revolutionaries in terms of background or trade must be 
removed.55 There are also certain limits to its size and openness to society on a larger scale. 
These revolutionaries engage in revolutionary action professionally insofar as they make 
revolution their profession. This is to say that they might have other jobs or trades, but that their 
primary focus is revolutionary action, and that they are not inhibited by other kinds of (material) 
concerns.56 Importantly, Lenin argues that “…our task is not to champion the degrading of the 
revolutionary to the level of an amateur, but to raise the amateurs to the level of 
revolutionaries.”57 In particular this entails raising up members of the working class into these 
 
53 Ibid., p 85. 
54 Ibid., p. 138. 
55 Ibid. 
56 For example, Lenin, What is to Be done? p. 163: “A worker-agitator who is at all talented and ‘promising’ must 
not be left to work eleven hours a day in a factory. We must arrange that he be maintained by the Party, that he may 
go underground in good time, that he change the place of his activity, otherwise he will not enlarge his experience, 
he will not widen his outlook, and will not be able to hold out for at least a few years in the fight against the 
gendarmes.” 
57 Ibid., p. 156. 
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ranks. Rather than ‘talking down’ to the working class, Lenin is, “devoted principally to raising 
the workers to the level of revolutionaries.”58 
 The kind of consciousness required, according to Lenin, is not one that focuses on only 
one aspect or dimension of society, but rather a fully developed political consciousness that is 
able to address they many ways in which the working-class struggles under capitalism. For 
Lenin, Social-Democratic theory should not lag behind the working class, supporting whatever 
spontaneous outbreak happens to come along next. Rather, theory should be at the forefront, with 
a vanguard of professional revolutionaries armed with the most advanced theoretical tools 
leading the way. Only this, he argues, will provide the agency necessary for a successful 
revolution. This vanguard of professional revolutionaries “…combined voluntarily, precisely for 
the purpose of fighting the enemy.” 59 This work is not left to the spontaneous or ‘organic’ 
development of the working class. Perhaps there is a tendency of the working-class towards left-
leaning politics; this tendency, however, is not always strong enough to win the day. Historically 
at any rate, Lenin is still right insofar as spontaneous revolutionary tendencies have not yet 
succeeded in revolutionary action. This kind of agency must be developed – by and through the 
political ‘Social-Democratic’ consciousness of the working class. 
Luxemburg’s Critique of Centralization 
 In “Organizational Questions of Russian Social Democracy” Rosa Luxemburg provides a 
sustained critique of the strategy of centralization adopted by Lenin and the Bolshevik party in 
Russia.60 She warns against the tendency to centralize and consolidate power in one political 
 
58 Ibid., p. 161. 
59 Ibid., p. 10. 
60 Note that her critique is before the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. 
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party, arguing that it is in and through the mass movement of the workers that the revolutionary 
and transformative power lies. According to Luxemburg, class consciousness arises through 
working-class engagement in spontaneous economic, social, and political action, and that it is not 
necessary for it to be ‘brought from without.’ At best, this top down approach is out of touch 
with the mass of workers; at worst, it manipulates them into acting in the interest of the party 
elite and not their own class interest. Agency is indeed developed and maintained in 
revolutionary organizing; Luxemburg’s worry, however, is that this agency will direct the 
revolutionary kernel of the masses away from their own interest. Luxemburg’s worry is justified, 
even if a vanguard party of professional revolutionaries plays a crucial role in the development 
and continuation of proletarian class consciousness.  
 Luxemburg, at the beginning of her essay criticizing Lenin, warns that while parallels can 
and should be drawn between different revolutionary movements happening in different places 
and at different points in history, making these connections requires understanding the context 
and material conditions out of which they arise. Lessons can indeed be learned from studying 
these revolutionary moments as long as one attends to these differences. This attention to 
difference, she argues, is precisely what Lenin misses in his analysis of the class struggle in 
Russia. “Lenin sees the whole of the difference between Social Democracy and Blanquism in the 
organization and the class consciousness of the proletariat as opposed to the conspiracy of a 
small minority.” 61 The conditions in Russia, Luxemburg asserts, are very different from the 
conditions in France that allowed Blanqui and his small band of followers to engage in their 
revolutionary action. She continues: “He forgets that this difference implies a complete revision 
 
61 Luxembourg, “Organizational Questions of Russian Social Democracy” p. 288. 
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of the concept of organization, a whole new content for the concept of centralism, and a whole 
new conception of the reciprocal relation of the organization and the struggle.”62 Because of 
these differences, she argues, no ready-made, pre-established tactics63 can be determined in 
advance by any kind of central committee, even if such a central committee employs the most 
accurate Social-Democratic theory and propaganda. 
 The type of centralization favored by Lenin, Luxemburg argues, draws too sharp of a 
distinction between the masses and the party leadership. This hard and fast distinction relies on 
the blind obedience of the workers – a ‘skill’ learned from and perfected by employment within a 
capitalist economy. Obedience, Luxemburg argues, is precisely the opposite character trait 
needed by the masses engaging in revolutionary action. Rather, it is in and through struggle that 
the working class arrives at an awareness of the economic structure of capitalism, as well as their 
class position in it. Thus, the proletariat, insofar as they are already engaged in the class struggle, 
maintain, continue, and develop the “class-conscious kernel”64 of the movement. Instituting a 
division between this kernel and the party leaders thus not only puts those leaders out of touch, 
but also separates them from precisely the conditions that make revolutionary or transformative 
action possible. It follows that a ‘vanguard’ party out of touch with this kernel could be a 
‘vanguard’ in name only, since it would be disconnected from the very possibility it is 
supposedly attempting to actualize.  
 
62 Ibid., p. 288. 
63 Ibid., p. 289. 
64 Ibid., p. 289-290: “It follows that the Social Democratic centralization cannot be based on blind obedience, nor on 
the mechanical subordination of the party militants to a central power. On the other hand, it follows that an absolute 
dividing wall cannot be erected between the class-conscious kernel of the proletariat already organized as party 
cadre, and the immediate popular environment which is gripped by the class struggle and finds itself in the process 
of class enlightenment.” 
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 Luxemburg argues that in order for Social Democratic centralism to be effective in 
Russia, the following conditions must be met. First, there must a “noteworthy stratum of 
proletarians already schooled in the political struggle,” and second there must be the possibility 
for these workers to “express their influence” in multiple arenas.65 These conditions, particularly 
the second, decidedly did not hold in Russia during this historical moment (Luxemburg publishes 
this essay in 1904, importantly before the failed uprising of 1905). She admits that the first 
condition was being developed, calling it “the building of a class-conscious vanguard of the 
proletariat capable of self-direction.”66 The principle goal of organizational or agitational work, 
she continues, should be the nurturing of the development of this vanguard.  
 Luxemburg’s critique of Lenin is not that he posits the necessity of a vanguard of 
professional revolutionaries, but rather that centralization, at this historical moment, does more 
harm to the working-class movement (as well as the development of their class consciousness) 
than good. With respect to the necessity of a vanguard party – a group of dedicated 
revolutionaries whose explicit aim is the development of class consciousness and the collective 
engagement in revolutionary action – Luxemburg is in fact in agreement with Lenin’s view. The 
only caveat she might add is that at least some of these professional revolutionaries must 
themselves come from the working class, and more importantly that no sharp distinction should 
be drawn between them and the working-class masses.  
 Further, it appears that on the question of class consciousness, Luxemburg is very much 
in agreement with Lenin, stating: “The great socialist significance of the trade-union and 
parliamentary struggles is that through them the awareness, the consciousness, of the proletariat 
 
65 Ibid., p. 290. 
66 Ibid., p. 290-291. 
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becomes socialist, and it is organized as a class.”67 Just as Lenin argues that the class struggle 
needs to be expanded beyond the narrow focus of the economic realm, Luxemburg’s position 
here68 is that trade-union and parliamentary struggles in themselves are not revolutionary, but are 
important steps to the realization that only through revolution can the problems of capitalism be 
resolved. The movement from proletariat to socialist mirrors Lenin’s conception of the 
development from embryonic trade-unionist consciousness to a fully-fledged Social-Democratic 
consciousness. Whereas the proletarian or trade-unionist consciousness is involved only in the 
economic struggle, the socialist consciousness is involved in the class struggle in all of its forms, 
in all69 of the realms of society, including the economic, the political, and the cultural.  
 Luxemburg’s ultimate point is that while theory might be brought to the working class 
from without, political agency cannot, or at least not in its entirety. The class-conscious kernel of 
the working class needs to be nurtured. It is not enough for a small, elite group of revolutionaries 
to engage in revolutionary action. The proletarian class must also engage in this struggle. “The 
mass of the proletariat must do more than stake out clearly the aims and direction of the 
revolution. It must also personally, by its own activity, bring socialism step by step into life.”70 
Thus the party certainly has a role to play in the formation of class consciousness in particular, 
and the engagement in revolutionary action in general; however, Luxemburg concludes that the 
masses should not unthinkingly follow the party leadership in blind obedience. Development 
 
67 Luxemburg, “Social Reform or Revolution” p. 86. 
68 She also develops this argument at greater length in “Reform or Revolution” arguing convincingly against 
Bernstein’s incrementalism. 
69 For Luxemburg, the Social Democratic Party is the lightning rod for the discontents of all classes of society. For 
example, see Luxemburg, “Organizational Questions of Russian Social Democracy” p. 303: “The proposition that 
Social Democracy…becomes true through the process of historical development by means of which Social 
Democracy, as a political party, gradually becomes the haven of the different dissatisfied elements of society, 
becoming a party of the people opposed to a tiny minority of capitalist rulers.” 
70 Luxemburg, “What does the Spartacus league want?” p. 368. 
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also occurs within the political activity and class struggle of the proletariat, and these insights 
should not be dismissed by party leadership, or any group of vanguard revolutionaries. 
Ultimately, it is the relation between these different elements – between mass and leaders, 
between economic, political, social, etc., aspects of the class struggle, between Social-
Democratic theory and agitational practice, between the embryonic consciousness of the trade-
unionists and the fully class consciousness of the professional vanguard – that must be 
emphasized overall.  
 In Lenin’s defense, he was aware that revolution itself cannot be brought from without. 
He recognizes the need for a “revolutionary situation” that no vanguard party, no matter how 
powerful or influential, could implement on its own. Consider the following passage from Lenin: 
To the Marxist it is indisputable that a revolution is impossible without a 
revolutionary situation; furthermore, it is not every revolutionary situation that 
leads to revolution. What, generally speaking, are the symptoms of a 
revolutionary situation? We shall certainly not be mistaken if we indicate the 
following three major symptoms: (1) when it is impossible for the ruling classes 
to maintain their rule without any change; when there is a crisis, in one form or 
another, among the “upper classes,” a crisis in the policy of the ruling class, 
leading to a fissure through which the discontent and indignation of the oppressed 
classes burst forth. For a revolution to take place, it is usually insufficient for “the 
lower classes not to want” to live in the old way; it is also necessary that “the 
upper classes should be unable” to live in the old way; (2) when the suffering and 
want of the oppressed classes have grown more acute than usual; (3) when, as a 
consequence of the above causes, there is a considerable increase in the activity of 
the masses, who uncomplainingly allow themselves to be robbed in “peace time,” 
but, in turbulent times, are drawn both by all the circumstances of the crisis and 
by the “upper classes” themselves into independent historical action.71  
A vanguard party might be better or worse at identifying where and when these conditions hold, 
but it is not the responsibility of that party to create them. Despite his appeal to centralization, 
 
71 Lenin, “The Collapse of the Second International” 
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Lenin does not dismiss the necessity of these revolutionary conditions out of which the 
possibility of transformative action arises. This means that when considering the capacity for 
revolutionary activity, these material conditions are indispensable to the analysis. No level of 
class consciousness among the vanguard or organizational prowess of the party can replace the 
necessity of these conditions.  
 Luxemburg’s warning against centralization of power and the division between party 
leadership and the working-class masses is poignant, especially considering that she made it over 
a decade before the successful Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. While she may agree with Lenin 
on the importance of developing class consciousness among the proletarian workers, Luxemburg 
emphasizes the need for close attention to the material conditions of society. Certainly Social-
Democratic theory can help determine tactics and strategy, but nothing can replace the education 
of actually engaging in class struggle.  
Conclusion 
Thinking about the relationship between class consciousness and political agency today 
requires that we first look at the historical moment in which we find ourselves. Does it meet any 
of the three requirements that Lenin sets out? If not, then the time is not ripe for revolution. This 
does not mean, however, that the revolutionary vanguard has no further responsibilities and must 
sit and wait patiently for the right time to strike. On the contrary, it is precisely in this time of 
relative calm that the professional revolutionary must engage in agitation, raising class 
consciousness and building as much power as possible so that when the next crisis occurs (and it 
will always occur according to a Marxist critique of capitalist economy, sooner or later) they will 
be ready. In order to understand the political agency at stake, and for class consciousness to be a 
useful concept in the 21st century, we must first understand both our contemporary historical 
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moment, (i.e., the particular groups that have already formed or could form in order to carry out 
revolutionary action) as well as the relationship between both these elements. As we will see 
below, Lukács’ own attempt to develop a concept of class consciousness draws explicitly on 
both Lenin and Luxemburg’s arguments.    
 
Introduction to Lukács  
In this section, I will argue that Georg Lukács defends a concept of class consciousness 
that includes not only an epistemic aspect, but also an agential one. He does this in part by 
incorporating both Lenin and Luxemburg’s account (as well as that of Marx and Engels) by 
showing that class consciousness signifies an ‘imputed’ position that is determined by the class 
struggle. Lukács develops this position as the standpoint of the proletariat, an epistemic position 
whereby society can be understood as a concrete totality. According to Lukács, the bourgeoisie 
can also be class conscious; however, this consciousness understands the laws of economy as 
natural or naturalized laws, and thus cannot understand the fundamental (dialectical) principles 
by which society operates. This bourgeois consciousness can only rise to a level that advocates 
reform of the system, but not a complete transformation of it. The proletarian class consciousness 
on the other hand understands that reform to the system does not resolve the fundamental 
contradictions inherent to capitalism, and thus is capable of thinking through or beyond them.  
 For Lukács, moving beyond capitalism in theory is tied to moving beyond it in practice. 
This entails that there is a crucial connection between the epistemic aspect of class consciousness 
that recognizes both the possibility and desirability of fundamentally restructuring society, and 
the agential aspect that entails actually being able to change it. Simply put, the ‘ought’ that is 
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entailed by the class-conscious standpoint of the proletariat implies a ‘can’ that is attached to the 
capacity for transformative action. Thus, a thin concept of class consciousness – a concept that 
includes only the epistemic aspect – misses this capacity, and results in a deficient model of class 
consciousness that risks fatalism or determinism. A thick concept of class consciousness – a 
concept that includes both the epistemic and agential aspects – avoids this fatalism.  
 This section focuses on Lukács’ early work, concentrating primarily on History and 
Class Consciousness. Lukács’ own relationship to this text changes considerably over his 
lifetime, as he discusses in the 1967 preface. Despite this distance, I follow Frederic Jameson in 
understanding History and Class Consciousness as a jumping off point, rather than a self-
contained position. The first part presents his account of class consciousness, showing how and 
where he draws on both Lenin and Luxemburg for insight. The second part explores the concept 
of class consciousness in more detail through a comparison between bourgeois and proletarian 
class consciousness. I show that proletarian class consciousness is superior epistemologically, 
since it opens onto the possibility of going beyond its own immediacy. The third part draws a 
distinction between a thick and thin notion of class consciousness. A thin notion of class 
consciousness would include merely the epistemological dimension – a thick notion would also 
include the agency to change society. I argue that Lukács’ account is already a thick notion, and 
that to best think through the relationship between consciousness and agency, we must further 
develop this thick notion of class consciousness. 
Lukács’ Dialectical Account of Class Consciousness 
In the essay entitled “Class Consciousness” Lukács lays out a programmatic 
understanding of the concept of class consciousness. On his view, class consciousness is not the 
empirical consciousness of actually existing members of a class, or even their mass 
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psychological consciousness. Rather, it is a consciousness that can be ‘imputed’72 from their 
class situation or position. Lukács arrives at this position through a dialectical unification of both 
Lenin and Luxemburg’s account of party organization. From Lenin, he takes the emphasis on 
conscious activity, especially in the form of a vanguard professional revolutionaries that reaches 
its highest expression in the Communist Party. From Luxemburg, he takes the emphasis on the 
development of the proletariat as a class arising from its concrete class struggles (in either 
parliamentarian or trade-unionist forms). In this unification, Lukács constructs an account of 
class consciousness that emphasizes the mediation of becoming conscious of a class. Ultimately 
for Lukács, the Party is the highest concrete expression of class consciousness. While he is 
optimistic73 concerning the revolutionary potential of the actually existing Communist Party of 
his day, it is important to note that his account of class consciousness does not guarantee 
successful revolutionary action.  
 In the essay “The Marxism of Rosa Luxemburg” Lukács argues that the thought of 
Luxemburg and Lenin should be seen as “the theoretical rebirth of Marxism.”74 Luxemburg’s 
theoretical project, Lukács argues, should be understood as picking up where Marx’s Capital left 
off. As Lukács notes (and as noted above), Luxemburg rightly observes that organization is 
seldom the cause of revolutionary action, but rather usually its effect. The (spontaneous) 
revolutionary ‘action’ of the masses reveals the necessity of some organizing body so that this 
action does not dissipate during times of relative calm. On this view, the party is the bearer of the 
class consciousness of the proletariat. The limits of her position, Lukács argues, is that “it 
 
72 Lukács provides an extended account of his use of the term imputed in an unpublished defense of History and 
Class Consciousness. See the section entitled ‘imputation’ in Lukács, A Defense of History and Class 
Consciousness: Tailism and the Dialectic, p. 63-86. 
73 A critique of this optimistic outlook with respect to the Communist Party is taken up in Chapter 2. 
74 Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, p. 35. 
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consists in the overestimation of its [the proletarian Revolution] purely proletarian character, and 
therefore the overestimation both of the external power and of the inner clarity and maturity that 
the proletarian class can possess” in the first stages of revolutionary struggle.75 Conversely, this 
position also entailed an underestimation of the importance of non-proletarian elements. Thus, 
more generally, she overestimates the organic and spontaneous elements of revolutionary action. 
This overestimation, Lukács continues, is an uncharacteristically undialectical position for 
Luxemburg to take. He grants that the kernel of revolutionary action does arise from the 
spontaneous action of the proletariat; however, Lukács argues that an overestimation of this 
spontaneity denies the conscious aspects of revolutionary action, and thus leads to less effective 
political strategy.  
 To theorize this conscious aspect of organization, Lukács turns to Lenin, arguing that his 
arguments in defense of the Social-Democratic consciousness supplement Luxemburg’s position, 
leading to a better account of class consciousness. This conscious action is crucial to 
revolutionary action because, contra Luxemburg, the proletariat as a class (as well as proletarian 
class consciousness) does not develop evenly, uniformly, or even continually over time. Lukács 
cites Lenin as saying that in capitalist democracy “developments do not always lead smoothly 
and directly to further democratization.”76 In other words, consciously directed action is 
necessary for any revolution because spontaneous action alone is rarely sufficient to make it 
successful. As the history of the twentieth century has shown, even in those situations where 
spontaneous and conscious action were married together, success is not guaranteed. Relying too 
 




heavily on the spontaneous, organic development of the proletarian class ultimately devolves 
into a kind of fatalism.  
 Lukács emphasizes the conscious aspects of revolutionary action precisely so that he does 
not fall into this fatalism. Class consciousness must be more than merely the consciousness of, or 
produced by, a class engaged in class struggle. It must entail the dialectical relation between the 
spontaneous and conscious elements;77 or more broadly speaking, a dialectical relation between 
theory and practice. Lastly, Lukács points out that the antithesis between Luxemburg and Lenin, 
while deeply rooted in the history of Marxism, is a disagreement about organizational 
considerations rather than tactics. They were “politically and theoretically”78 in agreement on 
most issues, particularly with respect to the need to combat opportunism. I will pick up this 
discussion about Party organization and its relation to group agency in Chapter 3; however, it is 
important to keep in mind that despite their polemics against one another, their positions are 
quite close together, as Lukács shows. 
 In uniting the positions of Luxemburg and Lenin, Lukács defends the view that the 
concept of class consciousness must take a central position in both the theory and practice of 
revolutionary action. He gives the following definition of class consciousness: “Now class 
consciousness consists in fact of the appropriate and rational reactions ‘imputed’ [zugerechnet] 
to a particular typical position in the process of production.” 79 Two aspects of class 
consciousness according to Lukács immediately stand out. First, class consciousness is rooted in 
the ‘typical position’ of a class within a particular mode of production. Clearly this is in line with 
 
77 Feenberg refers to this as the dilemma between structure and agency in The Philosophy of Praxis: Marx, Lukács, 
and the Frankfurt School.  
78 Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, p. 284. 
79 Ibid., p. 51. 
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a thoroughly material and historical approach of Marx (as well as Lenin and Luxemburg). Class 
consciousness is not something independent from the material conditions of society, floating in 
‘spirit’ in an ideal form. It is generated by and through class struggle. Second, it is ‘appropriate’ 
and ‘rational’ and thus is not tied to the actually existing consciousness of anyone or group 
within society. He goes on to clarify this position: “This consciousness is, therefore, neither the 
sum nor the average of what is thought or felt by the single individuals who make up the class.”80 
While determining the actually existing consciousness of members or groups in society may be 
an important political or tactical step in order to engage in revolutionary action, it does not 
determine the content of the concept of class consciousness. Rather, the content is ‘imputed’ via 
a class analysis, i.e., an analysis of society from the standpoint of a particular class.  
 Lukács concludes this definition by emphasizing the role of class consciousness on the 
movement of a society in history: “And yet the historically significant actions of the class as a 
whole are determined in the last resort by this consciousness and not by the thought of the 
individual – and these actions can be understood only by reference to this consciousness.”81 
Understanding the consciousness of individual members or groups in society is undertaken by 
reference to this concept of class consciousness, not the other way around. Indeed, Lukács goes 
on to highlight the practical significance of the differences between this imputed consciousness 
and the actually existing empirical consciousness of individuals or groups in society. However, 
in order to understand society, one must take up this standpoint of the class (in particular, the 
standpoint of the proletariat) rather than the standpoint of the individual. 
 




 The concept of class consciousness is thus a lens or perspective through which to look at 
society. As a lens or perspective, Lukács emphasizes the relationality within the concept of class 
consciousness, arguing that it plays the role of a mediating force.82 Unlike in previous 
revolutions, where the class interests of the revolutionary class could be understood in their 
immediacy, the class consciousness of the proletariat must be different, since “its class 
consciousness must develop a dialectical contradiction between its immediate interests and its 
long-term objectives, and between the discrete factors and the whole.”83 Whether implicit (as in 
previous revolutions) or explicit (as with the proletariat revolution), the concept of class 
consciousness is not immediately given, but rather acts as a force of mediation – for example as a 
crystallization of the class struggle in practice, or as expressed in and by the Party in theory. 
Setting aside for the moment Lukács’ optimism in the role of the party, it is important to note 
that he cautions that even with this proper account of class consciousness, the revolution is not 





82 Cf. Ibid., p. 163. 
83 Ibid., p. 71. 
84 Ibid., p. 43. Of Luxemburg’s ‘certainty’ of revolutionary action, Lukács says: “What they call faith and seek to 
deprecate by adding the epithet ‘religious’ is nothing more nor less than the certainty that capitalism is doomed and 
that – ultimately the proletariat will be victorious. There can be no ‘material’ guarantee of this certitude. It can be 
guaranteed methodologically – by the dialectical method. And even this must be tested and proved by action, by the 
revolution itself, by living and dying for the revolution. A Marxist who cultivates the objectivity of the academic 
study is just as reprehensible as the man who believes that the victory of the world revolution can be guaranteed by 
the ‘laws of nature’.” 
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Epistemic Difference between Bourgeois and Proletarian Class Consciousness  
 While each class in society can be class conscious, Lukács focuses primarily on 
bourgeois and proletarian consciousness. While both are dialectical (unlike other classes),85 the 
proletarian class consciousness goes beyond that of the bourgeoisie because it is able to 
understand society as a concrete totality. Bourgeois consciousness is not able to resolve its own 
contradictions, and thus relies on the illusion of atomization and the insistence on the eternality 
of its own economic laws, describing them as ‘laws of nature.’ The class consciousness of the 
proletariat, as understood as taking up the standpoint of the proletariat, indicates this epistemic 
dimension of the role of class consciousness. The main difference, then, between the class 
consciousness of different classes is this ability to understand the whole.86 
 While for Lukács both bourgeois and proletarian class consciousness are dialectical, the 
standpoint of the bourgeoisie is unable to transcend its own immediacy, and thus restricts its 
standpoint to that of the individual. For example, “Bourgeois thought observes economic life 
consistently and necessarily from the standpoint of the individual capitalist and this naturally 
produces a sharp confrontation between the individual and the overpowering supra-personal ‘law 
of nature’ which propels all social phenomena.”87 From the standpoint of the bourgeoisie, there 
 
85 Marx and Engels are also aware that actually existing capitalist society is not simply split between bourgeoisie 
and proletariat. This class struggle, however, is the primary class antagonism within a system of capitalism, and thus 
are the ones a Marxist analysis often focus on. Even by Lukács’ time a middle class had begun to grow, which 
complicates the class situation considerably. For an analysis of this, with an interesting example of ‘contradictory 
class locations,’ see Wright, Classes. 
86 Martin Jay, in Marxism and Totality: The Adventures of a Concept from Lukacs to Habermas, provides a history 
of the concept of totality as it appears in Marxist thought in the 20th century. While there is not space here to address 
all of his concerns about the concept, especially as Lukács deploys it, I do return briefly at the end of this section, as 
well as below in Chapter 2.   
87 Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, p. 63. 
  
 53 
is a dialectical relation between the ‘free’ individual and the determinate economic structure. 
Thus, bourgeois class consciousness is unable to overcome this contradiction.  
 This entails that there is a necessary88 illusion of the atomization of the individual 
wherein “this isolation and fragmentation is only apparent.”89 In fact, the commodity form 
informs all relations under capitalism such that the inherently social aspect of the relation is 
covered over. The commodity becomes the universal category of society as a whole.  
Only then does the commodity become crucial for the subjugation of men’s 
consciousness to the forms in which this reification finds expression and for their 
attempts to comprehend the process or to rebel against its disastrous effects and 
liberate themselves from servitude to the ‘second nature’ so created.90   
Under ‘normal’ capitalist conditions, the worker’s consciousness is reified because they cannot 
see beyond their immediate situation. In overcoming this reification,91 proletarian class 
consciousness is able to understand the inherently social aspect of the commodity and see society 
as a whole. Bourgeois class consciousness cannot understand this inherent sociality because it 
goes against its own immediate class interests. As a class, the bourgeoisie persists through the 
accumulation of surplus value, thus through the exploitation of the worker. If the worker is 
exploited, however, she cannot be ‘free’ or atomized in the way that classical economics 
assumes. Thus, the full realization of bourgeois class consciousness leads away from the 
standpoint of the capitalist, and towards the standpoint of the proletariat. The bourgeois 
 
88 Ibid., p. 92. 
89 Ibid., p. 91. 
90 Ibid., p. 86. 
91 I return to the concept of reification below in Chapter 2 
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intellectual, according to Lukács, must either abandon his class position, or resort to a kind of 
false consciousness in order to continue defending his class interest.92  
 The standpoint of the proletariat, on the other hand, does not run into the same problem. 
While in its immediacy it is the same for both proletariat and bourgeoisie, the means by which it 
is mediated through its class consciousness is very different.93 Consider the following: 
For the proletariat to become aware of the dialectical nature of its existence is a 
matter of life and death, whereas the bourgeoisie uses the abstract categories of 
reflection, such as quantity and infinite progression, to conceal the dialectical 
structure of the historical process in daily life only to be confronted by 
unmediated catastrophes when the pattern in reversed.94  
The main limitation of the standpoint of the bourgeoisie is that it takes the mediated relations in 
society as immediate facts. This leads to two problems. First, it takes the inherently contingent 
laws of society as universal and eternal, akin to the laws of nature; and second, it cannot explain 
the periodic crises that are generated by the system itself, and so can only posit them as 
catastrophic, accidental events. The standpoint of the proletariat, on the other hand, does not face 
these limitations. It understands the laws of society as mediated social relations, and thus 
understands the laws of society as fundamentally changeable and mutable. Further, it sees that 
capital itself generates its own crises, and thus sees them as opportunities to further the interests 
of the proletariat rather than an abnormality or something that could be avoided. Ultimately, 
Lukács argues, the superiority of the proletariat as a class is not because it is better organized or 
 
92 Cf. Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, p. 164: “…this same reality employs the motor of class interests to 
keep the bourgeoisie imprisoned within this immediacy while forcing the proletariat to go beyond it.” 
93 Ibid., p. 150: “To put it more concretely: the objective reality of social existence is in its immediacy ‘the same’ for 
both proletariat and bourgeoisie. But this does not prevent the specific categories of mediation by means of which 
both classes raise this immediacy to the level of consciousness…from being fundamentally different, thanks to the 
different position occupied by the two classes within the ‘same’ economic process.” 
94 Ibid., p. 164-165. 
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has more power in society, but because it is able to understand society as a whole. This 
understanding of the whole of society, paired with active, conscious intervention, is what 
constitutes the capacity of the proletariat to engage in political action that can change society.  
 The epistemic advantage or the standpoint of the proletariat is that it can think society as 
a concrete totality. In order to understand society as a whole, Lukács argues that we must use the 
category of totality. “The category of totality, the all-pervasive supremacy of the whole over the 
parts is the essence of the method which Marx took over from Hegel…”95 A method that 
prioritizes the part over the whole, while perhaps partially successful in localized areas, cannot 
get at the underlying movement of society. 96 Bourgeois historians, for example, think that they 
arrive at such analysis by locating the concrete in either the empirical individual or an 
empirically given consciousness.97 Understanding this concrete totality is actually something else 
entirely. “Concrete analysis means then: the relation to society as a whole. For only when this 
relation is established does the consciousness of their existence that men have at any given time 
emerge in all its essential characteristics.”98 Concrete analysis does not and cannot understand 
individuals or even groups of individuals in their abstract relation to one another devoid of any 
 
95 Ibid., p. 27. 
96 Ibid., p. 28: “The category of totality, however, determines not only the object of knowledge but also the subject. 
Bourgeois thought judges social phenomena consciously or unconsciously, naively or subtly, consistently from the 
standpoint of the individual. No path leads from the individual to the totality; there is at best a road leading to 
aspects of particular areas, mere fragments for the most part, ‘facts’ bare of any context, or to abstract, special laws. 
The totality of an object can only be posited if the positing subject is itself a totality; and if the subject wishes to 
understand itself, it must conceive of the object as a totality. In modern society only the classes can represent this 
total point of view.” 




other characteristics. Individuals in society are not abstractions – when we relate to each other, it 
is not qua atomized individual, but as a worker, as a capitalist, etc.99  
 Lukács emphasized the dialectical nature of this relation. There are both subjective and 
objective aspects of this consciousness, and thus neglecting one of these sides of the relation 
cannot lead to an understanding of the whole. This is the process by which Lukács comes to 
understand the role of (proletarian) class consciousness in the analysis of society. “The relation 
with concrete totality and the dialectical determinants arising from it transcend pure description 
and yield the category of objective possibility.” 100 Objective possibility is not mere logical 
possibility, but rather describes what is possible given certain objective conditions.101 As we saw 
above, this focus on the particular, material conditions of society runs throughout the Marxist 
analysis. Lukács continues: “By relating consciousness to the whole of society it becomes 
possible to infer the thoughts and feelings which men would have in a particular situation if they 
were able to assess both it and the interests arising from it in their impact on immediate action 
and on the whole structure of society.”102 The relationship of consciousness with society as a 
concrete totality understood via dialectical method (i.e., historical materialism) is 
epistemologically superior to other methods of understanding society, since it does not take its 
own mediated relations as themselves immediate. Failing to see this relation (or covering it 
 
99 I would add here that not only as economic designations, but also as a woman or man, as homosexual or as 
heterosexual, as trans or cis, etc. While Lukács focuses primarily on the economic categories, on his own account, 
we must also look at these other social categories if we are to understand society as a whole. As DuBois argues, for 
example, the relation of the white proletarian to capital is not identical to that of the black proletarian, so in order to 
understand the totality at any given time, we must also attend to these social differences.   
100 Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, p. 51. 
101 For a longer discussion of objective possibility, see Chapter 1 of Macdonald, What Would Be Different: Figures 
of Possibility in Adorno. I pick up on the category of possibility in Chapter 2 below, particularly with respect to 
Adorno’s critique of Lukács.  
102 Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, p. 51.  
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over), we can only arrive at some type of false consciousness. That the standpoint of the 
proletariat entails a correct dialectical view of society as a whole is a benefit that on Lukács’ 
view, no other class has access to. 
 While this understanding of society as a concrete totality involves understanding history 
as a unified process, it does not entail a totalizing epistemic position. For Lukacs, the process of 
history unfolds dialectically such that any analysis of this or that aspect in isolation will miss its 
relation to the whole. Such an analysis might accurately describe the essential elements of a 
particular historical event, yet it misses the underlying relations, and thus its “function in the 
historical totality.”103 The function of this historical totality, or an understanding of society as a 
concrete totality does not require the flattening out of differences within the whole. On the 
contrary, “the category of totality does not reduce its various elements to an undifferentiated 
uniformity, to identity.”104 For Lukács, the category of totality enables us to understand the 
multitude of social relations in their complexity without recourse to abstraction.  
 While this use of the category of totality is perhaps not without its own problems,105 it 
reveals the dialectical relation Lukács sees between the class position of the proletariat, and its 
epistemic standpoint. Both objectively and subjectively, the proletariat as a class occupies a 
position within society that can understand society as a concrete totality without abandoning its 
own class position. The standpoint of the bourgeoisie might get close, but cannot arrive at this 
position without abandoning either their class interest or epistemic position. 106 The standpoint of 
 
103 Ibid., p. 12. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Cf. Jay, Marxism and Totality. 
106 Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, p. 181: “This can be seen only from the standpoint of the proletariat 
because the meaning of these tendencies is the abolition [aufheben] of capitalism and so for the bourgeoisie to 
become conscious of them would be tantamount to suicide.” 
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the proletariat incorporates both the epistemic position and its class interest because through an 
understanding of society as a whole, its class interest belongs to the overcoming of the system of 
capitalism rather than its continuation. It is for this reason that a concept of political agency is a 
crucial element of the proletarian class consciousness.  
In Defense of the Agential Component of Class Consciousness  
 It is hopefully clear from the preceding section that the concept of class consciousness 
Lukács develops includes an epistemic component. It is important, however, to distinguish 
between two different notions of class consciousness – a thick and thin notion. A thin notion of 
class consciousness entails only an epistemic dimension, whereas a thick notion of class 
consciousness also includes an agential dimension. In this section, I argue that Lukács defends 
the later, implying that the proletariat as a class has a certain kind of agency – the agency to 
overthrow capitalism – even if this agency is latent, and requires the organization of a party in 
order to manifest it fully. 
 In order to understand Lukács’ position with respect to proletarian class consciousness, it 
is important to understand his rejection of the dilemma between fatalism and voluntarism. 
Fatalism is the position that the revolution will either happen or it will not, so any active, 
conscious intervention in political events ultimately cannot affect their outcome. Voluntarism, on 
the other hand, is the position that active, conscious intervention is able to make or create a 
revolutionary situation or outcome. Lukács rejects both these positions, arguing that:  
Fatalism and voluntarism are only mutually contradictory to an undialectical and 
unhistorical mind. In the dialectical view of history, they prove to be necessarily 
complementary opposites, intellectual reflexes clearly expressing the antagonisms 
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of capitalist society and the intractability of its problems when conceived in its 
own terms.107  
The standpoint of the proletariat, insofar as it entails a dialectical understanding of society as a 
whole, incorporates a way of understanding the relationship between these two seemingly 
contradictory positions. Taking either the fatalist or voluntarist position entails a one-sided 
understanding of the relationship of the proletarian class to the whole of society. Understood 
dialectically, these two opposing positions reveal the antagonisms of capitalist society, as well as 
the impossibility of that society to resolve these antagonisms inherent to its structure without 
restructuring society completely. “Thus, dialectical materialism is seen to offer the only approach 
to reality which can give action a direction.”108 Neither fatalism nor voluntarism can achieve this, 
since neither position admits that conscious, active intervention, while not a sufficient cause for 
revolution, constitutes a necessary condition of revolutionary activity. 
 In order to understand the dialectical nature of the class consciousness and standpoint of 
the proletariat, one must reject a mechanistic understanding of Marxism, particularly in the form 
presented at the Second International. A mechanistic understanding of society lends itself to the 
fatalist position, arguing that economic laws determine how and when revolutionary situations 
arise, and determines (at least in the last instance) the success or failure of revolutionary action. 
This includes positions that are optimistic about the possibility of revolutions (the spontaneity of 
Luxemburg, the structuralism of Althusser, etc.), or pessimistic (such as the vulgar Marxist 
position, or the positions of opportunists like Eduard Bernstein). Either way, Lukács argues, a 
mechanistic theory of society never arrives at an understanding of society as a whole.  
 
107 Ibid., p. 4. 
108 Ibid., p. 23. 
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 It is precisely this epistemic insight into the dynamic, dialectical relations that is coupled 
with the possibility of political action. “But the class consciousness of the proletariat, the truth of 
the process ‘as subject’ is itself far from stable and constant; it does not advance according to 
mechanical ‘laws.’ It is the consciousness of the dialectical process itself: it is likewise a 
dialectical concept.”109 In rejecting mechanistic analysis in favor of a dialectical one, Lukács 
emphasizes the dynamic and often volatile process by which the proletariat comes to understand 
and realize its place in society, as well as its relation to society as a whole.  
 This process of the proletariat itself becoming subject is not a straight line from 
unconsciousness to full consciousness. In this indeterminacy, both the epistemic and agential 
dimensions of the proletariat come into relief:  
For the active and practical side of class consciousness, its true essence, can only 
become visible in its authentic form when the historical process imperiously 
requires it to come into force, i.e., when an acute crisis in the economy drives it to 
action. At other times it remains theoretical and latent, corresponding to the latent 
and permanent crisis of capitalism: it confronts the individual questions and 
conflicts of the day with its demands, but as ‘mere’ consciousness, as an ‘ideal 
sum,’ in Rosa Luxemburg’s phrase.110  
The agential capacities of the proletarian class only reveal themselves in moments of (economic, 
political) crisis. No revolutionary vanguard, no matter how well organized or devoted to the 
cause can ‘make’ or ‘create’ revolution ex nihilo. Rather, the agential capacities of the class are 
revealed through the vanguard as the highest expression of proletarian class consciousness. As 
for periods of relative calm, the ‘latent’ periods between crises, the vanguard does not merely 
 
109 Ibid., p 40-41. 
110 Ibid., p. 40-41. 
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wait, but prepares and organizes so that it will be ready for the next opportunity for revolutionary 
action.  
 The (epistemological) standpoint of the proletariat, as we saw above, is superior to that of 
the bourgeoisie because it can incorporate the unity of theory and practice. This unity facilitates 
the possibility of action. Importantly, however, this unity should be best understood at the level 
of the class rather than the individual. “The scientific superiority of the standpoint of class (as 
against that of the individual) has become clear from the foregoing. Now we see the reason for 
this superiority: only the class can actively penetrate the reality of society and transform it in its 
entirety.” 111 The transformational agency of the proletariat is thus a class characteristic, and not 
necessarily an agency of the individual, or even a revolutionary party or vanguard. Only the class 
is capable of transforming society, and only if it understands its relation to society as a whole. 
Lukács continues: “In dialectical unity it is at once cause and effect, mirror and motor of the 
historical and dialectical process. The proletariat as the subject of thought in society destroys at 
one blow the dilemma of impotence: the dilemma created by the pure laws with their fatalism 
and by the ethics of pure intentions.”112 The dialectical view of the relation between the 
proletariat as a class and society as a whole allows Lukács to overcome the duality of the 
dilemma between fatalism and voluntarism. 
 The Party, then, is not the instigator of revolution, nor does it have, by itself, this 
transformational agency. Rather, it is the highest expression of this (latent) capacity of the 
proletariat. “In this process which it can neither provoke nor escape, the Party is assigned the 
sublime role of bearer of the class consciousness of the proletariat and the conscience of its 
 




historical vocation.”113 As the bearer of this class consciousness, the party actively mediates 
between the actions of individuals or groups and the revolutionary situation in which they find 
themselves. It coordinates, develops, and maintains revolutionary energy, directing rather than 
generating it. Thus, the agential dimension of class consciousness is expressed through the party, 
however, the capacity of the party to engage in political action does not exhaust the potential of 
the class as a whole to act.  
 The standpoint of the proletariat as the epistemic position of the class as a whole is 
directly connected to the capacity of the class to act. The class consciousness of the bourgeoisie, 
while retaining a similar dialectical structure, cannot arrive at a position that motivates 
transformative action. At best, it motivates conservative action that supports the status quo, but 
can only understand society in its immediacy.  
For the proletariat, however, this ability to go beyond the immediate in search of 
the ‘remoter’ factors means the transformation of the objective nature of the 
objects of action…For the change lies on the one hand in the practical interaction 
of the awakening consciousness and the objects from which it is born and of 
which it is the consciousness. And on the other hand, the change means that the 
objects that are viewed here as aspects of the development of society, i.e., of the 
dialectical totality, become fluid: they become parts of a process.114  
This ability to see the whole of society means that the standpoint of the proletariat entails seeing 
society as a process. Further, as the proletariat becomes conscious of its own role in society, it 
understands its own agency, and is able to actualize what was previously only potential. The 
movement of the development of proletarian class consciousness entails its own self-
understanding of these latent potentialities.  Lukács continues: “And as the innermost kernel of 
 
113 Ibid., p. 41. 
114 Ibid., p. 175. 
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this movement is praxis, its point of departure is of necessity that of action; it holds the 
immediate objects of action firmly and decisively in its grip so as to bring about their total, 
structural transformation and thus the movement of the whole gets under way.” 115 Action is a 
necessary component of proletarian class consciousness for Lukács because insofar as the 
proletariat understands its own class position, it also understands that it has the tools to overcome 
itself through active, consciousness intervention of society.  
 Despite this agential component of class consciousness, it is important to note that on 
Lukács’ account, a successful revolution is not guaranteed. No (theoretical) analysis, no matter 
how rigorous, leads directly to the success or failure of revolutionary action. The certainty that 
the proletariat will be victorious does not mean that successful revolutionary action is inevitable. 
“There can be no ‘material’ guarantee of this certitude. It can be guaranteed methodologically – 
by the dialectical method. And even this must be tested and proved by action, by the revolution 
itself, by living and dying for the revolution.”116 Dialectical method can reveal the epistemic and 
agential components, and thus show how a successful revolution might unfold. That the 
revolution will unfold in this or that way is not determined in advance. Further, the class 
consciousness of the proletariat does not develop uniformly, such that the (political, social, 
economic) context in which members of the proletariat find themselves concretely embedded is 




115 Ibid., p. 175. 




 The concept of class consciousness plays an important role in Lukács’ understanding of 
society, as well as the way in which society can develop or transform. While History and Class 
Consciousness has been widely criticized (even and perhaps most strikingly by Lukács himself), 
this text has remained a core text of Marxist scholarship throughout the 20th century. Certainly 
Lukács’ own Hegelian tendencies are apparent throughout, and his concept of class 
consciousness is no exception. From the way in which he mediates the insights of both Lenin and 
Luxemburg, to the way in which proletarian class consciousness mediates the relationship 
between the class and society as a whole, Lukács’ is clearly thinking dialectically. This 
dialectical relationship, I argue, is crucial to understanding the kind of agency at the heart of 
proletarian class consciousness.  
 We must, following Lukács, reject the dilemma of fatalism or voluntarism. While 
successful revolutionary action is never guaranteed in advance, we must go beyond this one-
sided thinking. Certainly, during Lukács’ own time, the possibility of a successful Communist 
revolution seemed much closer on the horizon than it does today. I will pick up on this thread 
below in Chapter 2. In his book on Lenin, Lukács makes the following remark about the 
relationship between Lenin and Marx’s thought: “The actuality of the revolution: this is the core 
of Lenin’s thought and his decisive link with Marx.”117 Finding this actuality today is difficult, 
maybe impossible – society has changed considerably in the century after the Bolshevik 
Revolution. Nevertheless, the task remains; capitalist society continues to exploit workers all 
over the globe, and those workers continue to come together in order to contest capital’s power. 
 
117 Lukács, Lenin: A Study on the Unity of His Thought, p. 11. 
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Following Lukács, our task must be to continue to theorize and organize, seeking out the 
actuality of the revolution wherever and however we can.  
 
Summary of Chapter 1 
 The early Marxist tradition may not have a fully developed account of the relationship 
between consciousness and agency – however from the early Marx all the way to Lukács, each 
of these thinkers is clearly concerned with this problem. From Marx and Engels, we see that 
while the agency of the individual worker under capitalism is limited through systematic 
alienation of her labor, a class that comes together not only in itself but against capital, has some 
kind of agency to change society. From Lenin we see that following the spontaneous 
‘embryonic’ trade-union consciousness is almost never sufficient for large scale social 
transformation. Conscious intervention is necessary, not necessarily through isolated individuals 
acting by themselves, but through a highly organized vanguard of professional revolutionaries. 
From Luxemburg, we see that the heart of revolutionary action is the class struggle, and class 
consciousness cannot be something imposed, but must arise through revolutionary experience. 
From Lukács, we see that class consciousness is ‘imputed’ (not imposed) and entails not only an 
epistemic standpoint from which to critique bourgeois society, but also entails the agency 
through which that society can be changed.  
 Underlying these insights is an adherence to a Marxist methodology of dialectical, 
historical materialism. For these early Marxist thinkers, this methodology was not merely a 
conceptual tool to be used however one pleases. There is a constant worry about opportunism, or 
vulgar Marxist – a mechanistic adaptation of Marx’s insights that lead away from revolutionary 
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action, and toward maintaining the status quo. Lukács states that: “Materialist dialectic is a 
revolutionary dialectic.”118 Theory cannot be separated completely from practice – he reminds us 
of the eleventh thesis on Feuerbach that our job is to change the world, not merely to interpret 
it.119 Philosophy in a vacuum, separated completely from the material conditions of society, is at 
best benign bourgeois fiction, at worst, debilitating false consciousness that forecloses the 
possibility of revolution. What unites these thinkers is an unwavering commitment to changing 
society – whether this change happens in theory or in practice.  
 Given the historical moments that generated these ideas, especially those of Lenin, 
Luxemburg, and Lukács, this change appeared inevitable. Despite our own historical vantage 
point, and the understanding that there was no successful global Communist revolution, we 
should be able to see why such optimism was warranted. Since bourgeois society was not 
overthrown, it continued to develop and adapt to its own historical moment. As we will see 
below, in Chapter 2, Adorno has a very different vantage point, only twenty or thirty years later. 
To him, after witnessing the atrocities of the Holocaust, and a healthy mistrust of both Soviet 
‘Communism’ and American consumer capitalism, such optimism is clearly unwarranted. At that 
time, social possibilities were heavily restricted, and the palpable revolutionary spirit waned.  
 Today, our task must also include taking stock of our current historical moment. This 
interrogation into the relationship between class consciousness and political agency constitutes 
the theoretical aspect of such a task. By itself, such a task remains necessarily incomplete. The 
practical conditions of society are a moving target. When I started this dissertation project, it 
 
118 Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, p. 2. 
119 Marx, “Theses on Feuerbach” in The Marx-Engels Reader, p. 145: “The philosophers have only interpreted the 
world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it.” 
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would have been impossible to predict the material conditions of society today. By the same 
token, it is impossible to predict what those conditions will be in a month, a week, or even a day. 
The task, then, is not to prepare for every possible outcome, but rather take stock of where we 
are, and understand, to the best of our ability, where we can go from here. Such a purely 
theoretical account of class consciousness cannot be given in advance, and so the work here 
remains necessarily incomplete. However, a more detailed understanding of the relationship 
between class consciousness and political agency may provide tools with which to do justice to 




LUKÁCS AND ADORNO ON POSSIBILITY, AGENCY, IDEOLOGY 
 
 As we saw in Chapter 1, early Marxist theorists are interested in the relationship between 
class consciousness, and the agency through which social transformation becomes possible. 
While Marx and Engels may not have provided a fully defined account of this relationship, 
Lenin, Luxemburg, and later Lukács all develop accounts of this relation in their own way. 
Finally, with Lukács, we get a fully formed concept of class consciousness. His account, as we 
will see in this chapter is not without its own shortcomings. It is for this reason that turning to 
Theodor Adorno, and his critique of Lukács is important. While Adorno’s work is often taken to 
be pessimistic, I argue that his arguments about historical progress and social transformation are 
better understood as a commentary on the social conditions of his own historical moment. 
Specifically, the absence of a communist party that plays a mediating function seems especially 
problematic. In this chapter, I will use Adorno’s arguments to deepen Lukács’ account of class 
consciousness, arguing for an account of agency that incorporates nonidentity.  
 In Minima Moralia, Adorno discusses ideology, cultural criticism, and deception in a 
chapter entitled “Baby with the bath-water.” He argues that the notion of culture as ideology 
involves a critique that reveals the deception of the illusion of culture that covers over the 
material conditions of society. Adorno does not deny the deceptive nature of culture; however, 
he warns that reducing the relations of society to their material origins misses something 
important. Indeed, in principle, analysis of the modes and processes of production should be 
sufficient to understand it completely.  
But to act radically in accordance with this principle would be to extirpate, with 
the false, all that was true also, all that, however impotently, strives to escape the 
confines of universal practice, every chimerical anticipation of a nobler condition, 
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and so to bring about directly the barbarism that culture is reproached with 
furthering indirectly.1  
While not mentioned explicitly, this critique is plausibly directed at the Soviet Union, Stalinism, 
mechanical or vulgar Marxism, or any other reductive materialist or positivist2 accounts of his 
time. While these kinds of criticisms might get at a real problem within capitalist society, they 
throw out the proverbial baby with the bathwater. In critiquing culture produced in or under 
capitalism, they inadvertently do away with culture as such, ushering in similar, or even worse 
dangers than it attempts to address. 
 It is in this spirit that Adorno critiques Lukacs’ account of reification in Negative 
Dialectics. As we saw in Chapter 1, Lukács introduces this concept in his account of the 
standpoint of the proletariat. Prioritizing concepts like reification and alienation in one’s critique 
of capitalist society, Adorno argues, pales in comparison to its true horrors, such as those 
committed by the Nazis during the Holocaust. In the wake of the atrocities of the Second World 
War (as well as the collapse of the German Socialist Party and the descent of the Soviet Union 
into Stalinism), the concept of reification seemed inadequate to describe the ills of contemporary 
society. At best, it betrays a certain naiveté. Not only were socialist movements in decline at the 
time, but the communist Party, at least as it was initially theorized by the early Marxist thinkers, 
did not exist anymore.  
 
1 Adorno, Minima Moralia p. 44. 
2 It should be noted here that standard critiques of Lukacs (including, perhaps, Adorno’s own critique) attack his 
account as idealist rather than reductively materialist, although his position is also criticized as defending Stalinism. 
The nuances of Adorno’s critique of Lukacs are discussed in Hall, “Reification, Materialism, and Praxis: Adorno’s 
Critique of Lukacs.” 
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 Horkheimer asks Adorno “…in whose interest do we write, now that there is no longer a 
party and the revolution has become such an unlikely prospect?”3 Indeed, when this conversation 
happens in 1956, global communist revolution seemed difficult, if not impossible. This is due in 
large part because the groups who initially showed promise of carrying out successful 
revolutionary action either failed or disappeared. In Negative Dialectics, Adorno develops an 
account of negativity/nonidentity/difference that while drawing on Hegelian insight, departs 
from his idealism in substantial ways. “Dialectics,” as Adorno understands it, “is the ontology of 
the wrong state of things.”4 This is to say, his project does not concern the “concrete utopian 
possibility” or the ‘right’ state of affairs. It is in this light that we should understand the opening 
lines of the introduction: “Philosophy, which once seemed obsolete, lives on because the 
moment to realize it was missed.”5 This moment, I argue, is the moment of the 1920s, where 
Europe seemed on the brink of revolution. It stood poised to follow the Soviet experiment, and 
usher in an age of unparalleled freedom and prosperity. As Adorno sees it in 1966 when he 
publishes Negative Dialectics, this moment has passed. Not only did Europe bear witness to the 
atrocities of the Holocaust, but even the socialist experiment in Russia had become a totalitarian 
dictatorship.6 In is in this context that we should understand Adorno’s critique of Lukács. 
 In this chapter, I will reconstruct Adorno’s critique of Lukács, as well as provide an 
analysis of a conversation between Adorno and longtime friend and mentor Max Horkheimer 
about the relationship the role the communist party plays in establishing revolutionary social 
 
3 Horkheimer and Adorno, Towards a New Manifesto, p. 33-34. 
4 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 11. 
5 Ibid. p. 3. 
6 Ibid., p. 322: “Marx and Engels…could not foresee what became apparent later, in the revolution’s failure even 
where it succeeded: that domination may outlast the planned economy…the antagonism of economics toward mere 
politics, is extended beyond the specific phase of that economics.” 
  
 71 
conditions. I argue that Adorno does not completely reject Lukács’ analysis of history, 
reification, or class consciousness, but rather that the idealist moments in Lukács are still too 
Hegelian. Instead of understanding the agency of the proletariat as the unified reconciliation, the 
agent of history as identical subject-object, Adorno’s work provides the conceptual tools to 
develop an alternative account of agency that attends to the unreconciled and nonidentical 
aspects of the proletariat. Then, I engage the discussion between Horkheimer and Adorno on the 
absence of the party, relating their judgment concerning the possibility of social transformation 
to this absence. One way to understand how the proletariat in their time (and in our own as well) 
has not become a unified agent of history is see the function of the communist party. In the 
absence of the party, mediation breaks down and reconciliation is impossible. A new 
understanding of this agency is required to rework the concept of class consciousness, such that 
it can be relevant today. Before addressing this question of agency in Chapters 3 and 4, we must 
first see why Adorno cannot accept Lukács’ analysis wholesale. As Adorno warns, we must not 
throw the baby out with the bath water. 
 
Adorno’s Critique of Lukács 
 Adorno, while certainly drawing on insights from Lukács’ work, sees his account of 
reification and the standpoint of the proletariat as a form of Romanticism, and ultimately too 
idealist. According to Adorno, Lukács reproduces the same idealist problems found in Hegel’s 
thought. Specifically, he relies on the proletariat as the ‘subject-object of history’ to have the 
capacity to transform society once it overcomes all of its own internal contradictions. Adorno 
critiques this position in theory, but we might also say that the failure of a global proletarian 
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revolution shows the practical limitations of this view.7 These limitations, however, do not 
constitute grounds for complete rejection of Lukács’ position. Rather, I argue that by following 
Adorno in his critique, we can develop an account of agency that avoids these idealist charges 
and stays true to the spirit of Lukács’ account of class consciousness. Despite Adorno’s supposed 
pessimism, he provides the conceptual resources to think differently about the agency involved 
in class consciousness. Rather than being the unified agent of history, the proletariat is disjointed 
and nonidentical. It is through Adorno’s nonidentity, rather than Hegelian identity, that this 
agency should be understood. Before turning to a closer look at agency in Chapters 3 and 4, I 
will first provide some conceptual groundwork by reconstructing Adorno’s critique of Lukacs, 
then argue that one important reason that revolutionary conditions no longer held for Adorno was 
the absence of the party.  
 Below, I reconstruct Adorno’s critique of Lukács from Negative Dialectics. Adorno is 
wary of understanding development of society through history as ‘progress’ and develops a 
critique of Lukács’ account of reification that charges it with being both Romantic and idealist. I 
reconstruct the argument against Lukács’ ‘subject-object of history’ arguing that in order to 
address this charge of idealism, we must rethink the kind of agency that the proletariat possesses. 
Next, I turn to Adorno’s discussion of ‘the spell’ to show that Adorno does not foreclose the 
possibility of the spell breaking, although he is certainly not as optimistic as Lukács is about the 
result. The path away from barbarism is not through the predetermined unity of reconciliation, 
but rather the nonidentical difference that remains in tension.  
 
7 For example, Feenberg, while defending Lukács’ against a critique from Habermas, still argues that his theory of 
class consciousness has been “falsified by history.” Cf. Feenberg, Andrew, “Why Students of the Frankfurt School 
Will Have to Read Lukács.” 
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Reification in Negative Dialectics 
 While Lukacs’ name is hardly mentioned in Negative Dialectics, it is clear that Adorno is 
still drawing on his thought even as he critiques it. In order to trace out Adorno’s position with 
respect to Lukacs, in this section I will reconstruct Adorno’s critique of reification. Adorno 
traces the history of the concept of reification from its subjective idealist origins in Fichte 
through Marx to Lukacs’ own use in History and Class Consciousness. Marx, he argues, shows 
how a barter system necessarily produces false consciousness through the principle of exchange. 
At first glance, one might assume that Marxism holds the key to the “dissolution of reification” 
as a kind of philosopher’s stone that solves the problem entirely.8 This simplistic approach, 
which Adorno ascribes to the early Marx (in ‘contradistinction’ to the later Marx of Das 
Kapital), misses the fact that “reification itself is the reflexive form of false objectivity.”9  
 Reducing dialectics to reification, as Adorno charges Lukacs, remains ideological insofar 
as it glosses over the actual causes of human suffering. “Considering the possibility of total 
disaster” Adorno asserts “reification is an epiphenomenon, and even more so is the alienation 
coupled with reification, the subjective state of consciousness that corresponds to it.”10 The 
implicit charge against Lukács in this passage is that alienation and reification are no longer the 
underlying problem of capitalism. There is human suffering that is more fundamental to this 
problem, and Lukács’ account risks missing it. Moreover, Lukács offers an abstract, ideal 
solution through the unity of the subject-object form embodied by the proletariat. For Adorno, 
 





this unity falsely promises a new immediacy as the overcoming of capitalism – a promise that at 
best remains unfulfilled, and at worst no longer possible. 
 Ultimately for Adorno, the central role of the concept of reification in Lukacs reveals his 
latent Romanticism. These Romantic tendencies glorify preindustrial society, medieval towns, 
and a life yet unmarred by industrial production. “The meaningful times for whose return the 
early Lukacs yearned were as much due to reification, to inhuman institutions, as he would later 
attest it only to the bourgeois age.”11 In response to the horrors of the modern age, the Romantic 
finds refuge in the past. For Adorno, however, these conditions are only glamorous insofar as 
they are lost.12 Previous societies (as Marx notes in the German Ideology) had their own 
contradictions, and it is only through the rose-tinted glasses of history that one could possibly 
find these societies preferable to our own. Adorno’s point here is to show that even where 
Lukacs points to the possible future unification of subject-object, theory-practice, etc., he in fact 
is looking back at pre-industrial society.  
 Looking beyond the category of reification, Adorno is pessimistic about social 
transformation for the better, as well as the society’s historical progress.13 According to Adorno, 
there can be no moral certainty, since any idea of goodness that is supposed to guide action 
always risks that it “unwittingly take orders from the reified consciousness, from that which 
society has approved.”14 Politically, this insight is particularly pessimistic with respect to the 
possibility of transformative agency. Adorno continues: “Whatever an individual or a group may 
 
11 Ibid., p. 191. 
12 Ibid. 
13 For a detailed account of Adorno’s critique of historical progress, see Allen, Amy. The End of Progress: 
Decolonizing the Normative Foundations of Critical Theory.  
14 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 242. 
  
 75 
undertake against the totality they are part of is infected by the evil of that totality; and no less 
infected is he who does nothing at all.”15 Even the proletariat constituted as a class for itself, as 
the subject-object ‘agent of history,’ is still produced by the totality of capitalist society, and thus 
infected by it.  
 Since capitalism has produced the proletariat as a class, it is shot through with the very 
problems it seeks to solve. Following this argument to its limits, Adorno argues that it is no 
longer possible to believe in world-historical progress, since the history is written by the victor 
through force and violence, rather than a morally superior spirit.16 “The unity of world history 
which animates the philosopher to trace it as the path of the world spirit is the unity of terror 
rolling over mankind; it is the immediacy of antagonism.”17 This is not to say that progress is 
impossible – just that the dialectic of historical process does not always overcome itself in order 
to achieve a higher state. Contra Hegel,18 nothing in the logic of the unfolding of history guides 
society towards the victory of good over evil, of freedom over suffering.  
Lukacs and the ‘Subject-Object of History’ 
 Through these twin charges of idealism and Romanticism, Adorno ultimately rejects the 
central place of reification in his negative dialectics. He argues that “the category of reification, 
which was inspired by the wishful image of unbroken subjective immediacy, no longer merits 
the key position accorded to it, overzealously, by an apologetic thinking happy to absorb 
 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid., p. 341: “Yet world history can no longer be trusted to make progress in its passage from nation to nation, in 
a phase in which the victor is no longer bound to occupy the higher level that was probably always credited to him 
only because he was the victor.” 
17 Ibid. 
18 Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of History  
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materialist thinking.”19 Those who insist on the category of reification, such as Lukács, Adorno 
argues, still cling to Hegel’s problematic identitarian and idealist dialectics. Specifically, this 
category of reification posits an immediate subjectivity – the proletariat as ‘subject-object’ of 
history – that has overcome the antinomies of bourgeois thought. This critique suggests a serious 
shortcoming of an account of political agency based in Lukács’ concept of class consciousness. 
If the proletariat cannot (or has failed to) overcome this antinomy in order to (re)establish a 
subjective immediacy capable of transformative capacities, then the proletariat does not seem to 
be a good candidate to be the ‘agent of history.’ Specifically, it means that an account of class 
consciousness might not be able to do what Lukács hopes it can do: provide a standpoint (the 
standpoint of the proletariat) from which one can understand society as a concrete totality, as 
well as show the capacity for social transformation inherent in a class analysis. In this section, I 
outline Lukács’ position on the proletariat as the agency of history, noting where Lukács himself 
is critical of his own analysis. I argue that rather than completely rejecting Lukács’ analysis, 
Adorno offers a different way of looking at the political agency of the proletariat. Focusing on 
what remains negated, rather than the immediacy of a newly established unity, he develops an 
alternative way of understanding the political agency at work in the concept of class 
consciousness.  
 It should be noted that Lukács himself, in the 1967 preface to History and Class 
Consciousness admits that his earlier position in this text is flawed.20 He admits that the absence 
 
19 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 374. 
20 This self-criticism in 1967 should be distinguished from the self-criticism published in the wake of the reception 
of History and Class Consciousness. Lukács highlights the fact that the initial self-criticism was a political 
necessity. Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, p. xxxviii: “Tactically it was, however, necessary to distance 




of labor as mediator leads to the disappearance of the objectivity of nature; that there is an 
unintended, but overriding subjectivism in his account of the contradictions of capitalism; that 
‘imputed’ consciousness and revolutionary praxis are not directly related; that concerning 
reification, alienation and objectification are not identical; and that to think that the proletariat 
can become the identical subject-object of history created via self-knowledge is an idealist 
impulse to ‘out-Hegel’ Hegel. 
 Despite these criticisms, Lukács does not completely disavow this text, instead arguing 
that there are still lessons to be learned. In the first place, he suggests that these problems with 
History and Class Consciousness are due to the time and place in which it was written, rather 
than his own errors or personal failures.”21 Even if his theory failed to do justice to the historical 
moment, it succeeded in capturing a typical view of the time period, and so is, at the very least, 
important for that reason. Moreover, it is important to take into account the context in which 
History and Class Consciousness was written. In order to combat the vulgar and mechanistic 
‘Marxisms’ of opportunists and revisionists like Eduard Bernstein and Karl Kautsky, Lukács 
understood the importance of a return to Hegel. “For anyone wishing to return to the 
revolutionary traditions of Marxism the revival of the Hegelian traditions was obligatory.”22 
Despite the latent Hegelianism, Lukács clearly remained convinced that Hegelian dialectics 
 
official theories of literature would not be impeded by counter-attacks in which my opponents would have been 
objectively in the right in my view, however narrow-minded they might otherwise be.” His later relationship, as he 
describes in the preface, is much more nuanced than simple endorsement or rejection. 
21 Ibid., p. xxv: “The very fact that all the errors listed here have their source not so much in the idiosyncrasies of the 
author as in the prevalent, if often mistaken, tendencies of the age gives the book a certain claim to be regarded as 
representative. A momentous, world-historical change was struggling to find a theoretical expression.” 
22 Ibid., p. xxi.  
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should not be completely purged from Marxist analysis. That the revolutionary traditions of 
Marxism owe a deep debt to Hegel is a point of agreement for both Lukács and Adorno. 
 Given this self-criticism, as well as Adorno’s critique of reification in Negative 
Dialectics, we can now reconstruct a poignant critique of the political agency at work in the 
concept of class consciousness. Lukács admits that the overcoming entailed by the identical 
subject-object of history cannot be overcome through self-knowledge. “For even when the 
content of knowledge is referred back to the knowing subject, this does not mean that the act of 
cognition is thereby freed of its alienated nature.”23 Lukács concedes that Hegel saw this in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit – for the identical subject-object to transcend its own limitations in the 
form of objectification and alienation, it must also transcend the object as well, and would entail 
“the end of objective reality and thus of any reality at all.”24 The identical subject-object of 
history would not be an agent, because it would have already resolved all of the contradictions 
within itself. Lukács’ account risks making the potential agent impotent of the very thing it is 
called by history to do. 
 Adorno picks up on this impotence by highlighting the conditions under which the agent 
is intended to act. “The trouble is with the conditions that condemn mankind to impotence and 
apathy and would yet be changeable by human action; it is not primarily with people and with 
the way conditions appear to people.”25 Even though reified or false consciousness make the 
conditions of society appear necessary, they are in fact contingent: the fundamental problem is 
with the conditions themselves, rather than the consciousness that fails to understand. However, 
 
23 Ibid., p. xxiii. 
24 Ibid., p. xxiii-xxiv. 
25 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 190. 
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this (subjective) consciousness is also itself an objective condition of society, and thus the 
agency of an individual or even group within society is still bound to these conditions. Adorno’s 
argument here is that if overcoming of the problem of alienation must happen before overcoming 
it, such an overcoming will never happen.26  
 To address this, Adorno argues that one should not attempt to expunge every instance of 
the alien ‘thingness’ in our consciousness. Dialectics, as negative dialectics of the ‘wrong state of 
things’ must incorporate this otherness. “We cannot eliminate from the dialectics of the extant 
what is experienced in consciousness as an alien thing: negatively, coercion and heteronomy, but 
also the marred figure of what we should love, and what the spell, the endogamy of 
consciousness, does not permit us to love.”27 An initial reading of Lukács might assume that the 
political agency entailed by class consciousness would entail the complete overcoming of 
alienation in the proletariat as the subject-object of history. Here Adorno shows that this kind of 
simple reconciliation is neither possible, nor desirable.28 Instead, Adorno defends an alternative 
approach which emphasizes the nonidentity of the relation, rather than covering over difference. 
The “reconciled condition” would instead find happiness “in the fact that the alien, in the 
proximity it is granted, remains what is distant and different, beyond the heterogeneous and 
beyond that which is one’s own.”29 While the type of agency indicated by Lukács in History and 
Class Consciousness might not be achievable, here Adorno points toward the possibility of 
 
26 Ibid., p. 190: “Alienation is reproduced by anxiety; consciousness – reified in the already constituted society – is 
not the constituens of anxiety.”  
27 Ibid., p. 191. 
28 What remains in the reconciliation inherent to Hegel’s idealism is an allusion to agency as mastery, as pure 
unification, ipseity, or sovereignty; autonomous action independent from the material conditions of one’s society or 
world. This type of reconciliation is typical of the Enlightenment thinking and technical, instrumental reason that 
Adorno criticizes with Horkheimer in the Dialectics of Enlightenment. 
29 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 191. 
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another kind of agency – one that implies not a complete rejection of the alien other, but includes 
it and allows for its difference.  
Adorno and ‘The Spell’ 
 Despite this critique of Lukács’ Hegelian tendencies, Adorno offers a different approach 
to these issues concerning agency by moving away from Hegel’s (idealist) insistence on 
reconciliation. Adorno argues that while Hegel’s prioritization of universality over particularity 
is true, his instantiation of the universal’s substantiality in the individual adheres to a certain kind 
of subjective ‘spell.’ “The spell” Adorno argues, “is the subjective form of the world spirit, the 
internal reinforcement of its primacy over the external process of life.”30 The spell acts on those 
who have internalized this world spirit, creating obstacles that obscure material conditions of 
society. Adorno clearly believes that human beings today (in his own time, as well as our own) 
are under this spell. For a capitalist society, this spell takes on the fetish character of 
merchandise.31 In the process of production, something self-made becomes a thing-in-itself, from 
which the self cannot escape. Echoing Marx’s account of commodity exchange,32 Adorno 
affirms the Marxist analysis of the contradiction inherent in capitalist economy, and the resulting 
fetishism of the commodity. “Spell and ideology are one and the same…Its content is the 
tautology of identity: what ought to be is what is anyway.” The spell, as ideology, inhibits the 
possibility of overcoming itself by insisting that no other form of society is possible. Commodity 
fetishism arises from ‘objective’ economic laws, and while perhaps unfortunate, according to the 
logic of the spell such a situation is unavoidable.  
 
30 Ibid., p. 344. 
31 Ibid., p. 346. 
32 Cf. Marx, Capital. 
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 Adorno’s account of the spell as ideology33 relates directly to the discussion of reification 
and Lukács above. While not citing Lukács directly, it is clear Adorno has History and Class 
Consciousness in mind. “In the spell, the reified consciousness has become total. The fact of its 
being a false consciousness holds out a promise that it will be possible to avoid it – that it will 
not last…”34 That false consciousness can be transformed into proletarian class consciousness 
via the standpoint of the proletariat is clearly the view Adorno ascribes to Lukács. False 
consciousness35 as reified consciousness need only be cleansed of its reification in order to be 
true. However, Adorno is not convinced that such a process is easy, or even happening at all. 
Certainly, there is a tendency within capitalist society to turn in on itself. This is the tendency 
found in Marx36 and echoed by Lenin37 that capitalist society produces the tools needed for its 
own destruction. Lenin realizes, however, in contrast to Luxemburg, that capitalist society 
creates its own tendencies, tendencies that are often taken up (unconsciously or unknowingly) by 
the proletariat. Adorno recognizes this worry, arguing that the outcome of the tensions within 
capitalist society are not, and cannot be determined in advance. History does not unfold 
according to a set of discoverable laws, thus “there is no telling yet whether it will be a disaster 
 
33 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 197: “The task of criticizing ideology is to judge the subjective and objective 
shares and their dynamics.” 
34 Ibid., p. 346. 
35 Adorno’s account of false consciousness also appears to mirror, or perhaps invert, the structure of ressentiment in 
Nietzsche. Adorno writes “the will turns back upon the willing; as a mere means of itself it becomes an end. This 
turn is already a turn to the false consciousness. If the lion had a consciousness, his rage at the antelope he wants to 
eat would be ideology.” Compare with On the Genealogy of Morals, Essay 1, section 13.  
36 The Communist Manifesto speaks of this tendency in powerful metaphors. Marx and Engels, “The Communist 
Manifesto” in The Marx-Engels Reader, p. 478: “Modern bourgeois society with its relations of production, of 
exchange and of property, a society that has conjured up such gigantic means of production and of exchange, is like 
the sorcerer, who is no longer able to control the powers of the nether world whom he has called up by his spells;” 
or again, p. 483: “The development of Modern Industry, therefore, cuts from under its feet the very foundation on 
which the bourgeoisie produces and appropriates products. What the bourgeoisie, therefore, produces, above all, is 
its own grave diggers.” 
37 In What is to Be Done? 
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or a liberation.38 The possibility of liberation is not foreclosed, although it cannot be guaranteed 
in advance. 
 Following this logic of uncertainty, Adorno argues that regress as well as progress can 
occur under the spell. The risk of regression appears because under the spell, anything alien or 
nonidentical is expelled. Here Adorno diverges sharply from the Hegelian principle of unity. 
“Whatever nonidentity the rule of identity principle will tolerate is mediated in turn by the 
identitarian compulsion.”39 Nonidentity must be transformed, through mediation, into and 
through identity, or else “extirpated”40 from subjectivity, the self, or society. Contra Hegel, 
Adorno defends the power of the negative, of the nonidentical. This difference gets at the heart 
of the dialectics Adorno is engaging in. For Hegel, Adorno argues, dialectics aims at overcoming 
tension or contradiction. This overcoming (aufheben) appears as a new unity – specifically an 
identity that incorporates that which has been overcome. Since for Hegel, this movement 
happens in and through world history, the working out of contradiction happens in spirit. A 
materialist dialectic, Adorno argues, cannot proceed in this way. “What is negated is negative 
until it has passed. This is the decisive break with Hegel. To use identity as a palliative for 
dialectical contradiction, for the expression of the insolubly nonidentical, is to ignore what the 
contradiction means.”41 In order to break the spell, we must attend to the nonidentical, 
unreconciled elements within society. 
 
38 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 346. 
39 Ibid., p. 347. 
40 Ibid.: “But Hegel pledges allegiance to extirpation, his pathos grants the world spirit the only reality, echoing a 
hellish laughter in heaven.” 
41 Ibid., p. 160. 
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 While Adorno maintains that it is possible for the spell to be broken,42 the effects of 
breaking the spell are not determined in advance. As we saw above, liberation is possible, but so 
is disaster. Following Adorno’s argument, any agency we have to transform society is similarly 
uncertain. What is certain, however, is that by understanding agency that requires reconciliation, 
or the unity of identity, remains an abstract idealism. Following Adorno, we must not ignore the 
contradiction and attend to what has been negated but not yet passed. This means that the 
political task is less about determining an ‘agent of history’ whose actions guarantee the 
overthrow of global capitalism. Rather, it means recognizing the elements of society that remain 
unreconciled. There is a kind of agency in these moments of strain and struggle, albeit agency of 
a different kind. Adorno describes these moments theoretically: “The universal that compresses 
the particular until it splinters, like a torture instrument, is working against itself for its substance 
is the life of the particular.”43 Concretely, we see this splintering in moments of crisis or social 
upheaval. These are openings in an otherwise closed and total system – we must first do our best 
to understand these moments, if we are ever going to transform society.  
Conclusion 
Despite Adorno’s critique, he is clearly influenced by Lukács’ thought. What is 
problematic, on his view, is Lukács’ latent idealism. Adorno is pessimistic about ‘world-
historical’ progress, arguing that while there may be forces within capitalism that resist it, there 
is no guarantee that the future will be better than the past. Lukács’ account of the proletariat as 
the agent of history seems to optimistic not because progress is impossible, but rather because 
 
42 Ibid., p. 346: “It is not altogether unlikely that the spell is thus breaking itself. For the time being a so-called 
pluralism would falsely deny the total structure of society, but its truth come from such impending disintegration, 




the (contingent) conditions of society do not allow for it. Following Adorno, I argue that in order 
to understand agency directed towards social transformation, one must look to difference and 
nonidentity that remains unreconciled. The spell, as the subjective, ideological dimension, 
according to Adorno, is also not impossible to break; his warning, however, is that breaking the 
spell can lead to either liberation or destruction – the result cannot be determined in advance.  
 In what follows, I will argue that one reason Adorno might think that the social 
conditions are not revolutionary is because there is no longer a Communist Party; or to be more 
precise, there is no longer a group that functions as the Communist Party is supposed to function. 
I will develop an account of the agency of such a group in Chapter 3, however for now, it is 
important to highlight the continuity between Adorno’s position and those of the early Marxists 
covered in Chapter 1. Just as Marx drew on Hegelian insights in order to develop his arguments 
for the relationship between consciousness and agency, so too does Adorno rely on a critique of 
Hegelian dialectics. Thus, I read Adorno’s critique of Lukács’ as deepening and expanding on 
his underlying argument, rather than its outright rejection. 
 
Politics Without a Party 
 As with the early Marxist thinkers, Adorno also agrees that the party plays an important 
mediating function in society that is necessary for a revolutionary situation. As we saw above, 
social progress is never guaranteed, especially in the absence of a party. I will return to a detailed 
account of the function of the party, focusing in particular on the account of agency at work. 
Before turning to this analysis, however, it is important to understand what Adorno and longtime 
friend and mentor Max Horkheimer have to say about the role of the party. In a private 
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conversation only recently published as Towards a New Manifesto, the two thinkers discuss what 
can be done given their contemporary historical moment. While they maintain that the conditions 
of their own society are decidedly not revolutionary, they hold out hope that conditions could 
change. They discuss the possibility of a new manifesto – one that does “justice to the current 
situation”44 and stays “faithful to Marx, Engels, and Lenin.”45 Establishing a new party, a 
socialist or communist party that rejected both the consumer capitalism of America and Europe 
as well as the authoritarianism of Russia and China would open new political possibilities. They 
offer no guarantees, but I argue that their discussion can help us today rework the concept of 
class consciousness, especially by focusing on the role of the party and the kind of agency it 
would have.  
 Below, I outline the context of the discussion between Horkheimer and Adorno 
concerning the absence of the party. We must consider the historical moment in which the 
discussion takes place. Theory and practice have become disconnected, they argue, and they do 
not entirely agree on what is or even could be done to remedy it. Next, I argue that despite their 
differences, Horkheimer and Adorno agree that while the ‘spell’ of ideology could be broken, no 
successful revolution is guaranteed. Specifically, the two thinkers disagree about whether history 
can be successful. Even if in their own historical moment, they can still send theoretical 
‘messages in a bottle’ to generations in the future. Finally, I consider some remarks Adorno 
made about the concept of class consciousness in his Lectures on Sociology, arguing that rather 
than reject the concept completely, Adorno maintains its usefulness, as long as it takes into 
 
44 Horkheimer and Adorno, Towards a New Manifesto, p. 63.  
45 Ibid., p. 69. 
  
 86 
account the way in which capitalist society has changed since Marx’s time, so that it can be 
reworked for our present historical moment. 
Theory and Practice in Trying Times 
 Even though the conditions of society were not revolutionary, Adorno did not give up 
completely on the possibility of political progress. In a recently published transcript of a series of 
conversations from the spring of 1956 between Adorno and Horkheimer, it is clear that Adorno 
does not completely give up on the possibility of politics. While at times disjointed and 
unsystematic, the conversation reveals that Adorno and Horkheimer were interested in sending 
‘messages in a bottle’ into the future in the form of theory. They admit that politics in an era 
without the (communist) ‘Party’ is difficult, if not impossible, they do not (or at least I argue that 
Adorno does not) acquiesce to quietism in the realm of politics. In this section, I will explore 
these conversations in order to reconstruct Adorno’s position with respect to the possibility of 
politics without the party and discuss what impact this might have on our contemporary 
historical moment. 
 In the context of their discussion of the relationship between theory and practice, 
Horkheimer asks an important and guiding question related to the possibility of political action 
and agency. Despite his (theoretical) insights into social structure, Adorno worries that it would 
be difficult, if not impossible to put those insights to practical use. Horkheimer asks: “What is 
the meaning of practice if there is no longer a party? In that case doesn’t practice mean either 
reformism or quietism?”46 Horkheimer’s point here is that practice must have some connection 
 
46 Ibid., p. 52. See also ibid., p. 33-34: “Horkheimer: Our question is, in whose interest do we write, now that there is 




with theory, and as we saw in Chapter 1, the early Marxist thinkers saw an important connection 
between the party and the how social transformation happened. Without this mediation, 
Horkheimer’s worry is that political practice can no longer be transformative. This is to say, even 
armed with the most advanced social theory, we are seemingly faced with a dilemma. On the one 
hand, we could reform the current system by trying to make life more livable. On the other hand, 
we could accept the futility of the political struggle, and refuse to engage in political action. 
Either way, he argues, the possibility of social transformation, not merely reform, no longer 
appears possible. This agency to transform rather than reform society no longer exists, if it ever 
existed at all. 
 Although Adorno protests that the concept of practice must be different, he seems 
generally in agreement. Horkheimer provides this reformulation: “By practice we really mean 
that we’re serious about the idea that the world needs fundamental change.”47 As Marx 
emphasizes in the eleventh thesis on Feuerbach, interpretation of the world is not enough; 
fundamental social change is needed. Horkheimer ties this to a notion of difference. What is 
needed, he argues, is to think and act differently. However, without a party, there is no 
organizational structure to guide these changes. Absent revolutionary conditions, society will 
never transform. Theorizing in such a society seems to present itself with the dilemma above. 
Ultimately, however, Horkheimer’s point seems to be that the choice between reform and 
 
measure everything against the idea that all should be well. We shall probably be unable to do anything else. It is all 
tied up with language. Everything intellectual is connected to language. It is in language that the idea that all should 
be well can be articulated.” 
47 Ibid., p. 53: “This has to show itself in both thought and action. The practical aspect lies in the notion of 
difference; the world has to become different. It is not as if we should do something other than thinking, but rather 
that we should think differently and act differently. Perhaps this practice really just expects us to kill ourselves? We 
probably have to start from the position of saying to ourselves that even if the party no longer exists, the fact that we 
are here still has a certain value.” 
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quietism is a false one, since neither leads to practical action. The capacity for fundamental 
change is radically transformed without a party to organize and guide it. 
 Perhaps one reason Horkheimer and Adorno see their contemporary social conditions as 
hopeless48 is due in part to the historical moment during which the conversation takes place. In 
the spring of 1956, the two thinkers find themselves faced with a difficult political dilemma. To 
the West, the neoliberal societies in Europe and the USA have developed a form of capitalism 
they clearly reject. To the East, the so-called communist regimes in China and the USSR are not 
much better. Without erasing the differences between the two,49 Horkheimer and Adorno see 
little reason for hope in either direction. Contemporary theory coming out of the Soviet bloc, 
according to Adorno, “is more reified than the most advanced bourgeois thought.”50 The two 
thinkers occupy a kind of liminal space between these two existing societies; neither society 
offers the real possibility of revolutionary action, and yet Horkheimer and Adorno persist in their 
search for just such a possibility. Further, they warn against the impetus to establish ‘theory’ as a 
recipe for generating it. Despite such a dire situation, Adorno maintains that he has “always 
wanted to rectify” this problem, in order to “develop a theory that remains faithful to Marx, 
Engels and Lenin, while keeping up with culture at its most advanced.”51 While Horkheimer 
appears more convinced of the hopelessness of producing revolutionary writing in a non-
revolutionary time, Adorno indicates that something of the sort is possible. 
 
48 Horkheimer laments, ibid., p. 70: “If you produce revolutionary writings in a non-revolutionary situation without 
engaging with the positive aspects of a culture, it always seems somehow hopeless.” 
49 Horkheimer clarifies, ibid., p. 44: “We will have to include a sentence or two to the effect that even if American 
TV programs are very similar to Russian ones, they do not directly advocate murder. We have to distinguish clearly 
between our attitudes towards the different countries.” 




 In response to Horkheimer’s apparent quietism with respect to politics, Adorno suggests 
that not all political theory must connect directly to a contemporary revolutionary moment. 
“When Marx and Engels wrote the Communist Manifesto,” he argues, “there was no party either. 
It is not always necessary to join up with something in existence.”52 Here perhaps Adorno 
overstates the claim. Staying in line with the Marxist tradition, certainly it is necessary to join up 
with something in existence. Clearly Marx himself engaged with the political, economic, and 
social struggles of his time.53 Adorno is not advocating for theory as independent from the 
material conditions of society, no matter how ideologically purified.54 Rather, Adorno’s point is 
that it is not always necessary to join up with an actually existing revolutionary movement or 
political action in order to engage in revolutionary theory. In any case, Adorno’s example of 
Marx and Engels writing in the absence of a party is a crucial point with respect to the possibility 
of doing theory in an historical moment devoid of explicitly revolutionary action.  
 Marx and Engels did in fact ‘join up’ with something in existence; they closely followed 
the political struggles of their time and wrote about them from the standpoint of class struggle. 
Marx did not have, in Adorno’s words, “the aura of someone godforsaken,”55 which in turn 
indicates that neither should he and Horkheimer (or, for that matter, should we). Granted, the 
development of Marxist theory and practice from Marx’s time to their own had developed 
through and by party politics. The advancements made in the 1920s came in large part using the 
Communist Party as political vehicle of social and economic transformation. However, and this 
seems to Adorno’s point, this is not the only way in which social transformation happens. The 
 
52 Ibid., p. 70. 
53 See the section on Marx’s 18th Brumaire in Chapter 1.  
54 See the section on The German Ideology in Chapter 1. 
55 Horkheimer and Adorno, Towards a New Manifesto, p. 71. 
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party, like any other form of social organization rooted in history, came into existence at some 
point. That it no longer exists is politically problematic, and certainly makes revolutionary 
engagement more difficult, but cannot, on Marxian logic, mean that it will never exist again. 
This means that a new form of political organization could arise that has similar function. 
Despite Horkheimer’s repeated protests, Adorno argues that social transformation is still 
possible, even if in their own historical moment, it is not. 
Hope, History, Ideology 
 The one disagreement between Horkheimer and Adorno concerns political action and the 
role of history. Horkheimer states that the disagreement is about faith in progress on the one 
hand (Adorno), and the view that history cannot achieve it (Horkheimer). In response, Adorno 
restates the disagreement: “Our disagreement is about whether history can succeed or not. How 
are we to interpret the ‘can?’ On the one hand, the world contains opportunities for success. On 
the other hand, everything is bewitched, as if under a spell.”56 The disagreement here turns on 
the interpretation of ‘can.’ Horkheimer looks out at his own historical moment and does not see 
the objective possibility of revolution. That is, history cannot succeed, or achieve the desired 
political results, given the current state of affairs. Adorno agrees that the situation is dire, and 
that the ‘spell’ that bewitches society is a strong force. However, as we saw earlier in Negative 
Dialectics, Adorno is committed to the possibility that the spell can be broken.  
 While difficult and possibly disastrous, ideology, even hegemonic ideology is not without 
the possibility of being overcome. Adorno continues: “If the spell could be broken, success 
would be a possibility. If people want to persuade us that the conditional nature of man sets 
 
56 Ibid., p. 14. 
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limits to utopia, that is simply untrue. The possibility of a completely unshackled reality remains 
valid.”57 Despite the bewitching spell of ideology, history can ‘succeed’ in casting off this 
ideology, which would open new social, political, and economic possibilities. Horkheimer is 
quick to point out that regression is always a possibility – that a relapse into barbarism is just as 
conceivable as utopia. Adorno agrees, however implicit in his responses is the position that the 
possibility of the former does not foreclose the possibility of the later. The tension within society 
that persists within capitalism does not allow for the equilibrium required to destroy the 
possibility of spontaneity. Adorno cannot imagine a world so intensified such that objective 
oppositional forces would not be unleashed.58 
 Despite the piecemeal, and at times disjointed nature of this conversation, it is clear that 
Horkheimer and Adorno remain unwilling to give up59 on the possibility of revolution, in theory 
or in practice. Towards the end of the conversations, Horkheimer argues that in the absence of 
the party, there are certain uncertainties involved in the relationship between theory and practice. 
In the realm of theory, he argues, “what is produced…no longer has anything in common with 
Marx, with the most advanced class consciousness; our thoughts are no longer a function of the 
proletariat.”60 Horkheimer’s point here is that the production of (revolutionary) theory in a non-
 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid., p. 26: “Adorno: My innermost feeling is that at the moment everything has shut down, but it could all 
change at a moment’s notice. My own belief is as follows: this society is not moving towards a welfare state. It is 
gaining increasing control over its citizens, but this control grows in tandem with the growth in its rationality. And 
the combination of the two is constitutive. As long as this tension persists, you cannot arrive at the equilibrium that 
would be needed to put an end to all spontaneity. I cannot imagine a world intensified to a point of insanity without 
objective oppositional forces being unleashed.” Adorno cannot imagine such a world, but Horkheimer can, ibid: 
“The world is mad and will remain so.” 
59 Ibid.: “Horkheimer: …Perhaps this practice really just expects us to kill ourselves? We probably have to start 
from the position of saying to ourselves that even if the party no longer exists, the fact that we are here still has a 
certain value.” 
60 Ibid., p. 67. 
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revolutionary situation is disconnected from the practice of the current historical moment. 
Nevertheless, Adorno responds, saying that “In the best case, it is theory as a message in a 
bottle.”61 That is, theory can move beyond the historical moment in which it is produced, and 
speak across generations to a time and place where it might again be useful and connect to 
practice.  
 Their hope is that theory, as a message in a bottle, will connect back up with ‘the most 
advanced class consciousness’ such that thoughts may again be a function of the proletariat. 
Despite the nonrevolutionary situations the two thinkers find themselves in, Adorno still wants to 
develop a new Leninist manifesto. He has not given up on the world, or the possibility of social 
transformation, even if that possibility is foreclosed during his own historical moment. I argue 
that it is our job, as theorists in Horkheimer and Adorno’s future, to (re)discover these ‘messages 
in a bottle’ in order to think critically in a way that engages the political practices of our time. 
Today, perhaps we are not in a revolutionary situation;62 however, our own historical moment is 
decidedly different now than it was sixty years ago. The practical and political task, then, is to 
look at our own historical moment in order to determine whether the conditions are ripe for 
revolution. For Horkheimer and Adorno, as we saw for the early Marxists, the party plays a 
crucial role, particularly for understanding what can be done to transform society. I will return to 
the function of the party organizational structure in Chapter 3. Equipped with these messages, 
 
61 Ibid. 
62 Considering recent developments, perhaps, our own historical moment is beginning to look more revolutionary 
than it did even a couple months ago. Given the spread of the COVID-19 virus, as well as neoliberal capitalism’s 
severely mismanaged response, especially in the United States, we may be entering into a new revolutionary 
situation. While an in-depth analysis of the existing conditions unfortunately goes beyond the present scope, I will 
return to this question in the conclusion of the dissertation.  
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perhaps we will be able to do what Horkheimer and Adorno could not – reconnect theory with 
practice. 
Adorno and Class Consciousness  
 Even during the 1968 student protest movement, 63 it appears that Adorno maintained 
throughout his life that his own historical moment was not a revolutionary situation. Despite this 
position, however, Adorno continued theorizing, demonstrating that there was still some benefit 
to philosophical and sociological critique. For example, Adorno talks about class consciousness 
in the context of his Introduction to Sociology lectures. In this section, I argue that while at first 
it might appear that Adorno rejects use of the concept of class consciousness, he is still interested 
in the kind of political agency at the heart of the concept. Any indication that Adorno wants to 
abandon the concept of class consciousness reveals more about his own historical moment than 
about the theoretical usefulness of the concept as social category. Reading Adorno against 
himself, further interrogation into the concept of class consciousness is required, rather than its 
rejection altogether.  
 In the Introduction to Sociology lectures, Adorno discusses class consciousness in the 
context of the relationship between sociology and the essential laws of society. One might be 
tempted, he argues, to treat the empirical fact of diminishing class consciousness in advanced 
industrial nations as proof that a class analysis is no longer useful. He states “Class-
consciousness is a secondary product, but it is not produced automatically by the historical 
process. Contrary to Marx’s prognosis and to the situation in the middle of the last century, class-
 
63 Adorno disagreed vehemently with his longtime friend Herbert Marcuse about the revolutionary potential of the 
student movement in particular, and the New Left movement in general. See Adorno, Theodor and Herbert Marcuse. 
“Correspondence on the German Student Movement,” New Left Review, 123-136.  
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consciousness is tending to diminish.”64 Adorno uses this example in order to explain the 
distinction between sociology as investigating fundamental or essential laws of society, and 
sociology as mere observation of social facts. He continues: “There comes a point – and I believe 
that this is a case in which the empirical aspect of sociology comes into its own – where a 
concept such as class-consciousness must be simply confronted with the reality of individual 
consciousness.”65 At first, this might appear to sound as though Adorno’s position is to do away 
with the concept of class consciousness altogether. The reality of his current historical moment is 
showing the opposite historical tendency that Marx, or traditional Marxists thinkers would have 
expected to see. In the face of this reality, Adorno is arguing here that traditional Marxist theory 
cannot continue as it is or was, since material conditions have changed. However, confronting 
the concept of class consciousness does not necessarily entail its rejection.  
 Despite the trend of diminishing class consciousness in advanced industrial countries, 
Adorno is not advocating the retreat of theoretical considerations to “take refuge in the mere 
observation of facts.”66 One might reject the appeal to class consciousness, arguing that it is 
simply ‘metaphysics’ and has no place in sociological knowledge. Adorno, however, is unwilling 
to take this step. “Rather, one ought to try to explain the non-appearance of class-consciousness, 
or the disappearance of the proletariat, in terms of the objective laws of society, from its essential 
regularity.”67 What is crucial here is that Adorno refuses to give up on social theory in the face of 
positivist sociology. That is to say, he does not reject the usefulness of the concept of class 
consciousness as such; rather, he is arguing that it cannot play the same role that it has 
 
64 Adorno, Introduction to Sociology, p. 23. 
65 Ibid., p. 23. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid., p. 24. 
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traditionally played. The material conditions of Adorno’s historical moment are not the same as 
in the 1920s – class consciousness in his day was diminishing rather than expanding. In its most 
general form, this kind of social dialectics goes as follows:  
All I mean to say is that, on one hand, sociology should hold fast to certain 
essential definitions, such as that of classes, which continue to exist, decisively, in 
the dependence of most people on anonymous and opaque economic processes. 
On the other hand, however, sociology should deduce from this developmental 
tendency, or at last understand in relation to it, those modifications which are 
causing such a fundamental datum as that of classes no longer to manifest itself in 
the traditional form.68  
Put another way, we should not reject a class analysis, but rather reformulate it in order to better 
understand and describe our contemporary social phenomena. In the context of the discussion of 
class consciousness above, this means that the relation or mediation between the actually existing 
consciousness of individuals (the individual, psychological consciousness), and the ‘imputed’ 
consciousness is still an important sociological question. Focusing on either one side or the other 
leaves us in the dilemma of positivistic, descriptive sociology versus normative, ideal sociology. 
Adorno’s point here seems to be that we must understand the mediation between these two forms 
of sociology dialectically.69  This means that we cannot simply accept or reject the traditional 
frameworks, but rather rework them for our own historical moment. 
 Today, reworking the concept of class consciousness entails an in-depth analysis of 
agency, as well as a closer look at the difference between the empirical and ‘imputed’ class 
consciousness of our current historical moment. Chapters 3 and 4 engage contemporary accounts 
 
68 Ibid., p. 24. 
69 Ibid., p. 25: “What is important is that in abandoning some traditional categories we remain true to the tradition 
they represent, instead of thinking we have to join the big battalions and jettison the ballast of troublesome concepts 
which cannot easily be verified.” 
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of agency and argue for adopting a more dialectical approach. A purely theoretical approach, 
however, is not sufficient for understanding how the concept of class consciousness might be 
useful both politically and intellectually. As we saw above, the kind of agency required for social 
transformation is not independent from the material conditions of society. The way society is 
organized at least in part determines what is socially possible. In addition to this theoretical 
reworking, practical engagement with contemporary political struggles is also necessary. This 
requires insight into what makes a situation revolutionary, as well as what can be done during 
such a situation in order to maintain and develop class consciousness in society. The analysis of 
contemporary social conditions would be too complex to engage with here; however, it is 
important to note that it is an essential component 
Conclusion 
 In this section, we saw that while Horkheimer and Adorno do not see their own historical 
moment as revolutionary, they do not abandon all hope of the possibility of social 
transformation. One key feature of the social conditions required for a revolutionary situation is 
the existence of a properly organized communist party. Without the party to generate, develop, 
and maintain revolutionary energy, no social movement will be able to establish the agency 
required to transform society. The party functions to mediate between theory and practice; 
without this mediation, Horkheimer and Adorno see no possibility for successful revolutionary 
action. At best, revolutionary thought in non-revolutionary times can be a message in a bottle – a 
message sent forward in time to be read and understood by revolutionaries living in a society 
where the material conditions are more favorable. 
 There is perhaps revolutionary work to be done in nonrevolutionary times that goes 
beyond sending messages to future generations. We could imagine labor organizing or policy 
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work that provides conditions more favorable to change. Horkheimer and Adorno might decry 
this as reformism – and perhaps it is. However, we might also see this as preparatory work, work 
not ultimately aimed at reform, but rather getting ready for social transformation when or if it 
ever appears. A revolutionary movement must start somewhere; today just as during the rest of 
the history of capitalism, workers are suffering, and their labor is exploited. Horkheimer and 
Adorno right to be aware of their role as theorists. They recognize the limits of intellectual 
engagement, while holding out hope for the conditions of society to change.  
 
Summary of Chapter 2 
 As we saw in this chapter, there is an important relationship between the possibility of 
social transformation, and the agency through which it happens. Adorno clearly follows the early 
Marxist theorists from Chapter 1 in maintaining that cultural and ideological factors are not 
independent from the material conditions of society. Even in his criticism of Lukács, Adorno is 
clearly following in this Marxist tradition. Adorno may not be as optimistic as the early his 
predecessors, and with good reason. Whereas Lenin and Luxemburg were on the front lines of a 
political struggle at a time when society was in a revolutionary situation, Adorno witnessed not 
only the eventually failure of these revolutions, but also the horrors of the Holocaust. From 
Adorno’s historical position in society, there was no real possibility of social transformation. 
Nevertheless, he continued to theorize, sending messages in a bottle to future generations of 
revolutionaries.  
 Drawing on Adorno’s insight in Negative Dialectics, looking to the proletariat as the 
agential ‘subject-object’ of history is at best naïve, at worst risks damaging the changes of social 
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transformation. History does not progress in a straight line, and social transformation that 
promises progress and liberation can also lead to suffering and total disaster. The proletariat is 
not messiah, whose development will usher in a perfect utopian society. Following Adorno’s 
negative dialectics, I argue that the differences within the proletariat are not just stages to be 
overcome, but rather part of the process that generate its agency. The proletariat is not a 
homogenous entity – it is not a ‘plural subject’ in the way that Margaret Gilbert describes, as I 
discuss in Chapter 3 below. To a greater or lesser degree, the early Marxist theorists from 
Chapter 1 recognize this fact. However, Adorno’s critique helps to center the analysis on the 
present, unreconciled conditions, rather that future conditions of unity. Prioritizing identity 
remains idealist. Thus, I argue that Adorno stays true to Marx’s materialist dialectic, to a method 
of “Orthodox Marxism” as Lukács defines it,70 even as he deepens and transforms it.  
 Attending to the differences within the working class, I argue, follows directly from the 
standpoint of the proletariat in Lukács, and what it really means to see society as a concrete 
totality. The early Marxists understood that the division of society between the proletariat and 
the bourgeoisie was not the only struggle in capitalist society. Insofar as the focus was on 
capitalism as an economic system of alienation and exploitation, the proletariat as the group or 
class through which to understand the issue. As Fredric Jameson notes71 the Marxist tradition in 
general, and Lukács’ work in particular, has resonated with theorists engaged in scholarship 
addressing other oppressive dimensions within society today. This is what I take to mean to 
understand society as a concrete totality – an analysis of contemporary capitalist society that 
focuses exclusively on economic class without taking into account the other aspects and 
 
70 See the introduction to Chapter 1 above. 
71 Jameson, “History and Class Consciousness as an ‘Unfinished Project’,” Rethinking Marxism, p. 68. 
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institutions, without accounting for the problem of suffering in generally would be to understand 
society abstracting away from all of the other complexities of life. To understand society as a 
concrete totality is to attend to these complexities, to all of these differences.  
 Following Lukács’ arguments in History and Class Consciousness, and Adorno’s 
arguments in Negative Dialectics, I argue for a concept of class consciousness that is neither 
deflationary nor reductive with respect to class. Class is a necessary component to any analysis 
of contemporary society, but it can neither explain the totality of human suffering, nor be 
explained in turn by an analysis of other forms of oppression. In abstraction, there may be a 
particular form of agency that relates directly and only to class; however, in its abstraction it 
remains in a purely idealist form. Rather than a purely class analysis, I argue for an analysis of 
the political agency entailed in class consciousness must remain open to other analyses of 
oppression. According a materialist analysis that takes the standpoint of the proletariat and 
understands society as a concrete totality, the agency at work in social transformation must be 
equally complex. Such an analysis that accounts for each of these oppressive structures goes 
beyond the scope of the current project. For now, I hope to gesture towards the openness of such 
an approach, highlighting the possibilities collaboration that intersects with important 
scholarship being done on other forms of social domination beyond class. 
 In what follows, I will develop a dialectical account of group agency that draws on the 
insights of Adorno from Chapter 2 and the early Marxist theorists from Chapter 1. By dialectical 
account of group agency, I mean that the agency of the group cannot be fully explained either as 
a mere aggregate of individuals, or as a unified whole. Rather, the agency of the group is 
generated by both of these aspects. In Chapter 3, I will engage with contemporary theorists in the 
analytic tradition in order to discuss the kind of group agency that arise when individuals come 
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together to form a group. Methodologically, the approach understands group agency through an 
understanding of the individual. Rather than investigate the agency of the proletariat as a whole, 
I will focus on the agency of a vanguard party. As we saw above, the existence and structure of 
the party plays a crucial role in the possibility of social transformation. In Chapter 4, I will 
engage with contemporary theorists in the French post-structural tradition in order to discuss the 
kind of group agency that arises from the collectivity and interdependency of the group. 
Methodologically, this approach understands individual agency through an understanding of the 
group. I hope to develop an account of group agency that prioritizes this mediation and 
relationality in order to better understand the kind of political agency entailed in reconstructing a 
dialectical account of class consciousness. In order to understand the collective agency by which 




GROUP AGENCY:  VANGUARD, PARTY, PROLETARIAT  
 
 In the previous two chapters, we saw the development of the relationship between class 
consciousness and political agency in the early Marxist theorists and first-generation Frankfurt 
School theorists. The concept of class consciousness as it was developed by Lukács, as Adorno 
shows, is in need of conceptual reworking. Specifically, Adorno shows that the account of 
agency it entails remains too idealist. It requires the proletariat to overcome its own differences 
in order to be the subject-object of history. Following Adorno, the concept of class 
consciousness, as well as the political agency it entails, should not focus exclusively on the 
possibility or actuality of the proletariat’s self-reconciliation. Rather, it requires careful attention 
to nonidentity and the differences within the proletariat itself. I argue that what is needed is a 
dialectical account of group agency – an account of agency that prioritizes the mediation 
between the individual and group. This requires that we understand group agency insofar as the 
group is made up of separate individuals, as well as how individuals can be separated from the 
group. In chapter 4, I will address the kind of agency involved in separating individuals from the 
group. In the present chapter, I will focus on group agency insofar as the group is made up of 
separate individuals, drawing on recant sources from the tradition of analytic philosophy.  
 One concern about drawing from philosophers in the analytic tradition is that most, if not 
all of them are methodological individualists. As Deborah Tollefsen notes “methodological 
individualism is the thesis that social phenomena (facts, objects, events, states, etc.) should be 
explained solely in terms of individual intentional states and the relations between those 
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individuals.”1 Methodological individualism is contrasted with methodological holism,2 which 
holds that social phenomena should be explained in reference to something other than individual 
psychological states. I argue that while both approaches have their merits, neither is able to 
arrive at a complete view, specifically with respect to the question of group agency. In order to 
understand the agency of a group, I argue that we must look at both the members and the 
relations between them, as well as understand the group as a whole irreducible to its constituent 
members. This does not mean that either methodological individualism or methodological holism 
is wrong, only that each is one-sided. In order to develop a dialectical account of group agency, I 
argue we must employ the insights of both. In this chapter, I discuss methodological individualist 
accounts of group agency, showing that the way individual members of a group come together 
affects the kind of agency that group has. In chapter 4, I discuss a more methodologically holist 
view, showing how the separation of the individual from the group affects possible forms of 
agency. Ultimately, I prioritize the mediation between the individual and the group, arguing that 
in order to have an adequate understanding of group agency, we must be able to understand the 
relationship in both directions. As opposed to an individualist or holist account, I call this a 
‘dialectic’ account of agency. A dialectic account of agency, I argue, follows directly from the 
insights of the early Marxist theorists in chapter 1, and Adorno’s insights in chapter 2.  
 In order to understand the kind of political agency involved in class consciousness, I will 
focus my analysis in this chapter on three crucial groups: the vanguard, the party, and the 
proletariat. The aim in this chapter is not to give an adequate description of these groups in their 
 
1 Tollefsen, “Collective Intentionality and Methodology in the Social Sciences.” The Routledge Handbook of 
Collective Intentionality, p. 391.  
2 In contemporary sociology, methodological individualism is credited to Max Weber, whereas methodological 
holism is credited to Emile Durkheim.  
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entirety, but rather to analyze the kind of group agency they may or not possess. First, I address 
Lenin’s account of the vanguard of professional revolutionaries, arguing that it is a plural subject 
according to Margaret Gilbert’s account. Next, I address the role of the Communist Party, 
arguing that it is a group agent according to Christian List and Philip Pettit’s account. Finally, I 
argue that while the proletariat as a whole may not have group agency, Deborah Tollefsen and 
Shaun Gallagher’s account of we-narratives offer a conceptual tool that can help us identify with 
the proletariat. Despite analytic philosophy’s methodological individualism, I argue it has useful 
conceptual tools, even if their analyses are ultimately one-sided. In order to arrive at a broader 
conception of agency, I will turn to contemporary theorists from the continental tradition in 
chapter 4.  
 
Vanguard and Plural Subjects 
 Lenin, in What is to Be Done? develops an argument for the political usefulness of 
developing a small band of professional revolutionaries to engage in the political struggle of his 
time. The task of this revolutionary vanguard is the agitate, educate, and organize the working 
class, and ultimately build toward a transformation of social conditions. While Lenin does not 
say that the vanguard can transform society on its own, it plays an important role on the process. 
Membership to the vanguard is not restricted by class position. Rather than class position, 
voluntary combination is a more important criterion. I argue that Margaret Gilbert’s account of 
plural subjects in A Theory of Political Obligation is useful for determining what Lenin means 
by a vanguard of professional revolutionaries. These individuals have shared goals and commit 
to joint actions. First, I outline the key features of the vanguard as Lenin describes, focusing on 
the voluntary way in which they come together. This group is on the front lines of the class 
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struggle and is meant to lead the revolutionary political movement. Then, I reconstruct Gilbert’s 
account of plural subjects, arguing that her emphasis on shared goals and joint action fits well 
with Lenin’s account of the vanguard. While the proletariat as a class may not be a plural subject 
(as Adorno’s insights from chapter 2 would seem to suggest), I argue that the vanguard is.  
Key Features of the Vanguard 
 As we in Chapter 1, Lenin develops an account of a vanguard of professional 
revolutionaries: a small dedicated group of individuals,  who are jointly committed to (1) the 
development of class consciousness among the working class, and (2) changing the material 
conditions so as to overthrow our current capitalist mode of production. Lenin describes the 
more spontaneous trade-unionist consciousness as embryonic.3 Riots and strikes express an 
awakening of consciousness but require revolutionary Socialist theory to become fully 
developed. While this theory must “come from without,”4 the members of the vanguard can 
come from any class, granted they are committed to the cause. Lenin briefly discusses forms of 
political education,5 however agitation and organization of the working class are also important 
factors. 
 On Lenin’s view the vanguard of professional revolutionaries is not determined by 
objective social conditions. Certainly, the individual members might decide to join the vanguard 
because of the problems of society, or in order to transform it. However, Lenin clearly does not 
attribute the development of the vanguard to these objective factors. He provides a description of 
the path of struggle with vivid imagery: 
 
3 Lenin, What is to Be Done? p. 36. 
4 Ibid., p. 37. 
5 Ibid., p. 70. 
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We are marching in a compact group along a precipitous and difficult path, firmly 
holding each other by the hand…We have combined voluntarily, precisely for the 
purpose of fighting the enemy, and not to retreat into the adjacent marsh, the 
inhabitants of which, from the very outset, have reproached us with having 
separated ourselves into an exclusive group and with having chosen the path of 
struggle instead of the path of conciliation.6 
The vanguard is made up of individuals who combine voluntarily. They freely choose to 
band together, each individually deciding in advance to engage in political struggle. They 
do not decide haphazardly or spontaneously, but with this specific purpose in mind. The 
‘mash inhabitants’ Lenin refers to are opportunists and reformists – those who proport to 
defend the ideas of progress and liberation, but in fact stand in its way. Specifically, 
Lenin criticizes the way they defend the ideal of freedom, but in reality, do just the 
opposite. He speaks about the ‘freedom of criticism’ but today we might think of a ‘free 
market’ or ‘right to work’. The concept of ‘right to work’ demonstrates this idea: this 
‘right’ is in fact the right to be exploited, the right to work two or three part time jobs to 
barely afford rent. To these inhabitants of the marsh Lenin says, “don’t besmirch the 
grand word ‘freedom’, for we too are ‘free’ to go where we please, free to fight not only 
against the marsh, but also against those who are turning toward the marsh!”7 While a lot 
turns on social conditions, from the way capitalism alienates the worker from their labor 
in Marx, to the ‘spell’ of capitalist society in Adorno, Lenin does not reject outright the 
capacity of the individual to struggle in association with others. There is still an appeal to 
freedom, which is shown in his call for a voluntary combination of revolutionaries. 
 




 Lenin calls this group of professional revolutionaries a vanguard because it is 
meant to be on the front lines of the class struggle, not bringing up the rear. “For it is not 
enough to call ourselves the vanguard; we must act like one; we must at in such a way 
that all the other detachments shall see us…”8 Lenin cares little for labels, only for 
action. The vanguard must act like a vanguard by being the furthest advanced, in both 
theory and practice. It must not hide9 behind other movements or ideas. Lenin 
emphasizes that above all, this vanguard should not hide behind the spontaneity of the 
masses, only to defer to embryonic, trade-unionist consciousness. “A ‘vanguard’ which 
fears that consciousness will outstrip spontaneity, which fears to put forward a bold 
‘plan’ that would compel universal recognition even among those who think differently 
than us.”10 Such a vanguard is one in name only, and in actuality only follows the 
developments as they are generated by the class struggle. Such a group does not intervene 
consciously in the class struggle and would be more properly called a ‘rearguard’.  
 Lenin’s focus on the voluntary nature under which the vanguard combines is 
meant to highlight the fact that individual members are conscious or aware of the group 
they form. Their choice to join the vanguard is not voluntary if by voluntary we 
understand as completely free of any coercive conditions whatsoever. Under a capitalist 
 
8 Ibid., p. 103. 
9 Lenin does, however, discuss the important of secrecy. Even this secrecy, he argues, still aims at the development 
of class consciousness, and is for the protection of the vanguard, ibid., p. 138: “Such an organization must of 
necessity be not too extensive and as secret as possible;” or, again, p. 154: “The centralization of the secret functions 
of the organization by no means implies the centralization of all the functions of the movement. The active 
participation of the widest mass in the illegal press will not diminish because a ‘dozen’ professional revolutionaries 
centralize the secret functions connected with this work; on the contrary, it will increase tenfold. In this way, and in 
this way along, will we ensure that reading of illegal literature, writing for it, and to some extend even distributing it, 
will almost cease to be secret work, for the police will soon come to realize the folly and futility of setting the whole 
juridical and administrative machine into motion to intercept every copy of publication that is being broadcast in 
thousands.” 
10 Ibid., p. 104. 
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economic system, workers are, in some sense, forced to keep working, or they will die. 
Insofar as the vanguard combines with the explicit goal of overthrowing capitalism, it 
must work from within its coercive limits. Thus, the vanguard, as a group against the 
conditions of capital, has certain obligations (to other members of the vanguard, to the 
proletariat as a class, etc.). Lenin does not hesitate to use moral language to describe the 
duties of a comrade, or the blame for not doing enough for the cause.11 Further, there 
might also be a normative claim that is generated by the oppressive economic conditions 
themselves. In addition to these, however, there does seem to be a specific normativity 
inherent in the combination of individual members of the vanguard. That is to say, that as 
a member of the vanguard, I would be in a position to rebuke another member if she did 
not do her part in furthering the revolution. Members of the vanguard have this obligation 
of conscious intervention, and thus their action is voluntary insofar as it does not merely 
conform to the spontaneity of the masses.  
 The vanguard of professional revolutionaries comes together voluntarily, in order 
to promote class consciousness, and promote revolutionary social transformation. The 
vanguard does not hide behind the spontaneity of the masses but intervenes consciously 
in the political struggle. In what follows, I argue that this vanguard of professionals can 
be described as a plural subject, following Margaret Gilbert’s account. Gilbert’s account 
is useful because it focuses on the way in which individuals come together in order to 
 
11 For example, see ibid., p. 164: “As we are directly to blame for doing too little to ‘stimulate’ the workers to take 
this path, common to them and to the ‘intellectuals’, of professional revolutionary training, and that we too 
frequently drag them back by our silly speeches about what ‘can be understood’ by the masses of the workers, by the 
‘average workers,’ etc.” 
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form a subject that is itself not reducible to its individual members. Her account focuses 
on joint commitment and intention, which the vanguard clearly must have.  
On Plural Subjects 
 For Gilbert, a joint commitment is a commitment of the will that involves two or more 
people. A joint commitment has, as its object, accepting a certain goal,12 e.g. committing to 
intend or believe something. “The general form of a joint commitment, then, is this: the parties 
jointly commit to X as a body.”13 By the phrase ‘as a body’ Gilbert argues that the individual 
members or persons need not personally believe exactly the same thing as the body itself 
believes. She argues that a body is constituted by individuals who hold a shared goal in common. 
“This constitution of a single body, with the belief in question will be achieved by a suitable 
concordance of the several actions and expressions of the individual parties.”14 Thus actions, not 
beliefs, of the involved parties determines the constitution of the body. More specifically, actions 
that advance the common goal are more important than the personal beliefs of individual parties. 
Gilbert argues that a joint commitment to believe X does not entail each individual party 
constituting the body personally believes X.15 This allows for the possibility of different 
members to believe different things as long as they are all committed to the same goal. 
 
12 Cf. Gilbert, A Theory of Political Obligation, p. 137: “People may jointly commit by accepting as a body, a 
certain goal.”  
13 Ibid., p. 137. Italics in original. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid: “It is worth emphasizing that a joint commitment to believe that such-and-such as a body does not –as I 
understand it – require that parties to the commitment personally to believe anything. The commitment is, after all, 
together to constitute as far as is possible, a single body that believes that such-and-such. None of the individuals in 
question is that body. It is reasonable, then, to deny that their personal beliefs are not in question.” 
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 Gilbert gives the following definition of a plural subject: “A and B (and…) (or those with 
feature F) constitute a plural subject (by definition) if and only if they are jointly committed to 
doing something as a body – in a broad sense of ‘do’.”16 When speaking of the intentions or 
beliefs of a plural subject, particularly if one includes oneself in said plural subject, the first 
person plural ‘we’ or ‘us’ is used. I would use the term ‘we’ when describing not my own 
thoughts or feelings about a particular subject, but when I want to include others in those 
thoughts or feelings as well. For example, I might say to an invited speaker: “We really enjoyed 
your talk.” The ‘we’ involved here refers to the collective of individuals who attended the talk, or 
to the philosophy department as a whole. By saying “We really enjoyed your talk” I am not 
stating a personal belief – I am rather stating a belief of a group of which I happen to be 
member.17 Perhaps I, for independent reasons, am not feeling well that day, and so I personally 
was not in the proper mentality to fully appreciate the talk; or perhaps I was not well versed in 
the relevant literature to derive proper ‘enjoyment’. Despite all this, I am still capable of making 
the judgment that ‘we’ really enjoyed the talk as a group.18  
 
16 Ibid., p. 144-145. 
17 My own personal beliefs might not match up exactly which the beliefs of the plural subject. Extending the 
example, I personally might believe that the talk was lack-luster, or that the speaker did not stay on topic. 
Nevertheless we (the audience or the department) as a whole might have really enjoyed it. 
18 If, however, I absolutely hated the talk, and moreover if I could see or imagine others hating the talk as well, one 
might say that the statement “we really enjoyed the talk” would be disingenuous. While such a case might be true, it 
does not threaten Gilbert’s theory as such, since we might more aptly describe two plural subjects: a body whose 
collective belief would be “we really enjoyed the talk” and a second body whose collective belief would be “we 
actually hated the talk” or some variant. Distinguishing these two groups does not in itself constitute a critique of 
Gilbert’s theory, but rather a misapplication to the situation. Moreover, distinguishing between these two groups 
does not entail that a plural subject consisting of ‘talk attendees’ or ‘the philosophy department’ does not exist – it 
merely means that such plural subjects could not accurately be attributed the belief “we really enjoyed the talk.” 
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 Gilbert argues that a plural subject is capable of acting together to accomplish a shared 
goal. She gives three necessary and sufficient conditions for acting together. People act together 
when:  
(1) they are jointly committed to espousing as a body the appropriate goal; (2) 
they are fulfilling the behavioral conditions associated with the achievement of 
that goal; [and] (3) their satisfaction of these conditions is motivated in each case 
by the existence of the joint commitment.19  
In essence, parties to a plural subject can be understood as acting together if they express a 
readiness to act with respect to their joint commitment. This is what Gilbert means by “in a broad 
sense of ‘do’.” Returning to the example, take the plural subject whose reference is the ‘we’ in 
the statement “We really enjoyed your talk.” I can be considered to be acting together with the 
other members of this plural subject if I fulfill the three conditions stated above.20  
 Thus, Gilbert’s account of plural subjects captures the subjective aspect (or lack thereof) 
of an economic class. Interestingly, Gilbert footnotes Marx,21 insisting that there is an important 
difference between a class that is aware of its social position, and one that is not. This distinction 
points to the fact that there are other factors involved in determining class membership and 
constitution outside of the subjective factors Gilbert highlights. In the following section, I will 
 
19 Gilbert, A Theory of Political Obligation, p. 146. 
20 Perhaps the goal of this plural subject is to get a drink with the speaker after the talk (an appropriate goal for the 
plural subject that expresses the belief “We really enjoyed your talk”). We act together when we are (1) jointly 
committed to saying we will go get a drink; (2) walking over to the bar; and (3) motivated to do so because we really 
enjoyed the talk. I, along with other parties of the plural subject, can express our readiness to act by asking when and 
where people are meeting up. 
21 Footnote 2, ibid., p. 167. As an aside, Gilbert indicates towards the distinction between a class in itself and a class 
for itself, which she cites the Communist Manifesto as its source. In fact, Marx and Engels do not make this 
distinction in the Manifesto, and such a dichotomy deserves further scrutiny. Cf. Andrew, Edward. “Class in Itself 
and Class against Capital: Karl Marx and his Classifiers,” Canadian Journal of Political Science, p. 577-584. 
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argue that an economic class is (also) determined by the objective aspects of class interest and 
struggle.  
 On Gilbert’s view, the members of a plural subject can be obligated to act in a certain 
way even if the plural subject formed under conditions of coercion.22 This entails that certain 
normative obligations may still hold even if individual members were coerced to be a member of 
the plural subject in question. Specifically, she appeals to a certain ambiguity in the term 
‘voluntary’ with respect to whether or not someone intentionally does something:  
Consider now the claim that one’s entry into an agreement…must be voluntary. 
Suppose one allows, plausibly, that this is true if ‘voluntary’ is interpreted in the 
intention sense: the claim that one agreed can be defeated if one can show that 
one did whatever is alleged to have constituted one’s entry into the agreement 
without any intention to agree. One must be careful not to slide from this 
plausible claim to the quite different point that one’s entry into an agreement must 
be voluntary in the sense of un-coerced.23 
It must be true that a member of the plural subject in question intends to join and does not join 
accidentally. I cannot trick someone into joining the vanguard, and still expect her to fulfill the 
obligations of membership. However, Gilbert leaves open the possibility that even under 
conditions of coercion, obligations between members of a plural subject still hold. We could 
imagine a situation in which someone is coerced into being a member of the vanguard by one’s 
dire economic conditions. Thus, on her view, this does not negate the obligation or duty to other 
members, even if this normativity is not morally normative. 
  Gilbert discusses this distinction in reference to obligations to “morally suspect political 
institutions.”24 She affirms the possibility of conflicting duties – I might still be obligated, in 
 
22 Gilbert talks about this in Chapter 5 of A Theory of Political Obligation p, 75-82.  
23 Ibid., p. 78-79. 
24 Ibid., p. 82-83. 
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some sense, to perform an immoral promise even in those situations where I might have a 
(moral) obligation not to do so. To add to this discussion, we might even imagine being part of 
multiple plural subjects, which obligate us to take contradictory actions, such that cannot even 
appeal to a moral/amoral distinction in order to resolve the contradiction. To be a part of a plural 
subject commits its constituent members to act a certain way, even under conditions of coercion. 
The vanguard is a good example of a plural subject because this kind of normativity seems to 
hold. Certainly, one might have moral reasons, or even reasons determined by (objective) 
economic factors to act a certain way with respect to other members of the vanguard. However, 
simply by virtue of membership in the vanguard, there are also certain normative standards that 
hold despite coercive conditions. Once agreeing to be a part of the vanguard, one has certain 
obligations to fulfill, and members hold each other accountable for fulfilling them.  
 An economic class on the other hand, particularly the proletarian class in our current 
historical moment, is not a plural subject in this way. As we saw in chapters 1 and 2, there are 
many obstacles for the proletariat as a class to unite in this way. The current members of the 
proletariat are not ‘jointly committed to doing something as a body’ even in the broadest sense of 
‘do’. According to Marx, the proletarian class might have a shared or common interest (i.e. 
revolution and overthrowing capitalist modes of production), but its members did not jointly 
commit to it. It is difficult to say that the proletariat in its current state even has beliefs held in 
common. As it exists today, the working class has certainly not espoused a readiness to act, or 
fulfilled any behavioral conditions, in even the broadest sense of ‘do’. However, there is nothing 
in Gilbert’s account that forecloses the possibility of the proletariat becoming a plural subject. If 
the members of the working class developed a joint commitment to some goal and expressed a 
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readiness to act on it, there is no reason why that group would not be a plural subject in the way 
Gilbert describes. 
Conclusion 
 In this section I have argued that Gilbert’s account of plural subjects is a useful way of 
understanding the vanguard group of revolutionaries as described by Lenin. For Gilbert, a plural 
subject jointly commits to an action in order to accomplish a shared goal. While the proletariat as 
a class might not be best seen as a plural subject, a small, dedicated group of professional 
revolutionaries would be. Lenin describes this vanguard group as coming together voluntarily in 
order to engage in revolutionary action. They establish a shared goal, social transformation, and 
commit to doing something, in the broadest sense of ‘do’.  
 Lenin does not clearly distinguish between this vanguard group of professional 
revolutionaries and a vanguard party. It is unclear whether he sees the agency of the vanguard as 
different than the agency of the party. In what follows, I will discuss the group agency of the 
Communist Party as conceptually distinct from that of the vanguard. The main difference is that 
the party has a particular organizational structure, as well as institutionalized methods of making 
decisions. While this distinction is helpful conceptually in order to better understand the kind of 
agency involved, it is important to keep in mind that these two groups overlap, especially 
considering that the professional revolutionaries of the vanguard were and are often also party 
members. When these individuals act, it would be difficult, if not impossible to distinguish 
whether they were acting strictly as party members, professional revolutionaries, or even as 
members of their social class. In what follows, the aim is not to offer hard and fast rules for 
determining these distinctions; rather, it is to look closer at different accounts of group agency in 
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order to better understand how they might help us in understanding what kind of agency is at 
work in the concept of class consciousness. 
 
The Corporate Agency of the Communist Party 
 In this section, I argue that the Communist Party is a group agent. Karl Marx and 
Friedrich Engels describe the Communist Party as having no separate interests of its own, but 
rather engages in the political struggle by taking on the interests of the proletariat as a whole. 
Christian List and Philip Pettit develop a realist account of group agency that resists reducing the 
agency of the group to the agency of its constituent members. I argue that the Communist Party 
meets the conditions for corporate agency as List and Pettit describe.25 Specifically, I argue that 
the party meets both the conditions of joint action, as well as conditions for functionally 
inexplicit institutional structure. List and Pettit’s account seeks to find a middle way between 
eliminativism and emergentism. I argue that the party structure pushes against their 
methodological individualism and opens the possibility of thinking beyond it. 
 Below, I discuss the role of the party in the Communist Manifesto. While Marx and 
Engels do not provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a concept of the party, they outline 
the role and function of the party. Importantly, the party does not have its own interests separate 
 
25 It is perhaps more than a little ironic to be describing the Communist Party as having corporate agency. I retain 
the language of corporate agency, however, in order to follow the recent trend in analytic group agency set by Peter 
French in Corporate Ethics. French uses the corporation as his example, however subsequent thinkers, such as List 
and Pettit, have a wider scope of what might count as a group agent. In what follows, I understand corporate agency 
not strictly as the agency of a corporation, but rather the agency of any group that is determined at least in part by its 
organizational structure. For those who still resist this use of the term corporation, I would note that Hegel discusses 
the ‘corporation’ (Korporation) in paragraphs 250-256 of the Philosophy of Right, although his conception is quite 
far from our modern use of the term. While an extended discussion of the Hegelian notion of the corporation and its 




from the proletariat and does not fight the class struggle in its place. Then, I discuss List and 
Pettit’s account of group agency, showing that the party meets conditions for joint action and has 
a functionally inexplicit organizational structure. List and Pettit identify four factors of joint 
action: having a shared goal, individual contribution, interdependence, and common awareness. 
 Functionally inexplicit groups do not make decisions according to mechanistically 
determined rules in advance but incorporate feedback mechanisms. Through a critique of their 
account of autonomy of the group agent its supervenience relation, I show that their account is in 
fact much closer to that of the early Marxist theorists than it might first appear. As we saw in 
Horkheimer and Adorno’s discussion above, the party function is an important aspect with 
respect to the possibility of social change. This account of the group agency of the party thus 
sheds some light onto why the party is so important to the concept of class consciousness.   
The Role of the Party in the Communist Manifesto 
 In the Manifesto of the Communist Party Marx and Engels lay out the most general 
principles of the party. These principles relate less to the organizational structure, and more 
specifically to the position the party should take in general. Section two of the Manifesto begins 
by asking the question of the relationship between Communists and the proletariat as a whole. 
Marx and Engels answer: “The Communists do not form a separate party opposed to other 
working-class parties. They have no interests separate and apart from those of the proletariat as a 
whole.26 They do not set up any sectarian principles of their own, by which to shape and mold 
the proletarian movement.”27 The Communist Party is not intended to have its own attitudes, 
 
26 I go into more detail about class interest below. 
27 Marx and Engels, “The Manifesto of the Communist Party,” in The Marx Engels Reader p. 483-484. 
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beliefs, or desires apart from those of the proletarian class as a whole.28 As we saw in chapter 2, 
however, determining these attitudes, beliefs, desires is difficult because of the spell of ideology 
– nevertheless, it is clear that on Marx and Engels’ view, the party does not establish its own 
interests over and against the working class, or other working class parties. On the contrary, it is 
the function of the party to express the interests of the proletariat as a whole. It would seem that 
the reason for establishment as a party precisely in order to facilitate revolutionary action. 
 Marx and Engels continue by distinguishing the Communist Party from other working-
class parties29 in two ways. First, they hold that, “In the national struggles of the proletarians of 
the different countries, they point out and bring to the front the common interests of the entire 
proletariat, independently of nationality.”30 National struggles in different countries around the 
world, in virtue of their different material conditions and geopolitical situations, inevitably play 
out differently. The goal particular to the communist party is to prioritize the common interests 
of the global proletariat as a class, not just the proletarians of a particular nation state. National 
workers parties, for example, might have the narrower goal of improving worker conditions in 
that particular nation state. The Communist Party, on the other hand, is explicitly tasked with 
finding the common interests across national difference. This is not to say that support of a 
national workers party would never be acceptable – in certain situations such action would be 
beneficial to the proletariat as a whole. Marx and Engels’ point here is that context matters with 
 
28 See Chapter 1 for Marx’s account of the difference between general and particular interests.  
29 Other working-class parties would be other political parties that fight for the interests of the working class, but do 
not adopt the values, tactics, or end goals of the Communist Party. These parties often fight for a reform of the 
system that benefits the working class, such as an increase in the minimum wage, or safer working conditions, but 
might not advocate revolutionary transformation of the social structure. Today, we might consider the Democratic 
Party such a party (although it is perhaps unclear whether the Democratic Party truly has the interests in mind, or 
only serves the interests of its capitalist donors). The Democratic Socialists of America (DSA) might be another, 
more progressive working-class party. While the DSA advocates for the interests of the proletariat as a class, it does 
not advocate seizing the means of production, or the abolition of private property.   
30 Marx and Engels, “The Manifesto of the Communist Party,” in The Marx-Engels Reader, p. 484. 
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respect to supporting particular worker movements, and that it is the job of the communist party 
to always keep the common interests of the entire proletariat in mind. 
 Second, they hold that, “In the various stages of development which the struggle of the 
working class against the bourgeoisie has to pass through, they always and everywhere represent 
the interests of the movement as a whole.”31 According to Marx and Engels, capitalist society 
does not develop evenly or uniformly across different countries. At times this means that the 
particular interests of proletarians in one country are different that the particular interests of 
proletarians in another. In order to avoid dividing the working-class movement, Marx and 
Engels’ position holds that the task of the Communist Party must be to in all cases represent the 
interests of the proletariat as a whole, not merely sections of it. The Communist Party is thus 
practically the most advanced32 section of working-class parties, which pushes forward all 
others. Theoretically, they have the clearest understanding33 of the movement of society and are 
thus in the best position to determine where aid is needed and lend that aid. 
 Ultimately, however, Marx and Engels hold that the aim of the communist party and 
those of other, national workers parties are in alignment: “The immediate aim of the communists 
is the same as that of all other proletarian parties: formation of the proletariat into a class, 
overthrow of the bourgeois supremacy, conquest of political power by the proletariat.” They say 
little else, either in the Manifesto or elsewhere, about specific party organizational structure. 
Party organizational structure becomes a question for Lenin and Luxemburg (among others) as 
seen in Chapter 1. In this sense, it is not primarily the task of the communist party to determine 
 
31 Ibid. 
32 Lenin draws on this notion in order to develop a concept of the vanguard discussed above.   
33 We saw in Chapter 1 that Lukács argues for the epistemological superiority of the standpoint of the proletariat. 
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what is to be done in order to achieve revolution; rather, it is to keep the interests of the class as a 
whole in mind, and act in such a way as to act in alignment with those interests. Following 
Lukacs, “The struggle of the Communist Party is focused upon the class consciousness of the 
proletariat. Its organizational separation from the class does not mean in this case that it wishes 
to do battle for its interests on its behalf and in its place.”34 In order to better understand this 
organizational separation, while not acting on behalf of the class, I will now turn to List and 
Pettit’s account of group agency.  
List and Pettit’s Account of Group Agency 
 In Group Agency, List and Pettit defend a position that groups meet the conditions for 
agency by having intentional states and engage in decision making processes. In this section, I 
argue that this kind of group agency maps onto the kind of agency described above in the party 
structure. While the party structure described above has many features, I will focus on two key 
features I see as central to the party structure: the joint intention of the group and its 
organizational structure. Despite methodological differences, I broadly agree with List and 
Pettit’s description of group agency as it applies to the organizational structure. This is to say, the 
Communist Party, as it is understood by the early Marxists theorists, meets the conditions for 
corporate agency as List and Pettit describe. After turning to each feature in detail, I will give a 
brief sketch why these features are salient to the party structure. 
 Joint Intention:  Joint intention is an important feature of group agency. In the party, as 
well as the vanguard, joint intention is an important aspect of this kind of group agency. List and 
Pettit identify four features of a collection of individuals who jointly intend some action: they 
 
34 Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, p. 326. 
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have a shared goal, each individual contributes, there is interdependence between the members, 
and they have a common awareness of each other’s beliefs concerning the group. As is consistent 
with their methodological individualism, List and Pettit focus on the conceptual movement from 
individual level to group level. After going over each feature in turn, I will suggest how we 
might also think of the conceptual movement going in the opposite direction as well. 
 Before turning to the four features of joint intention required for group agency, I would 
like to note that List and Pettit briefly consider the possibility of group agents without joint 
intention. They suggest two possible ways in which individuals could combine into group agents 
absent joint intention. The first involves “a process of natural or cultural evolution in which 
members are selected for possessing traits that lead them to act as required for group agency.”35 
In a situation such as this, they argue that the individuals might not be aware that group agency 
was achieved, but would still be able to adjust their desires and beliefs to one another, as well as 
the circumstances. Crucially, they admit the possibility that such a situation could result in 
“group acts in service of common desires according to common beliefs.”36 I will return to the 
possibility of such a situation in the section below, however for the present purposes, it is enough 
to say that List and Pettit do not consider such a situation plausible. They admit that cultural 
features such as competition shape commercial corporations, however they are unaware of such a 
process happening among human beings.37 Specifically, they are concerned with individuals, 
absent any joint intention, organizing or continuing to intervene, sustain, and enact group-level 
beliefs or desires other than, or even contrary to, their own individual ones. Indeed, this is 
 
35 List and Pettit, Group Agency p. 33. 
36 Ibid. 




perhaps the central question of the development of class consciousness. For the present purposes, 
I will leave this question aside. For now, I follow List and Pettit insofar as the group agency of 
the party is concerned. It is highly implausible that the group agency of the party would be able 
to function absent joint intention. As we saw in chapter 1, Luxemburg’s position with respect to 
the spontaneous organization of the party structure seems lacking. It is not enough to have 
members of the proletariat self-organize spontaneously – instead, some form of conscious 
intervention is required. Again, the tendencies of capitalism seem to push back against the 
spontaneous organization of the masses such that their coalescing into a group agent is 
improbable at best, impossible at worst. 
 List and Pettit consider a second way in which a group agent might form absent joint 
intention. This situation involves “one or several organizational designers co-opting others into a 
structure underpinning group agency, without making them aware of their agency at the group 
level and without seeking their intentional acquiescence in the arrangement.”38 They use the 
example of a terrorist cell in the dark about the full nature of their operation or overall purpose. 
Taking an example from the Marxian tradition, such a group might be instrumentalized for 
Blanquist reasons. If only a few Blanquist coordinators have full knowledge of society, it would 
be possible for them to direct other members of the proletariat so as to engage in social, political, 
or economic action. Those being directed need not have full class consciousness – discipline and 
the willingness to follow orders might be sufficient for a successful action. As we saw above, 
however, there are also more general problems with this position. While List and Pettit consider 
this second way more plausible, it is less appealing for our purposes.  
 
38 List and Pettit, Group Agency p. 33. 
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 Four Features of Joint Intention:  Setting aside questions of the possibility of the 
formation of a group agent absent joint intention, I follow, broadly speaking, List and Pettit’s 
account of group agents in the party case. While perhaps not sufficient for describing the agency 
of the party, joint intention does seem to be necessary. That is, in order to understand the kind of 
agency the party has, it is necessary to understand the requirements of joint intention List and 
Pettit outline. In what follows, I will discuss each feature, and suggest how it might apply to the 
formation, development, and/or continuation of the party.  
 Shared goal:  The first feature of joint intention is having a shared goal. For List and 
Pettit, members of a group39 jointly intend to do something if “they intend that they, the members 
of a more or less salient collection, together promote the given goal.”40 Individual members of 
the group must have a common goal. This is not to say that members might have different 
interpretations of the goal, or even different strategies on how to attain this goal. As we will see 
below, the internal organization of a group can have decision making mechanisms in order to 
resolve differences. Indeed, it would be an exceedingly high bar if all members of a group must 
agree absolutely on the stated goal. Rather, it seems this feature of having a shared goal can be 
described in more general terms. For the party, that it has a shared goal appears quite clear: to 
develop and maintain revolutionary energy for the sake of social transformation. Each member 
of the party, insofar as they are party members, must intend this goal. That is, entry into the party 
seems to require intending individually the promotion of this shared goal. 
 
39 List and Pettit employ the phrase ‘collection of individuals’ in their discussion of joint intention. In my discussion 
below, I have changed this language to ‘group’ since I argue that the party as a group does have a joint intention and 
is more than a mere collection of individuals.  
40 List and Pettit, Group Agency, p. 33. 
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 Individual contribution:  The second feature of joint intention is individual contribution. 
Members of a group jointly intend to do something if, “they each intend to do their allotted part 
in a more or less salient plan for achieving that goal.”41 Individual members of the group must 
each intend individually to do their part in order to achieve their goal. Again, the members of the 
group need not agree absolutely about what ‘doing their part’ entails. However, each must be 
willing to do their part, otherwise the group would not be able to function as a group. For the 
party, doing one’s part might include many different things – engaging in organizing work, 
building power for the movement, or any other such action that moves towards the goal of social 
transformation. Insofar as individuals are party members, they must be willing to act in this way. 
That is, membership in the party seems to require something more than just signing up, but rather 
a willingness to act for the sake of the goals established by the party. 
 Interdependence:  The third feature of joint intention is interdependence. Members of a 
group jointly intend to do something if, “they each form these [individual] intentions at least 
partly because of believing that others form such intentions too.”42 Individual members of the 
group must each form their intentions believing that everyone else has similar intentions. For the 
party, this feature seems clear as well. Individual members of the party believe that other 
members form similar intentions with respect to their overall goal. There are perhaps situations 
in which one member might suspect other members of not having such intentions. It is in these 
situations, however, that it would appear that the joint intention, and even the group agency of 
the party would break down. In fighting and accusations of revisionism and opportunism, at least 






the party as a group agent, it would seem, thus requires this kind of interdependence between its 
members. 
 Common awareness:  Members of a group jointly intend to do something as long as, 
“this is all a matter of common awareness, with each believing that the first three conditions are 
met, each believing that others believe this, and so on.”43 Individual members of the group must 
each know that the first three features hold. This knowledge need not be absolute – it may be 
very difficult, or even impossible, to guarantee that each member knows each other member well 
enough to believe their intentions, and so on. It seems reasonable to suggest that common 
awareness would be achieved with a relative level of group transparency, such that members 
know other members, and are able to talk freely and openly. For the party, this final feature 
seems important as well. Again, it is precisely when common awareness is not present, that we 
see the historical break down of the party structure. When party members stop believing that 
other members are acting in the interest of the proletariat, or worse, accusing others of 
inadequate levels of conviction for the cause, do we see the inability of the group to form a joint 
intention, and thus act effectively as a group. 
  As we have seen, the party meets the conditions for forming a joint intention, which in 
turn supports the claim that it is a group agent. The party must have a shared goal – social 
transformation. Each of the individual members must contribute in some way to achieving that 
goal. Each member must believe others have similar intentions, as well as believe all others 
believe these things as well. Break down of this structure, at least historically, suggests that party 





joint intention, it would appear that the party could not properly function as a group agent. The 
party is not only a group with a joint intention but also follows a particular organizational 
structure. 
Organizational Structure  
In addition to forming joint intentions, List and Pettit argue that the organizational structure of a 
group agent (at least in part) grants the group a kind of agency. They distinguish between 
different organizational structures of group agents as functionally explicit or functionally 
inexplicit organizational structures. In this section, I will argue that the party as group agent has 
(or is at least closer to) a functionally inexplicit organizational structure. Based on this 
assessment, I will weigh in on List and Pettit’s discussion on two related topics: holistic 
supervenience between individuals and groups; and the autonomy of the group agent with 
respect to its members. Where they offer supervenience as an adequate explanation, I will 
suggest that the organizational structure of the party, as described by the early Marxists theorists 
in chapter 1, offers a more complicated (and perhaps nuanced) view. 
 List and Pettit distinguish between functionally explicit and functionally inexplicit group 
structures. A functionally explicit group structure is one that, “uses a given aggregation function, 
such as majority voting, applies it mechanically to the attitudes of its members, and then enacts 
the resulting group attitudes in an equally mechanical way.”44 One example of this kind of 
mechanical aggregation function would be a simple majoritarian voting system in order to 
determine the preferences and judgments of the group. Under such an aggregate model, the 
preferences or judgments of the group would be directly reducible to the preferences or 
 
44 Ibid., p. 60. 
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judgments of the individual members of the group. A functionally inexplicit group structure, on 
the other hand, does not rely on this direct model of aggregation in order to determine the 
preferences or judgments of the group. Rather, it, “involves a heuristic for determining, from 
proposition to proposition, the way for the group to go on, perhaps through deliberation, giving 
the group the flexibility to adjust its attitudes whenever appropriate.”45 While this process may 
mimic some aggregation function, List and Pettit admit that it would be an exceedingly complex 
aggregation. They hold that even with a functionally inexplicit group structure, the group 
attitudes generated (assuming non-random mechanisms of attitude formation) are still a function 
of the individual members of the group.46 In short, they identify an advantage in functionally 
inexplicit group structures, since it allows for more flexibility with respect to the mode in which 
group-level attitudes are determined. 
 While it may be that the organizational structure of the party is not exactly one of a 
functionally inexplicit group structure (as we will see by the end of this section), it is certainly 
closer to it than a functionally explicit group structure. This is, in part, because of the possibility 
of feedback mechanisms that accompany the functionally inexplicit model. List and Pettit 
identify two points about feedback mechanisms. First they, point out that feedback mechanisms 
allow individuals, when determining an group attitude (about some proposition ‘p’), to be driven 
by preferences and judgments about whether it would be better for the group to adopt an attitude 
with respect to ‘p’, and not just their own personal preferences or judgments about the issue in 
question. This means that individual members of a group are able to take group level attitudes 
and beliefs into account when making their individual decisions. Second, feedback mechanisms 
 




introduce a causal relationship between individual-level and group-level phenomena. The 
attitudes of the individuals can cause the attitudes of the group to change, and vice versa.47  
 As an example, let’s think about feedback mechanisms in the context of a group of 
workers considering whether or not to go on a wildcat strike.48 Let’s assume that their 
organizational structure is functionally inexplicit – there are no mechanistic rules that they 
follow, and their decision will not be implemented mechanistically. Rather, they are simply 
sitting around a table in the break room weighing their options. One of the workers has a family 
to support and is in a dire financial situation. While the other workers could support themselves 
for a few months if they get fired, this worker could not. When the workers are deciding whether 
or not to strike, they will consider not only their own individual position, but also the position of 
the group. The worker with financial difficulties, if deciding only with their own individual 
situation in mind, might decide against a strike, since losing their job would cause a lot of 
suffering. However, establishing that there is a feedback mechanism means that the worker is 
also about to take group-level attitudes and beliefs into account. The group, after enduring years 
of mistreatment by management, is fed up and angry with the situation. The worker with 
financial difficulties might take this into account, deciding to strike with the rest, despite the 
possibility of individual hardship. This means that there is a causal relation between the 
individual and group level attitudes and beliefs. In our example, the worker with financial 
difficulties ultimately decides to strike because the group wants to, or because the group has been 
 
47 List and Pettit hold that the presence of sophisticated motives and causal relations do not contradict their claim 
that the group ultimately implements some aggregation function that member attitudes are mapped onto group 
attitudes. 
48 A wildcat strike, as opposed to a regular strike, is one that has not be officially organized by a union or sanctioned 
by management. I use this type of strike as an example because it involves decisions that are clearly not mechanistic.  
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mistreated. The way that the group feels about the situation affects their decision – and the 
worker uses this feedback in order to make their final decision concerning the strike.  
 I argue that that the organizational structure of the party would be functionally inexplicit. 
The party, on Lukács’ view, must not be a mechanistically determined group, but rather be 
always flexible insofar as it can respond to the material conditions of society. Consider the 
following quote, “Thus the ability to act, the faculty of self-criticism, of self-correction and of 
theoretical development all co-exist in a state of constant interaction. The Communist Party does 
not function as a stand-in for the proletariat even in theory.”49 Here Lukács focuses on the 
reflexive properties of the party, arguing that even theoretically, the party cannot stand in for the 
thoughts and attitudes of the proletariat. Rather, the party must maintain an internal faculty of 
adjustment or self-alteration. Lukács continues: “If the class consciousness of the proletariat as a 
function of the thought and action of the class as a whole is something organic and in a state of 
constant flux, then this must be reflected in the organized form of that class consciousness, 
namely in the Communist Party.”50 The party, as the organized form of proletarian class 
consciousness, cannot be rigidly or mechanistically determined, even by its own organizational 
structure. It must remain open, not only to the changing attitudes of its individual members, but 
also to the preferences and judgments of the proletariat as a whole. Here, the ‘heuristic’ involved 
is indeed complex – involving not only members of the group in question (the party), but also 
members of another group (individual members of the proletarian class), as well as the group 
 




attitudes of that group as a whole (attitudes of the proletariat51). At the very least, this heuristic 
pushes up against the limits of calling it an ‘aggregation function’ since it seems difficult, if not 
impossible, to reduce the attitude of the party to the attitudes of the individual members of the 
party. That is to say, the attitudes of the party members may be necessary, but not sufficient in 
determining the attitude of the group. As I will suggest below, we perhaps need other factors in 
order to determine this group attitude. 
Holistic Supervenience and the Autonomy of the Group Agent 
 List and Pettit hold a supervenience view of group agents. They reject both the 
Emergentist and Eliminativist views, arguing for a kind of middle position between the two. 
They hold that a supervenience view of the relationship between individual members of a group 
and the group as a whole. This view allows them to reject the eliminative view of groups, which 
would hold that groups are a metaphysical fiction, and all our talk of group phenomena is 
metaphorical. It also allows them to reject the emergence view of groups, which would hold that 
a group is a new metaphysical entity over and above its individual members. In this section, I 
will consider List and Pettit’s account of supervenience, especially insofar as it relates to the 
autonomy of the group agent. Taking the party as an example of a group agent, I will push on the 
limits of this view, arguing that holistic supervenience is necessary, but not sufficient for 
describing the role or function of the party. Ultimately, I hold that List and Pettit’s view on group 
 
51 Whether or not the proletariat, as a group, can have attitudes is an important question. However, it is not one that I 
can explore here. For our purposes here, one need only admit that individual members of the party believe the 
proletariat as a whole to have attitudes, not that they in fact have them. We can thus remain agnostic with respect to 
the question of whether the proletariat can have an attitude, while at the same time affirming the claim that 
individual members of the party believe the proletariat to have an attitude, and this belief (individual, shared, 
collective, etc.) can motivate the rational decision making of that individual visa vis the group attitude of the party. 
In any case, as I have shown above/will show below, it is not unreasonable to ascribe to the proletariat a group 
interest – whether this group interest translates into a group attitude, on the other hand, is another matter.   
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agency is not incorrect, but merely incomplete with respect to particular complex group agents 
whose role and function develop overtime.  
 List and Pettit defend a supervenience relation between individual-level and group-level 
phenomena. Supervenience is a mode of determination in which lower-level patterns relate to 
higher-level patterns in multiple and complex ways. The notion of supervenience is a key 
concept for List and Pettit because it, “leaves open the possibility that while the ‘lower-level’ 
pattern determines the ‘higher-level’ pattern, the higher-level pattern may be realized in a 
number of lower-level ways.”52 This leaves open different arrangements or possible complex or 
nuanced combinations of individual group members in order to explain group level phenomena. 
Specifically, they defend a holistic account of supervenience. “Holistic supervenience. The set of 
group attitudes across propositions is determined by the individual sets of attitudes across these 
propositions.”53 This kind of supervenience goes beyond proposition-wise supervenience, where 
the group attitude on a proposition is directly determined by the individual attitudes on the 
proposition, even if the mode of determination differs from proposition to proposition. Holistic 
supervenience is a relation in which the sets of individual attitudes determine the set of group 
attitudes, but there is not necessarily a one to one correlation between the individual and group 
attitudes. This implies that knowing individual attitudes towards a proposition p is neither 
sufficient nor necessary for determining the group’s attitudes towards p, resulting in weak 
autonomy or strong autonomy respectively. 
 Before turning to this notion of autonomy of the group level phenomenon, one aspect to 
note in List and Pettit’s account is that the organizational structures they identify that give rise to 
 
52 List and Pettit, Group Agency, p. 65. 
53 Ibid., p. 69. 
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a holistic supervenience relation between the attitudes of individual members and those of the 
group are still homogeneous insofar as each member of the group plays the same role in 
determining the group’s attitudes. While at first this may seem at odds with an account of the 
party, since different members will inevitably play different institutional roles within the 
organizational structure. While this may be true, there is a kind of homogeneity across party 
members that keeps true to the kind of holistic supervenience List and Pettit describe. Lenin, for 
example, maintains that a certain level of homogeneity among party members is required: “In 
view of this common feature of the members of such an organization, all distinctions as between 
workers and intellectuals, and certainly distinctions of trade and profession, must be utterly 
obliterated.”54 That is, while different members may fill different institutional roles, distinctions 
between so-called ‘specialists’ must be dissolved in order for the party to function properly.  
 As seen above, the vanguard of professional revolutionaries must make a similar 
dissolution – whereas capitalist society seeks to divide revolutionary organizations, the aim must 
be for some kind of unity or homogeneity.55 Or again, Lukács: “The party as a whole transcends 
the reified divisions according to nation, profession, etc., and according to modes of life 
(economics and politics) by virtue of its action. For this is oriented towards revolutionary unity 
and collaboration and aims to establish the true unity of the proletarian class.”56 Here the party as 
a group goes beyond (or aims at going beyond) divisions instilled through and by capitalist 
society. The party, as a whole, must have some kind of homogeneity unimpeded by these 
 
54 Lenin, What is to Be Done? p. 138. 
55 We should keep Adorno in mind here. The aim or goal is not complete unity or complete homogeneity. The party 
does not (or should not) seek to dissolve all distinctions – only those distinctions created by capital whose purpose is 
to divide, distract, and ultimately dismantle revolutionary activity.  
56 Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, p. 339. 
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divisions in order to function properly. Here, List and Pettit’s account of holistic supervenience 
seems in line (at least in this aspect) with both Lenin’s and Lukács’ position on the 
organizational structure of the party.  
 Autonomy of Group Agents:  Based on the notion of holistic supervenience, List and 
Pettit defend a moderate view of the autonomy of group agents. On their view, group agency that 
supervenes on its members is not “ontologically autonomous,” but rather epistemologically 
autonomous.57 This is to say, knowing the attitudes, beliefs, or desires of the group in question 
cannot be easily determined by simply knowing the attitudes, beliefs, or desires or the individual 
members of that group. Ultimately, List and Pettit argue that the group’s attitudes can be derived 
from the attitudes of individual members in principle, although they admit that there are serious 
practical difficulties in doing so.58 However, they maintain that insofar as they put aside any 
mysterious forces as solutions to the problem, they need not put aside surprise. Indeed, for an 
account that maintains a methodological individualism, the robust account of group level 
phenomenon is surprising. By maintaining a middle ground between emergentism and 
eliminitivism, I argue that they side closer to the Emergentist position, or at least what we might 
call an ‘Emergentist position’ that aligns very closely with the positions of the early Marxist 
theorists we considered in chapter 1.  
 What List and Pettit ultimately reject from the Emergentist position is an appeal to a vis 
vitalis, a life force or vital force (élan vitale) that is something added to a group that give it its 
ontological status over and above its parts, as well as its relative autonomy. “Taken at its word, 
emergentism holds that group agents are real entities whose properties as agents do not 
 
57 List and Pettit, Group Agency, p. 76. 
58 Ibid., p 77. 
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supervene on the contributions of their individual members…[They held] that the force by which 
a collection of individuals constitutes a group agent is an add-on to the individual contributions 
of the members; it is something that accompanies those contributions but does not logically 
derive from them.”59 According to List and Pettit, the Emergentist view speaks in vague and 
elusive metaphors; it posits some mysterious force over and above the individual members.60 
 Both with respect to the general case of group agency, as well as the specific case of the 
group agency of the party, I agree with List and Pettit insofar as I also reject any ‘add-on’ force 
that contributes to the agency of the group. As we saw in chapter 1, the Marxian account of 
dialectical materialism rejects the independence of some spiritual realm, over and against the 
material realm, operating completely apart from that of the material conditions. Thus, I am in 
complete agreement with List and Pettit in rejecting the appeal to some mysterious force that 
binds a group together on grounds that defy logic or reason. The account of group agency, 
particularly with respect to the agency of the party, however, does not appeal to some mysterious 
force. Rather, the kind of agency involved in the party is perhaps confusing because, according 
to the Marxian tradition, the party is not a fully formed group, but rather always in the process of 
becoming, evolving, and changing. “The party called upon to lead the proletarian revolution is 
not born ready-made into its leading role: it, too, is not but is becoming. And the process of 
 
59 Ibid., p. 74-75. 
60 Ibid., p. 75: “As we imagine a collection of agents assuming all the attitudes and undertaking all the roles 
associated with group agency, we cannot hold open the possibility that group agency might not materialize.” Here 
we see, perhaps as plainly as possible, the distinction we must make between agency in the narrow sense as 
described in the analytic tradition, and the kind of capacity to ‘enact’ social transformation at the core of the 
arguments of the early Marxist theorists. Narrowly speaking, I agree with List and Pettit on this point – we must say 
that such a group has agency in the way they have described it independent of the material conditions of society in 
which it finds itself. Taken in a broader sense, however, it is easy to see that the capacity to ‘enact’ social 
transformation could exist for the same group, same individuals with the same attitudes, in one situation, and not for 
another. We must disentangle these two notions in order to understand how social conditions themselves impact 
agency, whether at the individual or group level.  
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fruitful interaction between party and class repeats itself – albeit differently – in the relationship 
between the party and its members.”61 Here, with some interpretation, we might say that Lukacs 
agrees with List and Pettit’s position with respect to holistic supervenience. In the relationship 
between the party and its members, there is not strong ontological autonomy that implies 
complete independence of the group from its members. Rather, there is a reciprocal, dialectical 
relation between them. The party does not appear fully-formed – it is not, if the ‘is’ designates an 
ontological entity completely apart from its constituent pieces. The group as group is in a 
constant state of becoming – despite the uniformity and continuity granted to it through its 
organizational and joint intentional structure, it is constantly evolving and changing.  
  It is with this becoming of the party in mind that we might understand the following, 
seemingly paradoxical statement: ““Lenin’s concept of organization is itself dialectical: it is both 
a product of and a conscious contributor to, historical development in so far as it, too, is 
simultaneously product and producer of itself.”62 If the party is a group already fully formed, 
then the claim that it is both product and producer of itself makes no sense. If, however, it is the 
kind of group that is constantly changing, then it is continually developing and adjusting itself to 
its environment. This is another way of saying that there are feedback mechanisms at work in the 
organizational structure. Party members do not make decisions mechanistically – their 
organization is functionally inexplicit and entails complex feedback mechanisms that include the 
party, the proletariat as a class, and society as a whole.   
 This concept of the party in turn pushes against the explanatory limits of holistic 
supervenience, especially with respect to the kind of autonomy List and Pettit ascribe to it. On 
 
61 Lukács, Lenin, a study on the unity of his thought, p. 37-38. Italics in original. 
62 Ibid., p. 37. 
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Lukacs’ view, the party does achieve a kind of autonomy or independence from the proletariat, 
however it is not full or complete independence. Consider the following passage:  
The communist Party is an autonomous form of proletarian class consciousness 
serving the interests of the revolution. It is essential to gain a correct theoretical 
understanding of it in its twofold dialectical relation: as both the form of this 
consciousness and the form of this consciousness, i.e. as both an independent and 
subordinate phenomenon.63  
Here again, we can see that the party also plays a productive role – both in terms of its own 
attitudes and beliefs, but also those of the class. The deeply relational, or mediated and 
mediating64 nature of the party organizational structure, thus, seems to push at the limit of the 
account of autonomy described by List and Pettit, providing a possible example from which to 
extend their account of group agency even further. 
Conclusion 
 In this section, I have attempted to argue that the organizational structure of the 
Communist Party has group agency in the way that List and Pettit describe. The party has both a 
joint-intention and an organizational structure that allow for the group to be an agent. Party 
members share intentions and make decisions through feedback mechanisms. Lastly, I have 
suggested that the party form, at least insofar as it is described by Lukács, Lenin, and others, 
pushes against the limits of List and Pettit’s account, particularly with respect to the becoming, 
and not just being of the group in question. Certainly, List and Pettit would not hold that agency 
 
63 Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, p. 330. Italics in original. 
64  Ibid., p. 299: “Organization is the form of mediation between theory and practice. And, as in every dialectical 
relationship, the terms of the relation only acquire concreteness and reality in and by virtue of this mediation. This 
ability of organization to mediate between theory and practice is seen most clearly by the way in which it manifests 
a much greater, finer and more confident sensitivity towards divergent trends than any other sector of political 
thought and action.” 
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arises magically or mysteriously all of a sudden – it is something that is developed, continued, 
and maintained over time. Thinking of the party as having a kind of agency that is becoming, 
rather than already fully formed, pushes against the limit of their account in interesting ways. 
This is not to say that their account is wrong or misguided – just that more work is perhaps 
warranted in order to better understand the process of the development of group agency as not 
already fully formed, but continually becoming. 
 In order to apply these abstract concepts to our own historical moment, the next practical 
move would be to look at our own society and ask: Where is the party today? Just as Horkheimer 
and Adorno were pessimistic in the absence of the party, at first glance the party, at least in the 
organizational structure described above, indeed seems to be lacking. What would be required, 
however, in order to apply these concepts to our own society, would be to identify the function 
the party form is intended to play, and see if there are organizations that are continuing this 
struggle. Perhaps today there is no one, unifying organization that fulfills all the roles the party 
function is supposed to play. However, if we look to labor unions, NGOs, and other non-profit 
organizations, one might see the possibility of uniting these disparate groups under one common 
fight or struggle – the class struggle of the proletariat. In what follows, I will outline one way of 
thinking of the proletariat today.  
 
Section 3:  Identifying with the Proletariat 
 In this section, I will explore the biggest, and perhaps the most difficult group to account 
for this chapter – the proletariat. Unlike the vanguard and party, the proletariat is a much larger 
group, and on the whole is much less homologous. The (potential) unity of the proletariat as a 
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class is also much less clear. Whereas the vanguard and the party initially form into groups 
intentionally and voluntarily, the proletariat is formed by its position within capitalist society. 
Thus, it does not have agency as defined by List and Pettit, and others from the group agency 
literature. What binds the proletariat, at least initially, is a common situation, that leads to a 
common interest. As we will see, this common interest can be described objectively; that is to 
say, does not depend on the subjective views of the individual proletarian members. Then, I will 
explore List and Pettit’s account of the problem involved with identifying with group agents. 
Specifically, they suggest that we may be able to identify with a group agent in an aspirational 
sense, meaning that we can identify with a group agent absent the strict requirements of agency. 
Lastly, I suggest that one way to do this is the use of we-narratives. We-narratives, on my view, 
with respect to the proletariat as a class, give us new resources to shape, build, and understand 
the proletariat as an agent, and lend to the creation of a sense of agency. Finally, I will explore 
who the proletariat might be today, and briefly note that while the proletariat of our current 
historical moment may not fulfill the requirements for agency in the strictest sense, it may still 
have a capacity for social transformation that is not reducible to agency as described by List and 
Pettit, and others.  
 Below I discuss a Marxist account of class interest. Following Allen Wood, I argue that 
class interest is not generated through an aggregate of individual proletarians. Rather, this class 
interest is objective determined by an analysis of class struggle. First, I look at List and Pettit’s 
account of identifying with group agents. They use the example of a pilot’s engagement with 
their navigational instruments in order to think about the way we use information from and about 
our environment. I argue that adopting the standpoint of the proletariat might operate in a similar 
fashion. Then, I argue that one strategy one could use in order to develop an account of the 
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standpoint of the proletariat is to use we-narratives. I follow Gallagher and Tollefsen in arguing 
that groups as well as individuals can have narratives. While establishing proletarian we-
narratives will not be sufficient for successful revolutionary action, they provide a helpful 
conceptual tool for political organizers. 
Class Interest 
 According to the Marxist account of class, class interest is not determined subjectively 
through the psychological states of individuals within that class, but rather objectively through 
the material conditions and the modes and relations of production of a given society. The 
proletarian class must come together and constitute itself not just as a class in itself, but as a class 
against capital. As we saw for Lukács and Adorno, the process by which this happens, both on 
the individual-level and group-level is a complex process, and one that does not happen 
spontaneously or on its own. Setting aside this question of awareness for the moment, class 
determination via objective, economic conditions also generates certain class (individual and 
collective) positions, as well as a general class interest. Following Allen Wood, in this section I 
will outline a concept of a class interest apart, but not completely separated, from the individual, 
subjective attitudes of the (individual members) of the class. Put in another way, class interests 
cannot be determined through any aggregate function – they are determined rather by the 
material interests of society.  
 Allen Wood argues that Marx’s account of a general class interest holds for the class as a 
whole and is not simply a shorthand or metaphor for talking about the aggregate of the individual 
interests. “The concept of something’s interests, it seems to me, is closely connected to several 
other concepts: what benefits it, what is good for it, what makes it well off. Something can be 
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said to have interests if these other things can be said of it.”65 On Wood’s view, the fact that we 
ascribe an interest to a thing is enough to say that it indeed has an interest. One might object, 
however, saying that such ascription is merely a shorthand of talking about the interests of the 
individual members of the class, and does not describe something other than these individual 
interests. Wood addresses this kind of objection, arguing that it is Marx’s account of a general 
class interest is warranted not only because we have the practice of ascribing interest to groups, 
but also because they may be ascribed to the political movements on which Marx’s theory of 
class is based.66  
 I would add to this account by saying that it is at least plausible to ascribe a general 
interest to a class because, following List and Pettit’s argument above, there is not a direct 
correlation between the interests of the members and the group or movement as a whole. For 
example, it may not be in the interest of an individual proletarian to go on strike – they might 
have a family to feed, or bills to pay.67 Nevertheless, it might be in the interest of the group on 
the whole that they strike. Such participation might further long-term goals of the proletariat 
such as increased wages or safer working conditions. At the very least, there must be a kind of 
holistic supervenience relation between the individual and the group with respect to interest.  
 As we saw in Chapter 1, Marx’s theory of class also involves class determination through 
class struggle. That is, one’s class position is not something determined subjectively – one’s 
class is not ‘up to you’ but rather is determined by the mode of production and social relations of 
 
65 Wood, Karl Marx, p. 97. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid., p. 95: “The historical potency Marx ascribes to general class interests thus presupposes not only that people 
tend to organize to promote the individual interests they share, but also that they sometimes tend to sacrifice these 
interests for the sake of the organizations they create and for the sake of the ideal values which serve to unify and 
strengthen these organizations.” 
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the society you live in. Even though class position is determined objectively, we saw from both 
Lukács and Adorno that subjective identification with one’s class position is often confused or 
obscured by capitalism itself through reification. In what follows, I will offer an approach, 
building off of List and Pettit’s account of (individually) identifying with group agents, as well 
as Gallagher and Tollefsen’s account of we-narratives that sketches the outlines of possible ways 
in which workers might align (or more properly realign) with their class position and class 
interest.   
List and Pettit on Identifying with Group Agents 
 List and Pettit argue that as individuals, we can identify our individual attitudes with 
group attitudes to such an extent that those group-level attitudes can become second nature 
individual attitudes. They use the example of a pilot using the instruments in a cockpit. They also 
highlight the role particular members of a group can play in realigning individual attitudes with 
group attitudes. I agree with this practice of group identification, arguing that it fits nicely with 
the picture of political action and agency I develop in Chapters 1 and 2. 
 List and Pettit use the example of an expert pilot who navigates a plane by developing a 
direct connection with the plane’s instruments. Rather than treating the instruments as evidences 
that counts in their own reasoning process, they incorporate68 these measurements and readings 
directly. “Just as pilots can connect in this direct way to the instruments on the cockpit panel, so 
the members of a group may connect themselves directly to the attitudes of the group…their 
individual attitudes are under the automatic guidance of the group, so that they can respond as 
 
68 Although it would go beyond the scope of the present argument, one might even say that this process indicates an 
extended mind, or enactivist approach. On the whole, I take List and Pettit’s view, as well as my own, to be 
compatible with such approaches.  
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spontaneously as pilots do when they take their cue from the panel before them.”69 In cases such 
as these, we take on a first-personal plural, ‘we’ attitude towards the group. List and Pettit note 
that it is only metaphorically speaking that the group’s mind is instantiated in each of us insofar 
as we act automatically according to these group attitudes. It seems as though in the case of 
ideology, for example, this automatic adoption of group level beliefs, and the relative spontaneity 
with which we act on those beliefs indicate that this phenomenon is in fact more real than 
metaphorical. Leaving aside these questions of ideology, I broadly agree with List and Pettit that 
group attitudes link up with our responses without (conscious) mediation of a belief about our 
membership of that group. 
 In addition, List and Pettit hold that individuals stand to benefit, in certain situations, 
from adopting a group attitude, as well as from the actions of a group. Conversely, we stand to 
lose, and perhaps even risk the dissolution of the agency of the group agent, when we fail to 
assume a group attitude. This kind of situation includes failing to “assume an appropriate, group 
standpoint; we may fail to identify as the group that our collective attitudes should activate. And 
so we may fail to perform appropriately as a group agent.”70 One reason we might fail to adopt 
the appropriate group standpoint that comes from the Marxian tradition might be because of 
reification, or false consciousness. Reified consciousness, on Lukács’ view, understands 
individual members of the proletariat as atomized individuals, disconnected completely from 
each other and from society. Indeed, the proper attitude for Lukács would be precisely to do as 
List and Pettit suggest: adopt the appropriate group standpoint, vis. the standpoint of the 
proletariat.  
 
69 List and Pettit, Group Agency, p. 192. 
70 Ibid., p. 193. 
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 List and Pettit go on to suggest that certain, activist members can play impactful roles in 
sustaining a group agent. In moments where we may fall out of the group attitude and revert to 
an individual, first person mode, someone can help us remember our shared identity and 
(re)adopt the appropriate group standpoint. “They may reconnect us with those attitudes, 
transforming our way of thinking in the way in which the thinking of beginner pilots is 
transformed when the cockpit instruments assume control over their responses. Social activists 
often describe this shift, in Marxist terms, as one of raising ‘group consciousness’.”71 I agree 
wholeheartedly with List and Pettit, although I hold that the process is not as simplistic as they 
describe. The process of raising consciousness is a complex and nuanced one, involving multiple 
individuals and groups across society. Moreover, this ‘consciousness raising’ is not without 
difficulties and barriers. However, given Adorno’s concerns about the totalized nature of 
capitalist society in Chapter 2, it is precisely this process of dislodging certain (individualistic) 
beliefs, and facilitating the adoption of the appropriate group beliefs that is of the utmost 
importance.  
Strategic Use of We-Narratives 
 One approach we could use to develop this kind of group identification with the 
proletariat is the implementation of we-narratives. Broadly speaking, this is in line with the task 
of the vanguard. Granted, the approach is almost certainly not sufficient for developing the kind 
of class consciousness outlined in chapter 1. Nevertheless, it may be a useful political organizing 
strategy. In this section, I will first describe the we-narrative as Gallagher and Tollefsen describe 
it and show what they expect it can do. Then I will suggest a way we could implement a 
 
71 Ibid., p. 193. 
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proletarian we-narrative and explore possible benefits of the approach. On the outset, it must be 
said that no single approach is likely to be a cure-all solution of the problem of reified conscious 
under capitalist society. That said, hopefully this (re)description of ideology critique in terms of a 
we-narrative will offer helpful insights into the problem. 
 Gallagher and Tollefsen use we-narratives as a way to address a problem of stability and 
depth in the shared agency literature. The reason individuals might participate in a joint action, 
particularly over long periods of time, might differ from person to person. Especially in the 
absence of an institutional or organizational structure that provides a stable framework in which 
to deliberate, a group agent risks dissolving into merely its individual members.72 On the 
individual level, we often talk about narrative as framework in which to understand individual 
authorship, particularly of one’s actions. Gallagher and Tollefsen suggest that we often use 
narratives about groups in addition to individual narratives. These we-narratives, or narratives 
about groups, they argue offer another way of addressing the stability and depth problem of 
shared agency. “Our proposal” they state, “is that when these narratives are shared, in the sense 
that the narrative is endorsed by each party, they can play a significant role in stabilizing and 
deepening shared agency.”73 Conversely, they add, conflicting we-narratives that are not shared 
by members of a group decrease the stability and depth of shared agency. 
 One important distinction to keep in mind is the distinction between agency and a sense 
of agency. Gallagher and Tollefsen admit that it is possible that the ‘we’ in question might not 
have first-person phenomenological status.74 That is to say, it may be that the group in question 
 
72 Gallagher and Tollefsen, “We-Narratives and the Stability and Depth of Shared Agency” Philosophy of the Social 
Sciences, p. 99. 
73 Ibid., p. 103. 
74 Ibid., p. 106. 
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might not be capable of having a sense of agency, even if we can plausibly ascribe to it some sort 
of group agency, whether that is corporate agency or joint-agency. Nevertheless, we can, and 
often do, talk about the narrative of a ‘we’ that need not have this kind of status. Thus, the use of 
a we-narrative can avoid certain problems about group minds, or the need to establish something 
like group qualia. Further, a we-narrative can instill in the individual members of a group a sense 
of agency independent from the actual or perceived agency of the group. “The narrative allows 
for a coherency of shared understanding – our joint actions either fit or do not fit the narrative, 
and the sense of joint agency in individual participants may depend in part on this – which may 
also relate to collective responsibility.”75 Further, the use of a we-narrative can play a regulatory 
role with respect to individual action, especially insofar as the individual identifies strongly with 
the group.  
 With respect to a proletarian we-narrative, this approach offers a couple of potential 
benefits. First, while other approaches require the group in question to already have some sort of 
agential or intentional structure, the we-narrative approach need not require this. That is, it is 
possible to have a we-narrative about a mere collection of individuals who are not already united 
in any strong, subjective sense. Building on this, since we-narratives do not appear to be tied to 
the subjective dimension in the same way other approaches are, they open onto the possibility of 
including objective factors, such as class interest discussed above. That is, a proletarian we-
narrative built around a shared sense of disenfranchisement and common goal of liberating 
ourselves from conditions is completely consistent with the relative disunity and nonagency of 
the disenfranchised group as a whole. Given the relative disunity of the working-class movement 
 
75 Ibid., p. 104. 
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in our own historical moment, an approach like this offers a potentially beneficial framework 
from which to begin or continue building power. Using a we-narrative could offer a different 
approach when thinking about our common interest as a class. As the history of the 20th century 
has shown, simply having a shared objective class interest is not sufficient for successful 
revolutionary action. Perhaps the addition of proletarian we-narratives (rather than reified 
bourgeois narratives that focus exclusively on an individual, atomized ‘I’), along with other 
political strategies, will help activists be more effective organizers.    
Conclusion 
 The contemporary proletariat is not a homogenized, unified whole. Today, we are 
perhaps no closer to an organized proletariat capable of social transformation than we were in 
Adorno, or even Marx’s time. However, class interest, analysis, and struggle continue to be 
important concepts with which to understand society and organize political action. List and Pettit 
offer an account of how we might individually identity with a group. They provide an argument 
that perhaps surprisingly lines up with the insights we saw in the early Marxist theorists in 
chapter 1. With the strategic use of we-narratives, perhaps political organizers can be better 
equipped to engage in the revolutionary struggle. While this chapter certainly does not provide a 
fully formed account of the proletariat, it hopefully sketches out the outlines of how arguments 
from the analytic tradition of group agency might intersect with the insights from the Marxist 
tradition. 
 Slavoj Zizek ends his postface to Lukács’ Tailism and the Dialectic: a defense of history 
and class consciousness with a discussion of who today is a social agent. Zizek is less interested 
in asking how Lukács’ work stands in relation to today’s society, and more interested in how 
Lukács might stand in relation to us. Specifically, Zizek asks about our possibility to commit to 
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revolutionary action, to the act proper as Lukács describes. Zizek asks: “Which social agent is, 
on account of its radical dislocation, today, able to accomplish it?”76 As we saw in chapter 2, the 
project of establishing the proletariat as a subject-object agent of history has its problems. 
Zizek’s question follows directly from this problem. Who is the proletariat today? A complete 
answer to this question goes well beyond the scope of this current investigation. However, I hope 
that the discussion in this section works towards developing the theoretical and conceptual tools 
required to ask it. Certainly, in order to ask who can act today requires a practical analysis of our 
own contemporary moment that takes into account the social conditions of our time. I argue that 
a class analysis of the proletariat has a role to play in that account, and that even though society 
has changed considerably since the time of the early Marxist theorists, their insights are still 
useful.  
 
Summary of Chapter 3 
 In Chapter 3, we saw how agency plays out in three different social groups: the vanguard, 
the party, and the proletariat. Gilbert’s account of plural subjects captures the voluntary 
combination of the vanguard, as well as its joint commitment to social transformation. List and 
Pettit’s account of group agents captures the organizational structure and joint action of the 
Communist party. While the proletariat may not be an agent, particularly according to the way in 
which the term is used in analytic philosophy, it is an important social group. Using Tollefsen 
and Gallagher’s account of we-narratives offers a useful conceptual tool in order to think the 
proletariat as more than a mere collection or aggregate of individuals. As we saw in chapters 1 
 
76 Lukács, Tailism and the Dialectic, p. 178. 
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and 2, an understanding of the political agency of these different social groups is not always 
clear. The conceptual clarification offered in this chapter hopefully shows how the agency of 
these particular groups plays out. Reworking the concept of class consciousness requires 
understanding not only how the agency of these different groups works on their own, but also 
how they might interact with one another. For example, a worker considering whether or not to 
strike might be a part of all three. They might have a small group of dedicated friends who are 
working toward organizing their fellow workers. In addition to this, they might also be part of a 
political party, or some other political organization that has the organizational structure of a 
group. Finally, they are also part of the proletariat, an must also consider their own particular 
interests, as well as those of the class. The analysis above is not intended to provide a totalizing 
picture of agency; but it hopefully mores towards understanding it in its complexity. 
 Throughout the chapter, I have provisionally adopted the methodological individualism 
of contemporary analytic philosophy in order to highlight the important ways that individuals 
come together (or could fail to come together) to form a group agent. I argue that this is a 
necessary aspect to consider in order to understand how group agency functions in society. As 
we saw in chapter 1, capitalism isolates us from each other and alienates us from our labor. This 
separation is not merely a psychological delusion to be overcome through proper Marxist theory. 
The fact of this separation must be taken into account, in order to better understand the agency, 
we have when we jointly commit to take some action, or jointly decide on some goal. How we 
understand what a group can do shows us the social conditions we live under, as well as what 
can be done to change them. Starting with individuals in order to understand the agency of the 
group they constitute is a necessary aspect of understanding class consciousness; however, it is 
not sufficient. As we saw above, List and Pettit’s account of holistic supervenience pushes up 
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against the limits of their methodological individualism. As the complexity of the social 
phenomenon increases, the more difficult it is to adhere to a strict individualist methodology. 
Methodological individualism, on my view, is not wrong, only incomplete. It shows only one 
part of the picture: the movement from the individual to the group. In addition to this, I argue we 
also need to understand the movement from the group to the individual. Putting both these 
dimensions together, I argue that we arrive not at an individualist, or holistic view of agency, but 
a dialectical one.  
 In what follows, I draw on resources from two contemporary theorists from the 
continental tradition: Jodi Dean and Judith Butler. Rather than focus on individuals as 
preexisting entities in order to understand how they combine to form groups, these thinkers 
emphasize that we are already part of a group, that our interdependence as individuals takes 
priority. For Dean, this understanding comes through an analysis of the crowd. The nature of the 
crowd is not that it is made of up individuals, but rather that one loses one’s individuality in the 
crowd. For Butler, this understanding comes from the embodied, interdependent, and ultimately 
precarious nature of our existence. Both thinkers highlight the capacity of a group to engage in 
political action that is irreducible to the capacities of its constituent members. The task is not to 
understand the agency of the individuals first, or even understand the agency of the group as 
generated through the relations between individuals. Rather they point to social phenomena that 
resists the prioritization of the individual. The groups they discuss might not have ‘agency’ in the 
strict of the term as it is used in contemporary analytic philosophy. Nevertheless, there is a kind 
of capacity at work in these groups. The group does something and is able to effect political 
change on a massive scale. In addition to the agency discussed in this chapter, I argue we must 
also take this other form of agency into account. In order to develop a dialectical account of 
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group agency, we must also interrogate how agency works as understood as moving from the 
group to the individual. Instead of a building up of agency, it will constitute agency as a kind of 
lack, as pointing to something that is missing. Following Adorno, we must not fall back into an 
idealist romanticism that focuses exclusively on unity, reconciliation, and identity. In order to 
understand the political agency entailed by the concept of class consciousness, we must now turn 





THE CAPACITY OF THE COLLECTIVE 
 
 As we saw above, the agency of a group can be understood through an analysis of its 
individual members. The way in which individuals come together in part determines the kind of 
agency the group has. We saw this using the vanguard and the party as examples of successful 
joint action, and the proletariat as a group that does not have ‘agency’ in the narrow sense used 
in the tradition of analytic philosophy. While this methodology of building up group agency 
through an analysis of its constituent members is one aspect of understanding group agency, I 
argue that it remains incomplete. The other aspect requires an understanding of the collectivity 
and interdependency of the group. Methodologically, I argue that we must be able to understand 
group agency by starting with the group and moving to the individual. In this chapter, I look at 
two examples of this from Jodi Dean and Judith Butler in order to show how the collectivity of 
the group affects the possibility of group agency. This, coupled with the discussion above in 
Chapter 3, aims at understanding agency in both directions: from the individual to the group, and 
from the group to the individual. This ‘dialectical’ account of agency builds on the 
methodological resources from Chapters 1 and 2, and I argue it develops an account of agency 
that helps to explain what is at work in the concept of class consciousness.  
 Both Dean and Butler draw on very different conceptual resources than Gilbert or List 
and Pettit. While both are American, they draw heavily from conceptual resources developed in 
contemporary French Theory. In Crowds and Party, Dean draws on a wide variety of resources, 
from the Structural Marxist tradition of Louis Althusser and Alan Badiou, to other post-
structuralist thinkers such as Giles Deleuze and Michel Foucault. From these thinkers, Dean 
develops an account of the crowd based in an account of political subjectivity that is 
  
 150 
fundamentally collective. On her view, ideology individuates us. What it means to be a political 
subject, then, prioritizes collectivity, and explains individuality in reference to this collectivity. 
In Notes Toward a Performativity Theory of Assembly, Butler makes more explicit reference to 
Hannah Arendt than French theorists, but her approach clearly follows thinkers like Foucault and 
Jacques Derrida. Butler’s account of embodiment and precarity blurs the clear conceptual lines 
between action defined in a narrow sense, and the conditions that make that action possible. Her 
position emphasizes our own interdependence, which leads to an expanded account of political 
action.  
 Both Dean and Butler, I argue, take an approach more aligned with methodological 
holism than methodological individualism. It is perhaps unfair to squeeze these thinkers into 
methodological boxes. A complete discussion of each of their methodologies, and their relation 
to methods developed in the analytic tradition would get very complicated very quickly. For 
now, my argument here is that both Dean and Butler take a different approach to group agency, 
emphasizing the collectivity of the whole as opposed to the individuality of its members. As I 
said above in Chapter 3, this approach is not wrong, just one-sided. Understanding the way in 
which the collective determines the individual is a necessary component to understand group 
agency, but it is not sufficient. Ultimately, I argue, both are important aspects of what I have 
been calling ‘dialectical’ agency. In order to understand the kind of political agency at work in 
the concept of class consciousness, I argue we need to prioritize mediation, rather than the 
individual or the group. Putting the insights of chapter 3 together with the insights of the present 
chapter, I argue we arrive at a more complete view of group agency.  
 This perhaps goes beyond ‘agency’ in a narrow sense but might be better described as a 
capacity to effect change. Society changes and transforms according to a complex set of forces. 
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Some of these forces can be traced to groups that might not have agency in the traditional sense. 
There might not be joint commitment or action between the individual members of a crowd or 
demonstration – they might not have a shared goal or intention. Nevertheless, they are capable of 
transforming society. If we restrict our analysis to a methodological individualism, we risk 
misunderstanding these social phenomena. In this chapter, I hope to establish an argument for 
broadening our conception of agency.  
 Below I take a look at Dean’s account of crowds in Crowds and Party. I discuss her 
critiques of 19th century crowd theorists and show that her position highlights the collectivity of 
political subjectivity. While I worry that her position on the ‘egalitarian discharge’ of the crowd 
might be too broad, I generally agree with her approach, and argue it goes a long way in helping 
to understand the irreducible collectivity and nonidentity of certain groups. Next, I take a look at 
Butler’s account of precarity and embodiment in Notes Toward a Theory of Assembly. I discuss 
her account of vulnerability and interdependence, arguing that her approach to group action blurs 
the line between action in a narrow sense and the conditions that make action possible. I argue 
that her emphasis on the capacity to be affected, rather than on the capacity to affect others or the 
world compliments and complicates our understanding of group agency as dialectical.  
 
Dean and the Theory of the Crowd 
 In Crowds and Party Jodi Dean provides a psychodynamic account of groups. She 
provides an account of group political action where the agency of the group is not reducible to 
the agency of its individual members. Specifically, she draws on Canetti’s account of crowds in 
Crowds and Power in order to develop a ‘gap theory’ of subjectivity; on her view, the individual 
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is individuated as political subject insofar as she is singled out from the crowd. In order for this 
process to happen, she must be, first, part of the crowd, and only then called to be an individual. 
The crowd, on Dean’s view, has a potential or capacity for effective political action that is 
irreducible to the capacities of its individual members. In this relation or ‘gap’ Dean defends 
what she calls the “egalitarian discharge of the crowd.” While I agree with Dean with respect to 
the political capacity of the crowd, I argue that her account is ultimately too utopian. In this 
section, I will argue for a more neutral conception of the crowd that hopefully better addresses 
our contemporary populist movements on the right as well as on the left. 
 This section takes an extended look at Dean’s Crowds and Party. First, I discuss Dean’s 
critique of Louis Althusser’s account of ideology as interpellation. Dean reverses Althusser’s 
position, arguing that interpellation is better understood as the individuation of subjects that the 
subjectivation of individuals. Then, I discuss Dean’s account of the crowd, arguing that she 
develops a ‘gap’ account of subjectivity. This gap or split within the people demonstrates that the 
collective political subject is not identical with itself. This opens new possibilities for action. In 
Lastly, I give a critique of Dean’s account of the ‘egalitarian discharge’ of the crowd. I worry 
Dean sides too much on the side of fidelity to the crowd event and offer an example to show why 
fidelity to the crowd risks being problematic as well as progressive.  
Individuals and Subjects 
Drawing on a wide variety of authors and disciplines, Dean articulates an account of the 
crowd that serves to decenter the individual as the primary unit of political analysis. In contrast 
to thinkers from the analytic tradition considered above, she develops an account of groups that 
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finds collective possibilities in the “ruptures of the fragile individual form.”1 The “interlinked 
psychic and economic problem” Dean documents is “the incapacity and contradictions of the 
individual form as a locus for creativity difference, agency, and responsibility.”2 She traces the 
development of the changes in the individual form from the rugged individual of the frontier to 
the gamesmen of the corporation.3 Even the figure of the ‘survivor’ falls into this logic of the 
individual form, since it places ultimate responsibility on the individual, and need not 
acknowledge one’s own insufficiency as an individual.4 Even on the Left, Dean argues, 
formulations of the heroic, self-producing individual are ubiquitous.5 Against these positions that 
prioritize the primacy of the individual with respect to political analysis, Dean provides an 
account of the individual that prioritizes collectivity by appealing to Louis Althusser’s account of 
ideology as interpellation. 
 On Althusser’s view, the function of ideology is to constitute the concrete individual as a 
subject. his example, cited by Dean, involves a police officer calling out to an individual on the 
street. Before the call, the person called blends in with the crowd. Once called or hailed, they are 
picked out as distinct from the crowd. “Interpellation, then, is a process of subjection. Becoming 
subject the individual both takes on and comes under ideology’s structure of beliefs and 
expectations.”6 For Dean, what is important here is that the individual has not been individuated 
 
1 Dean, Crowds and Party, p. 32. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism, p. 235. 
4 Dean, Crowds and Party, p.  46-47. 
5 Ibid., p. 46: “The fight to survive is the key feature of an identity imagined as dignified and heroic because it has to 
produce itself by itself;” compare with Dean, “Left Individualism,” Comrades, p. 50-55. 
6 Dean, Crowds and Party, p. 76. Compare this to the discussion of ideology from Chapter 1, and Adorno on 
ideology critique and ‘the Spell’ from Chapter 2. 
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as a political subject prior to the individuating call of ideology.7 Ideology, as we saw with 
Adorno’s account of the ‘spell’, functions to single someone out in order to exert control over 
them. Our goal, however, is not to discover some primordial state before ideology in which 
everything and everyone is indistinguishable. Seeking out a perfect prior state is at best utopian, 
and risks falling back into romantic idealism, or even totalitarianism. Rather, the goal is to 
understand the way in which ideology individualizes us in our own contemporary society in 
order to show its effect on possibilities of agency.  
 While Dean draws heavily from Althusser’s account, she argues that he got the process of 
interpellation backwards. “Ideological interpellation makes more sense as a theory of 
individuation than as a theory of subjection.”8 This reversal is important for Dean’s view, since 
“the individual form itself becomes a problem, the coercive and unstable product of the 
enclosure of the common in never-ceasing efforts to repress, deny, and foreclose collective 
political subjectivity.”9 Rather than building up from the aggregation of individuals in order to 
form a group, Dean’s Althusserian account of interpellation starts from the fact of the crowd, 
then provides an account of the process by which someone becomes an individualized political 
subject. Further, this process of individualizing interpellation restricts the full power of collective 
political subjectivity by breaking the crowd up into its component parts. This division seeks to 
nullify the collective and relational aspects of collectivity, which in turn reduces the whole into 
merely the sum of its parts.  
 
7 This is not, of course, to say that human beings, absent a figure of authority, meld into one another such that their 
being is indistinguishable from one another 
8 Dean, Crowds and Party, p. 79. 
9 Ibid., p. 80. 
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 Dean appeals to the process of commodity fetishism as an analogous case to the process 
of individualization. “But just as collective experience of antagonism – the ‘social substance’ – 
underlies what Marx calls the ‘phantom-like objectivity’ of the commodity, so too does it 
underlie the phantom-like subjectivity of the individual.”10 While Dean does not cite Lukacs 
here, the resemblance to his critique of the reification of the proletariat from History and Class 
Consciousness is striking.11 The “phantom-like subjectivity of the individual” for Lukacs is 
reified consciousness. Dean gets to her analysis via Althusser’s account of interpellation in a 
similar fashion as Lukacs gets to his via Marx’s account of the commodity form. Reified or 
‘phantom-like’ consciousness of the individual (proletarian) under capitalism is generated by and 
through these structures of society, as well as the real processes of production. We could say, 
then, that Dean follows Lukács’ critique of subjectivity via her critique of Althusser. In contrast 





10 Ibid., p. 81. 
11 Dean cites Foucault and Federici as examples of theorists who explore the production of the individual via 
disciplinary power. For example, Ibid., p. 86: “Bourgeois ideology, manifest in the disciplinary techniques that make 
individuals, hails the collective subject, the mass of workers, vagabonds, soldiers, and students, as individuals (even 
as the capacity of the common people for individuated self-discipline in the service of capital accumulation and 
liberal order will persist as a problem). It singles out and separates, producing the very individuals it extracts.” 
While it would go beyond the limitations of the present argument, this question of discipline, particularly with 
respect to the way in which party discipline functions in Lenin’s account of the party form, is a crucial one. As we 
saw in chapter 1, Luxembourg criticizes Lenin on precisely this point – relying on the ‘discipline’ of the working 
class learned under capitalism risks reproducing similar conditions. Dean’s argument on interpellation here seems to 
support Luxembourg’s worry. Reproducing, or even relying on current forms of disciplinary power risks re-
individualizing the subject, and thus reinscribe the problems of capitalism within the party cadre (or, to use Lukacs’ 
language, to reify false consciousness in the individual proletarian workers).  
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The Power of the Crowd 
 Building on Allthusser’s account of ideology as interpretation, Dean develops a collective 
account of the subjectivity. She focuses on the subjectivity as a ‘gap’ – the split within the 
collective that makes certain kinds of political action possible. On her view, subjectivity is at its 
most fundamental level, not a characteristic or property of individuals. It is not the site of 
individual freedom, decision or choice. Through a discussion of the Paris Commune, Dean 
develops a ‘gap’ account of subjectivity that I argue helps understand group agency, or at least a 
capacity to effect change, that cannot be explained by an appeal to its individual members.  
Dean’s gap account of subjectivity relies on the psychodynamic fact that the people do not know 
what they want. This gap is not something that can be explained by the idea that some are 
excluded from the people, or that their exclusion can be expressed merely as a problem of 
political representation. Rather, Dean argues that the plurality or multiplicity of the group 
generates differences within it. “Conflicting and contradictory desires and drives render the 
people a split subject perpetually pushing to express, encounter and address its own non-
knowledge.”12 This conflicting and contradictory tension constitutes a kind of non-identity of the 
group with itself. For Dean (and as we will see with Butler below), this non-identical self-
relation is the heart of subjectivity. The (collective, political) subject is able to do things because 
of this relation, because of this ‘gap’ within and between itself. 
 The people, as the collective political subject, is always changing and never fully present. 
This nonidentical self-relation means that somethings the political collectivity splits, creating 
 
12 Ibid., p. 91. 
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ruptures and divisions among the people.13 “This split” Dean argues “is practical and material, 
the condition of our physical being.”14 Consider a large public demonstration. Everyone does not 
arrive or leave at the same time. Some come early, others stay late. While the demonstration 
might last throughout the day, it is always comprised of different people. The fact that the crowd 
is constantly changing, on Dean’s view, does not mean that it is a mere aggregation. As the 
crowd continually changes and divides itself, it splits and creates gaps within itself. A split in the 
collective subject creates a gap – a generative negativity in the form of lack. Dean’s emphasis on 
the gap indicates a capacity of the group that is not reducible to the capacities of its individual 
members.  
 This gap is revealed in the Althusserian call or hail. The call of the police officer singles 
the individual out, separating them conceptually (and often physically) from the others in the 
crowd. On Dean’s view, this separation instantiates the individual as a subject, not the subject as 
individual. The subjective is the collective and has been shifted by the call. The person who 
called is cut off from the rest of the group and is constituted as an individual political subject 
who is required to account for herself and her actions. “Politics takes place in the non-identity, 
gap, or torsion between people and their self-governance. Political subjunctivization involves 
forcing this non-identity, making it felt as an effect of a subject.”15 Reversing the Althusserian 
notion of interpellation helps address a problem in political thought, namely, what can the 
subject do in the face of the difficulty, if not impossibility of transformative political action. 
Dean argues that understanding ideology as the interpellation of the subject as an individual 
 
13 Ibid., p. 89: “The people can never be politically (or, differently put, the ‘people’ is not an ontological category). 





means that, “the subject emerges where ideology fails because the subject is 
collective…Correspondingly, the subject is a gap in the structure because the people are the 
subject of politics.”16 The people, as the subject of politics, are constantly changing, creating 
gaps and ruptures. Rather than understanding these gaps as incapacities and limitations, Dean 
emphasizes what it allows the crowd to do. 
 Dean’s ‘gap’ account of political subjectivity, and thus her account of the capacity of the 
crowd to engage in political action, is grounded in a reading of Le Bon’s The Crowd. On Dean’s 
view, Le Bon is less interested in how or why crowds form, but rather what they can do once 
formed. According to Dean:  
Insofar as Le Bon conceives the crowd in terms of a dynamic wherein energies 
are concentrated in a single direction, he sees the force of crowds expressed in 
races, castes, classes, nations, juries, parties, and parliamentary assemblies. All 
these can override individual judgement and opinion, eliciting effects that exceed 
what an individual would rationally decide to do on his own. These are 
psychological crowds where ‘crowd’ names the novel consistency temporarily 
formed from interlinked processes.17  
The power or force of the crowd, Dean argues, demands illusion.18 This power blurs the 
distinction between the true and the false; motivation for action is not decided on by rational 
deliberation. Because of this power, the crowd is able to do things that no individual member is 
able to do.  
 Dean explores this possibility through a reading of the multiplicity of the Paris 
Commune. While the political experiment of the Paris Commune of 1871 may have been short 
 
16 Ibid., p. 88. 
17 Ibid., p. 104. 
18 Compare this with Lukács’ discussion of the ‘necessary illusion’ in Chapter 1, or Adorno’s account of ‘the spell’ 
in Chapter 2.  
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lived, it holds a special place in the imaginary of the Marxist tradition. In her reading of the 
political events, Dean highlights different, and often contradictory elements, arguing that the 
multiplicity of the event indicates a kind of fidelity to the rupture of the crowd. Depending on the 
author, even the name ‘Paris Commune’ refers sometimes to the voices of the council, 
sometimes to the working-class voters who elected them, or even somethings to the people of 
Paris in general. “While a politics can and should be traced in these shifts…we might also note 
that the fact of shifting indexes an irreducible feature of the people as non-all, non-totalizable, 
and never fully present to itself. The people is only present as few, some, or many…neither 
people nor class (nor movement nor mass) exists as a unity. Every attempt to invoke, create or 
speak in behalf of such a unity comes up against an ineliminable, constitutive division.”19 The 
commune, as political even in which the ‘people’ are never fully present (even or particularly for 
themselves), serves as a helpful representation of the kind of group Dean is talking about. In 
particular, the commune holds a kind of power or capacity in virtue of this inability to be 
totalized or fully present. 
 Dean connects this account of the Paris Commune with Badiou’s account of subjectivity. 
Insofar as the event of the Paris Commune20 represents a new political possibility,21 the 
multiplicity of the event are not merely indications of a new or different political form, or 
 
19 Dean, Crowds and Party, p. 133-134. See also ibid., p. 135: “The people resist and evade the very forms on which 
their political subjectivity depends. When it appears which isn’t often, the movement for the majority isn’t 
necessarily in the immediate interest of the majority. Since they can never be fully present, no revolution or 
revolutionary movement can actually be that of the people. It always entails the imposition of the ideas of some 
upon many.” 
20 Ibid., p. 133: “Marx, faithful to crowd rupture, presents the Commune as a continuation of the egalitarian 
moment.” 
21 See Ibid., p. 135: “Because it is a form for the expression of the people’s desire, the Commune is necessarily 
lacking.” This lack seems to imply a dialectical determinate negation (Hegel), or a present absence (Derrida). The 
lack of the Commune implies an openness to the future, to the futurity of the event, and/or the a-venir of politics. 
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reflections of a specific time and place. “Rather, they underscore the irreducibility of the gap 
between the people and their political forms, the gap constitutive of the people’s subjectivity.”22 
This gap account of subjectivity entails a kind of power generated by the psychodynamics of the 
crowd. The gap represents the irreducibility of the group or collective subjectivity to the 
individualized subjectivities of its members. This gap constitutes the power or the capacity of the 
group – it is what allows the group to act as a group, and not simple as an aggregate of individual 
members. Crucially for Dean, it is important not to fetishize this this rupture. The power of the 
crowd does not, and cannot, solve all of our political woes. The gap opens onto the possibility of 
new and different kinds of political action; however, it does not guarantee a leftist or progressive 
politics. It is the role and function of the party (as described in 3.2 above) to respond to the event 
of the crowd.  
 Dean’s account does not take the gap to be sufficient for transformative political action. It 
does, however, offer another model of understanding group agency. In contrast to the account of 
group agency discussed above in chapter 3, Dean prioritizes the collectivity, defending a view 
that understands the individual as individual as separated from the group. This is a different way 
of understanding political action and would perhaps not be considered ‘agency’ in a strict sense. 
Nevertheless, it a kind of capacity to effect change. Crowds are able to do things, even and 
especially when there is no explicit intention or joint action involved. 
The Egalitarian Discharge of the Crowd 
 The political force of the gap to which one must respond is grounded in what Dean calls 
the “egalitarian discharge of the crowd.” Drawing on Elias Canetti’s account of crowd dynamics 
 
22 Dean, Crowds and Party, p. 135. 
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in Crowds and Power, Dean develops an account of this discharge as a kind of jouissance.23 The 
crowd dynamic deindividuates the subject and opens onto new possibilities and capacities of 
political action. After describing this egalitarian discharge, I consider a potential worry about her 
view. While there certainly seems to be revolutionary potential in the event of the discharge of 
the crowd, I worry whether such a discharge is ‘egalitarian’ by definition. Further, how might 
Dean address crowds whose explicit reason for coming together is division and hate? At the very 
least, the ‘egalitarian’ nature of the crowd does not always extend universally. A lynch mob, or a 
Trump rally, for example, may indeed contain some element of an egalitarian discharge, but the 
scope of its egalitarian nature does not extend beyond a particular subset of human beings. 
 On Dean’s view, the process of forming a crowd breaks down the (ideological as well as 
physical) separation between individuals, such that within the crowd itself, no distinction 
between members remain. The crowd is no longer a mere aggregation of parts but becomes an 
entirely new, heterogeneous entity. “Conventional hierarchies collapse. In place of the 
distinctions mobilized to produce the individual form, there is a temporary being of multiple 
mouths, anuses, stomachs, hands, feet, a being comprised of fold upon fold of touching skin.”24 
Following Canetti, Dean’s account focuses on the ‘discharge’ as the moment of the crowd’s 
emergence as a group. While ultimately unstable, and prone to dissolution, the crowd has its own 
being or ontology apart from its individual members.  
 
23 Jouissance is a kind of libidinal energy that plays a central role in the thought of Lacan, as well as other French 
psychoanalytic thought.  
24 Dean, Crowds and Party, p. 120. Notice how Dean explicitly evokes the bodily aspects of the crowd. I will return 
to the body in the section on Judith Butler below. 
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 As long as the crowd keeps moving, it is able to endure. “It will persist” argues Dean, “as 
long as it is moving towards a goal.”25 Dean identifies two essential attributes of the crowd: 
growth and direction. For both Canetti and Dean, the crowd has desires – specifically, it has the 
desire to continue growing. In Lacanian terms, the desire of the crowd is a desire to desire. Dean 
describes the growth as, “a push to be more, to eliminate barriers, to universalize and extend the 
crowd feeling such that nothing is outside it.”26 Before addressing the egalitarian aspects of this 
universal expansion, it is important to note here that the form of the crowd is inherently unstable. 
The crowd not only wants to continue to grow, but also ceases to be a crowd once it stops 
growing. Not unlike the systems or structures of capitalist production and accumulation, growth 
is an essential element of the crowd. One the crowd gets what it wants, it begins to disappear. 
Thus the internal structure of the crowd is inherently unstable. The crowd must continue to 
increase its size and move in a particular direction. Insofar as its movement ceases, it is no longer 
a crowd.  
 In addition to its growth and direction, a crowd is an expression of a collective force. For 
Dean, in particular when a crowd comes together in a space authorized by neither capital nor 
state, the crowd breaches the given and installs a “gap of possibility.”27 Dean describes this gap 
in a couple different ways. She describes it as a “positive expression of negation,” meaning that 
it exists as a particular kind of lack. This speaks to the gap as an opening or a clearing. It allows 
for something new or different to come into being and does not determine it in advance. This 
entails both negation of the given as what has existed in the past, as well as clearing the way for 
 
25 Dean, Crowds and Party, p. 122. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid., p. 124. 
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what could be in the future. Dean also describes this collective force of desire as pre-figuring this 
possibility. She argues that the collective force “mis-assembles” rather than assembles or 
disassembles what is present. This force takes what is given and assembles it differently. It 
combines the people in such a way that “differences between individual heads and arms are 
irrelevant.”28 Out of previously separate individuals, the crowd emerges as the collective subject 
of a politics by impressing its own possibility for something new. 
 This un- or pre-differentiation of the crowd is not based in the interchangeability of its 
members, but rather constitutes the egalitarian nature of the collective force. While the crowd 
endures, there is no separation between individuals. “The libidinal energy of the crowd binds it 
together for a ‘blessed moment’, a moment Canetti renders as a ‘feeling of equality’ in the shared 
intensity of belonging.”29 In this ‘blessed moment’ there is no distinction between individuals 
and constitutes “a state of absolute equality” 30 between its members. “Equality as belonging – 
not separation, weighing, and measure – is what gives ‘energy’ (Canetti’s term) to the longing 
for justice.”31 It is important to note that this equality is not the formal equality of bourgeois 
ideology; it does not constitute a common standard applicable to different people or objects. It is 
not the interchangeability reinforced by a capitalist logic of market exchange. It is rather a force 
of equality that breaks down the individual, bourgeois form and enables the collective to 
experience itself in its collectivity. For Dean, this force is a demand for justice because it 
emerges out of a radically egalitarian horizon. The members of the crowd who can no longer 
distinguish themselves from one another want to grow, expanding in all directions. It is this 
 
28 Canetti, Crowds and Power, p. 29; cited by Dean, Crowds and Party, p. 124. 
29 Dean, Crowds and Party, p. 121. 
30 Canetti, Crowds and Power, p. 29; cited by Dean, Crowds and Party, p. 121. 
31 Dean, Crowds and Party, p. 122. 
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force, Dean argues, that constitutes the egalitarian possibility that is pre-figured by the crowd. 
The dynamics of the crowd, on her view, generate this egalitarian discharge. 
 It is important to note here that Dean does not equivocate between the energy of the 
crowd and political subjectivity. The egalitarian discharge of the crowd is necessary, but not 
sufficient on Dean’s view, in order to constitute political subjectivity. She criticizes anarchists 
and autonomists for misconstruing this egalitarian discharge for the end or goal of politics. Dean 
directs her critique at the politics of the “beautiful moment” which simply imagines its goal to 
proliferate multiplicities, potentialities, and differences.32 The politics of the beautiful moment 
forget that any political struggle necessarily entails a divergence with respect to the meaning of 
the event. “The crowd’s chaotic moment is indeterminate, but to fetishize this indeterminacy 
dematerializes the crowd, extracting the affective intensities rupturing a given setting from the 
rupture itself as if the crowd event were nothing more than semantic confusion.”33 Echoing 
Lukacs’ critique of Luxemburg, Dean clearly does not place her faith in the spontaneous 
irruption of the masses. Rather, she argues that it is the role of the party form to maintain and 
direct the egalitarian discharge of the crowd. The goal of politics is not to simply observe the 
force of the crowd and help it to where it is going – the goal is to join in the crowd event in order 
to direct its energy and flow.  
 While I agree in general with Dean’s account of the crowd, as well as her call for a return 
to the party as the political form to maintain, develop, and continue the crowd’s egalitarian 
discharge, I worry that she is too quick to accept the egalitarian nature of the crowd’s discharge. 
Certainly, there is a kind of egalitarian aspect to the undifferentiation inherent within the 
 
32 Ibid., p. 125. 
33 Ibid., p. 126. Cf. Derrida’s account of pre-political sovereignty as Walten in The Beast and the Sovereign Vol 2.  
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composition of the crowd. I follow Dean (and Canetti) insofar as I agree the crowd wants to 
grow. I disagree, however, with the move from the egalitarian discharge of the crowd to a 
demand or call for justice. More specifically, I argue that the ‘egalitarian’ nature of the discharge 
of the crowd is not always something to which we ought to maintain fidelity. While I agree that 
the crowd event, “provides an opportunity for the emergence of a political subject” I disagree 
that we should always maintain fidelity to the political subject that emerges. This is to say, the 
‘egalitarian’ discharge of the crowd may not demand the kind of ‘justice’ worth defending.  
 Consider the example of a lynch mob. Certainly, there can be the kind of egalitarian 
discharge Dean and Canetti describe. There is even an explicit call to ‘justice.’ This kind of 
crowd event, however, is not something to which I (or I hope anyone on the left) wish to 
maintain any kind of fidelity to. I would argue that what the crowd wants is in fact inegalitarian – 
it demands ‘justice’ to maintain a white supremacist status quo. In addition to the task Dean 
assigns to the party of “maintaining fidelity to this sense of the many” I would also add the task 
of discerning the nature of the ‘egalitarian’ discharge of the crowd. The party must not only be 
affected by the crowd, but also affect it. That is, the party does not unreflectingly mirror the 
desires of the crowd but must mediate them through the standpoint of the proletariat. Otherwise, 
the party risks taking on reactionary tendencies of the crowd, tendencies which on Dean’s own 
view cannot be purged from the crowd event itself. Dean’s account does a good job describing 
what the crowd can do; however, more needs to be said concerning the normative component of 
the account. Put differently, Dean nicely describes the agential component, but neglects the 
epistemological component.34 Perhaps one way to address this issue is by appealing to a 
 
34 Cf. chapter 1 on Lukacs and the two necessary aspects of his account of class consciousness. 
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particular we-narrative, as discussed in Chapter 3. The ‘we’ can demand conflicting, often 
contradictory accounts of justice. In any case, more work needs to be done in order to give an 
adequate account of why one should maintain fidelity to the crowd event, since its nature as 
‘egalitarian’ is clearly not sufficient.  
Conclusion 
 This theory of the crowd goes a long way to understanding the phenomena, however 
class should be more explicitly included. The party transforms the masses into the people, 
however, at least for Lenin, the proletariat must lead. The party form is not a party generated by 
the egalitarian discharge of the crowd event, but must also maintain fidelity to the class struggle, 
and as such adopt the standpoint of the proletariat in order to be the highest expression of class 
consciousness.  
 At times, Dean echoes the same non-identitarian logic that we saw was typical of Adorno 
in Chapter 2. Consider the following: “Some degree of alienation is unavoidable: making 
something ourselves, building collectives, creating new institutions cannot eliminate the minimal 
difference between the collectivity and the people” (CP 90). This is precisely Adorno’s point – 
alienation, at least on the individual level, is not something to be overcome because such 
alienation is not possible given current conditions of capitalism. Rather, the point is to build 
these groups which are capable of addressing the structural problems inherent in the system of 






Butler and the Capacity of Relation 
 Judith Butler, in Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly takes her 
performative account of gender, and her account of the precarity of the self, and applies each in 
order to develop an account of coalitional politics. Perhaps unsurprisingly, she draws heavily on 
a bodily account of performativity, emphasizing the role that the body, as well as the relationship 
between bodies within political spaces. At the same time, this embodied account is grounded in 
vulnerability – the capacity to be affected. This shared sense of precarity, Butler argues, 
constitutes the possibility for a particular kind of coalitional politics. For Butler, relation or 
mediation constitutes the opening in which politics can appear, or the way in which something or 
someone can appear as political. I argue that Butler’s account goes a long way toward 
developing an account of the group that describes the possibility of revolutionary action. In 
particular, her attentiveness to bodily precarity deepens the account given by Dean in the first 
section. However, like Dean, Butler does not go far enough in describing the capacity of the 
group to act politically. She stops short insofar as her account does not adequately address the 
relations of class – relations which are necessary, although not sufficient, for giving an adequate 
account of transformative or revolutionary action. 
 This section takes an extended look at Butler’s book Notes Toward a Performative 
Theory of Assembly. First, I discuss Butler’s account of embodiment, focusing on her account of 
political appearance. On her view, the space between bodies is generative, and I outline how her 
account of group agency is affected by this. Then, I discuss how Butler’s view on vulnerability 
and interdependency deepen her understanding of the capacity of a group to act. She 
intentionally blurs the lines between action itself and the conditions that make it possible. Lastly, 
I look at Butler’s account of precarity, arguing that on her view, the capacity to act collectively is 
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predicated on these conditions of precarity. Rather than avoid precarity and vulnerability, Butler 
incorporates those features of human existence of her account. 
Embodiment and Public Appearance 
 Since Gender Trouble, Butler’s work has focused, either explicitly or implicitly on the 
body and its role or function. It is beyond the scope of the current project to trace the trajectory 
of the concept of the body throughout Butler’s thought. It will suffice for our present purposes to 
take up the role or function of the body in her account of political collectivity. Not 
unsurprisingly, Butler takes the bodily aspects of a group assembled in public to play a pivotal 
role in understanding the dynamics of those assembled. In this section, I will focus on how, on 
Butler’s view, a group assembled in public cannot be understood without engaging the very 
bodies assembled. This account of the body, particularly the body as vulnerable, grounds her 
account of what a group can do. While the precarity of the body leaves us vulnerable to trauma 
and pain, it is also a site that conditions the possibility of confronting the very system that refuses 
to address or reduce this precarity.   
 In two places in Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly, Butler states 
explicitly the thesis of the project. In one place, she highlights the fact that (political) does not 
occur in a vacuum. “The thesis of this book is that none of us acts without the conditions to act, 
even though sometimes we must act to install and preserve those very conditions.”35 Butler 
recognizes the paradoxical nature of this statement: (political) action is sometimes required in 
order to condition the very action that is required. Rather than abandon this seemingly 
 
35 Butler, Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly, p. 16. 
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paradoxical statement, Butler chooses to begin with it, in order to better understand the 
phenomena of assemblies ‘in the street’.36 For Butler, this action is always embodied and plural.  
 In a second statement of the thesis of her project, Butler explicitly connects the embodied 
nature of the group to its political possibilities. “The specific thesis of this book is that acting in 
concert can be an embodied form of calling into question the inchoate and powerful dimensions 
of reigning notions of the political.”37 The point for Butler is that the embodied nature of the 
assembly is crucial to understanding the way in which the group resists dominant power 
structures. In order to better understand this relationship, I will first discuss the bodily aspects of 
the assembly, highlighting the ways in which Butler defends a view that holds its embodied 
nature as central to its capacity to act.  
 For Butler, the bodily component of the group is linked to its right to appear. On her 
view, the way individuals appear in a public space is not something completely determined by 
those individuals themselves. This is especially true with respect to political action: “So, for 
political action, I must appear to others in ways I cannot know, and in this way, my body is 
established by perspectives that I cannot inhabit but that, surely, inhabit me.”38 When I go into 
public, I have, at least to a certain degree, a fair amount of control over different aspects of my 
 
36 Ibid., p. 125: “Though sometimes bodies assembled on the street are clearly cause for joy and even hope – and 
surging crowds sometimes do because the occasion for revolutionary hopefulness – let us remember that the phrase 
‘bodies on the street’ can refer equally well to right-wing demonstrations, to military soldiers assembled to quell 
demonstrations or seize power, to lynch mobs or anti-immigrant populist movements taking over public space. So, 
they are neither intrinsically good nor bad; they assume differing values depending on what they are assembled for, 
and how that assembly works.” Cf. Dean’s account of the egalitarian discharge of the crowd, as well as my own 
critique of it above. Butler’s account is better than Dean’s insofar as it better takes into account the multiple forms 
the crowd event can take, admitting that while assemblies in the street might be cause for revolutionary hope, it is 
not necessarily so.  
37 Butler, Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly, p. 9. 
38 Ibid., p. 77. 
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appearance: I choose how to dress, where to go, who to be seen with, etc. Butler’s point here, 
however, is that while I may choose certain aspects of my appearance, I in fact do not, and 
cannot, control how I am perceived, and thus the way in which I appear is not completely of my 
own choosing. “It is not the case” Butler argues, “that the body only established my own 
perspective; it is also what displaces that perspective and makes that displacement into a 
necessity.”39 On Butler’s view, the way in which we appear bodily to others constitutes us not 
only (or even primarily) for ourselves, but rather for others.  
 When bodies come together on the street, they do so not in an ideal space, but rather in 
the space and time of the society in which they find themselves. When bodies appear in public, 
the force of their appearance is in part constituted, and in part constitutes, the conditions of their 
own appearance. This phenomenon is most clearly seen, Butler argues, in situations where 
bodies assemble outside of the explicit protection and legitimacy of the state. Using protests in 
Syria as her example, Butler defends a position wherein the appearance or expression of the 
bodies in public “speak” not only in language and gesture, but in the mere persistence of the 
body. “The body in its exposure calls that legitimacy [of the state] into question and does so 
precisely through a specific performativity of the body.”40 When protesters occupy public sites, 
their corporeal persistence contests the otherwise existing (and often explicitly or implicitly) 
military, or militarized police force. That one’s body appears, Butler claims, makes it a site or 
resistance – and the nature of this site is not something completely up to us. 
 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid., p. 83. 
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 Echoing Hannah Arendt’s argument about political freedom and public appearance,41 
Butler’s position here seeks to establish a bodily account of political action and movement. In 
addition to one’s appearance for oneself and others, Butler emphasizes the relation between 
bodies as they appear in public. “No one body establishes the space of appearance, but this 
action, this performative exercise, happens only ‘between’ bodies, in a space that constitutes the 
gap between my own body and another’s.”42 Both Dean and Butler rely on a gap, emphasizing 
the split nature of the collectivity. While Dean’s account focuses on the separation of the 
individual from the crowd, Butler emphasizes the physical distance between bodies. On Butler’s 
view, the space between bodies43 in part constitutes the possibility of their appearance. This is to 
say, it is not the case for Butler that bodies exist first independently from one another, and only 
then come together in a public place.  
 To appear in public is to in part constitute the body as a cite of political action or 
resistance. Especially when assembled without, or in spite of the legitimacy of the state, the 
appearance of the body is not constituted in advance of the assembly. Rather, bodies constitute 
each other’s appearance, such that this space between bodies helps to construct the performance. 
“In this way, Butler continues, “my body does not act alone when it acts politically. Indeed, the 
action emerges from the ‘between’, a spatial figure for a relation that both binds and 
 
41 Butler reads both with and against Arendt, ibid., p. 88: “Here we can see that a certain topographical or even 
architectural regulation of the body happens at the level of theory. Significantly, it is precisely this operation of 
power – foreclosure and differential allocation of whether and how the body may appear – that is excluded from 
Arendt’s explicit account of the political. Indeed, her explicit account of the political depends upon that very 
operation of power that it fails to consider as part of politics itself.”. Cf. Arendt, The Human Condition. 
42 Butler, Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly p. 77. 
43 Ibid., p. 97: “The body is constituted through perspectives it cannot inhabit; someone else sees our face in a way 
that we cannot and hears our voice in a way that we cannot. We are in this sense – bodily – always over there, yet 
here, and this dispossession marks the sociality to which we belong. Even as located beings, we are always 
elsewhere, constituted in a sociality that exceeds us. This establishes our exposure and our precarity, the way in 
which we depend on political and social institutions to persist.” 
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differentiates.”44 According to Butler’s emergent theory of action, the performance of the 
(political) action cannot be separated from the space between bodies that emerges against an 
existing hegemonic regime of legitimacy and power. The space between our bodies, when we act 
together politically, is not simply a byproduct of atomistic individual bodies constituted before 
entry into the political space. The relation between bodies binds and differentiates them, such 
that the relationality cannot be separated from the action insofar as it appears in public. The 
body, then, for Butler, is not a site of politics because it can be determined before or 
independently from the political, but rather because it emerges as a site of politics through and 
via political action itself.  
 Towards the end of Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly, Butler offers the 
closest thing to a definition of the body that is to be found in the book. “My argument, in fact, is 
that it would be as mistaken to think of the body as primarily or definitionally active as it would 
be to think of the body as primarily and definitionally vulnerable and inactive. If we have to have 
a definition, it will depend, rather, on being able to think vulnerability and agency together.”45 
On Butler’s view, the embodied nature of the group is not some accidental property but must 
rather be seen as an essential aspect of its collectivity. The body is an important site for the 
possibility of political action because it must be at once vulnerable active. Put slightly 
differently, the body has a capacity both to affect and to be affected. Emphasizing one of these 
sides over then other is one-sided: Butler challenges us to think both together.  
 In order to do this, we must first consider the bodily capacities of the group. This is to 
say, the way in which the group can act politically is at least in part constituted by their bodies – 
 
44 Ibid., p. 77. 
45 Ibid., p. 139. 
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by the way their bodies appear and persist in public spaces.46 Absent this analysis, Butler argues, 
we will miss crucial elements of the way in which the group acts, politically or otherwise. 
Collective forms of political resistance disrupt, or at least contain the possibility of disrupting, 
the hegemonic legitimacy of state power. “In those instances,” Butler contends, “bodies are 
themselves vectors of power where the directionality of force can be reversed; they are embodied 
interpretations, engaging in allied action, to counter force with another kind and quality of 
force”47 When bodies gather in the street (especially when they gather without the protection, or 
even in direct resistance to, the legitimate power of the state), they constitute and are constituted 
by the space of their appearance. For Butler, we must not only contend with what the assembled 
bodies express, but also with their capacity to be affected in their vulnerability.  
Interdependence and Vulnerability 
Butler’s position emphasizes the bodily dimension of the political assembly because of the role 
vulnerability plays in her account of political action. Specifically, the body, as an 
interdependent48 site of vulnerability, opens onto new possibilities of political action. On her 
view, action is not purely autonomous, or independent from the action of others and the 
infrastructure that supports it. This vulnerability as a capacity to be affected is not only a reason 
 
46 Ibid., p. 73-74:“To rethink the space of appearance in order to understand the power and effect of public 
demonstrations for our time, we will need to consider more closely the bodily dimensions of action what the body 
requires, and what the body can do, especially when we must think about bodies together in a historical space that 
undergoes a historical transformation by virtue of their collective action: What holds them together there, and what 
are their conditions of persistence and of power in relation to their precarity and exposure?” 
47 Ibid., p. 84. 
48 Butler admits that she does not sufficiently clarify the term ‘interdependency’ in this work. See also, ibid., p. 151: 
“We cannot presume that interdependency is some beautiful state of coexistence; it is not the same as social 
harmony. Inevitably, we rail against those whom we are most dependent (or those who are most dependent on us), 
and there is no way to dissociate dependency from aggression once and for all – this was perhaps the profound 
insight of Melanie Klein, but surely also Thomas Hobbes in another idiom.” 
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to act politically, but also constitutes the mechanism by and through which the group acts 
politically. According to Butler, we are often in the street because of this shared sense of 
precarity – because the fact of our precarity requires us to fight for social, political, and 
economic protection, but also because of what we are able to do via and through this shared 
precarity. 
 According to Butler’s account of political agency, one cannot simply focus on the 
particular agency of the individuals who act, or even the agency of the group. “Human action 
depends upon all sorts of supports – it is always supported action.”49 Drawing on disability 
studies,50 Butler argues that the capacity for action requires technological or societal scaffolding 
in order to be successful. Butler resists a hard and fast distinction between action itself, and that 
which makes such action possible.51 Since action never happens in a vacuum – that is to say 
action is impossible absent the necessary conditions for action – she includes these conditions in 
her treatment of action as such. For Butler, action is interdependent, such that my own action 
cannot be separated entirely from that which makes my action possible, as well as the action of 
others. On her view, the body is not constituted prior to politics, but is rather the site of this 
interdependence.52 The body is not constituted first, only then to appear in public. “On the 
contrary: precisely because bodies are formed and sustained in relation to infrastructural supports 
 
49 Ibid., p. 72. 
50 See also, ibid., p. 72: “We know from disability studies that the capacity to move depends upon instruments and 
surfaces that make movement possible, and that bodily movement is supported and facilitated by nonhuman objects 
and their particular capacity for agency.” Butler references ‘disability studies’ here and elsewhere in this book. Her 
references are always in general terms like this, and it is unclear specifically whose work she is referencing.   
51 Such a rejection of this distinction maybe itself be questionable. While such a distinction may be useful in certain 
circumstances, a full discussion of the usefulness of this distinction unfortunately goes beyond the scope of the 
present chapter. 
52 Ibid., p. 149: “Vulnerability implicates us in what is beyond us yet part of us, constituting one central dimension 
of what might tentatively be called our embodiment.” 
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(or their absence) and social and technological networks or webs of relation, we cannot extract 
the body from its constituting relations – and those relations are always economically and 
historically specific.”53 It is important to note here that Butler resists giving an account of the 
body in the abstract. The conditions of action are economically and historically specific, meaning 
that action cannot be determined in advance. We must understand the specific conditions in order 
to give an accurate account of political action at all.  
 Butler draws heavily on Hannah Arendt’s account of (political) action, defending a 
position wherein human action is not only dependent on the support of nonhuman objects, but 
also the human action of others. She argues, following Arendt, that we must understand “the 
human as a relational and social being, one whose action depends upon equality and articulates 
the principle of equality...No human can be human alone. And no human can be human without 
acting in concert with others and on conditions of equality.”54 The inherent relationality of the 
human is thus founded on conditions of equality; however, this is not the bourgeois equality 
between already existing individuals. It cannot be, since it is in fact this condition of equality that 
makes (political) action possible, and thus the individual cannot exist qua individual prior to it. It 
is important to emphasize that the relationality of the human as a social being in this sense means 
rethinking the relation between individuals as something other than a relation of equivalence. 
Equality here does not mean that any one individual can replace any other. It is rather that the 
conditions of equality must hold in order for there to be any political action at all.  
 Butler goes one step further than Arendt, arguing not only that these conditions of action 
constitute its possibility and thus cannot be separated completely from one another, but also that 
 
53 Ibid., p. 148. 
54 Ibid., p. 88. 
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the action itself grounds these conditions. Rather than understanding the conditions of equality 
that constitute the possibility of action as ideal conditions, she rather claims that the relation is 
reciprocal. “The claim of equality is not only spoken or written, but is made precisely when 
bodies appear together, or, rather, when, through their action, they bring the space of appearance 
into being.”55 This is to say, we generate the conditions of equality precisely by assembling in 
the street. The appearance of our bodies in public not only allows for, but also demands this 
equality – especially in situations where the very principle of equality is contested or not 
guaranteed by state power. Like Dean’s account of the egalitarian discharge of the crowd, 
Butler’s account of group agency here is deeply committed to the foundational relationality and 
interdependence of bodies in the street.  
 As we saw above, Butler defends a view in which the vulnerability and agency of the 
group are intertwined and related to the body as a site of politics. Building on this relationship, 
she advocates for political action that mobilizes this vulnerability. We must be careful, however, 
about the way in which this mobilization occurs, and who is doing the mobilizing, and how. 
Butler acknowledges the history of the concept of vulnerability to the project of feminist politics. 
She identifies a particular worry or risk involved in the term, particularly with respect to 
vulnerable populations. The phrase ‘vulnerable populations’ is often used as a way of managing 
populations and establishes a particular binary logic.56 Labeling a population as vulnerable can 
be used to help or hurt those populations – however either way it targets that population in a way 
that remains within a particular binary. “The notion of vulnerability works in two ways, to target 
 
55 Ibid., p. 88-89. 
56 Ibid., p. 144: “This has produced a paradox within neoliberalism and its notion of ‘responsibilization’ that 




a population or protect it, which means that the term has been used to establish a restrictive 
political logic according to which being targeted and being protected are the only two 
alternatives.”57 Within this binary, vulnerable populations are seen as either hyper-responsible 
for their own precarious positions, or as passive, suffering, and in need of care. Following 
Butler’s logic, neither position within the binary sees the vulnerable as active or capable of 
changing their situation.  
 Butler proposes an account of vulnerability that goes beyond this binary. In order to do 
that, she argues that vulnerability is not a contingent or fleeting situation, but rather at the heart 
of the human experience. On her view, while different people will be differently vulnerable and 
different times, in an underlying sense, we are always already vulnerable. “And though we may 
legitimately feel that we are vulnerable in some instances and not in others, the condition of our 
vulnerability is itself not changeable…To say that any of us are vulnerable beings is to mark our 
radical dependency not only on others, but on a sustaining and sustainable world.”58 
Vulnerability as an underlying condition of our existence goes beyond the binary logic above. If 
we are all, to a certain extent, vulnerable because we are dependent on others and the world 
around us,59 then our political response to conditions of vulnerability among our population is 
not restricted to the target-protect binary. Rather, vulnerability, as a condition for political action, 
opens onto new ways of understanding the possibility of coalitional politics.  
 
57 Ibid., p. 144. 
58 Ibid., p. 150. 
59 While Butler does not state it explicitly, this is clearly a Heideggerian formulation (perhaps of care Sorge). Being 
and Time clearly defends the equiprimordiality of Being-in-the-word and Being-with-others. Exploring this 
connection, especially in light of Adorno’s own critique of Heidegger in Negative Dialectics, while interesting, 
unfortunately falls outside the scope of the present chapter.  
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 This account of vulnerability as condition for political action sheds light onto the kinds of 
capacity an assembly has, and what it can do. For Butler, strength and vulnerability are not 
opposing forces, but rather mutually co-implicating. “Strength is not quite the opposite of 
vulnerability, and this becomes clear, I would suggest, when vulnerability is itself mobilized as 
an individual strategy, but in concert.”60 Collective mobilization of vulnerability, particularly 
outside of or beyond the target-protect binary, offers new possibilities of understanding how a 
group can act. That a population is vulnerable or in precarious situations does not entail that it is 
thus immobilized. Rather, the very conditions of vulnerability and precarity are able to be 
mobilized in order to struggle against the conditions themselves. Butler acknowledges that such 
mobilization risks falling back into the political logic of the target-protect binary; however, this 
risk in itself is not enough to recoil from such political analysis.  
Conditions of Precarity 
Indeed, Butler acknowledges one other risk, which I argue requires a bit more attention than she 
gives to it. She argues that while precarity is differently distributed across society, the shared 
sense of precarity can condition the organization of political alliance and coalition. While on the 
whole I agree with this position, I argue that it requires at the very least a much more precise 
language61 in order to describe and differentiate precarity. I worry that by relying on a shared 
sense of precarity, we risk covering over the differences between different precarious situations, 
which can create disunity and destroy solidarity. Certainly, a shared sense of precarity can unite 
 
60 Butler, Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly, p. 150. 
61 One strategy we might use in order to address this issue is we-narratives, as I describe in Chapter 3. 
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us, as long as we do not assume that different members of the collation are precarious in the 
same way.  
 For Butler, the concepts of vulnerability and precarity are similar, and certainly overlap 
in many areas. Precarity, more so than vulnerability, is the explicitly politically engaged concept. 
“The opposite of precarity is not security but, rather, the struggle for an egalitarian social and 
political order in which a livable interdependency becomes possible – it would be at once the 
condition of our self-governing as a democracy, and its sustained form would be one of the 
obligatory aims of that very governance.”62 Here precarity is a condition of a particular political, 
social, or economic order. The conditions under which one lives are more or less precarious – it 
seems that on Butler’s view, precarity is not something that can be avoided, but rather 
minimized. Security is not the opposite of precarity since it is possible to live in a condition of 
(relative) security (or at least in a condition in which one’s security is constantly threatened or 
under attack) and still recognize one’s own precarious situation. The opposite of precarity is 
rather an active struggle for a better world (Butler uses the phrase “egalitarian social and political 
order, whereas Dean often uses the phrase “communist or egalitarian horizon” but they seem to 
play a similar function in their thought). It involves the collective giving obligations to itself via 
democratic self-legislation or governance. Precarity, then, is not simply inaction, but rather the 
conditions that foreclose the possibility of the self-governance. Conditions of precarity disallow 
collective participation in the political decision-making process.  
 Butler highlights the collective aspect of precarity, arguing that we are not only 
precarious individually, but fundamentally as a group. Conditions of precarity implicate the 
 
62 Butler, Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly, p. 69. 
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hegemonic social, political, and economic order, calling into question their very legitimacy. 
“This means that in some of our most vulnerable experiences of social and economic 
deprivation, what is revealed is not only our precariousness as individual persons – though that 
may well be revealed – but also the failures and inequalities of socioeconomic and political 
institutions.”63 The reason for these institutions to exist is to alleviate the precarity in vulnerable 
populations. That conditions of precarity persist despite, or all too often because of, these 
existing institutions, is itself reason enough to be critical. That institutions fail particular 
individuals is often not enough evidence to prove their underlying, systematic problems. Such 
failures can, and often are, attributed to errors or accidents – bugs rather than features of the 
system. These vulnerable experiences take on a different dimension when understood 
collectively, since their failure cannot be explained away by accident or error. The task at hand, 
on Butler’s view, is not to stop at acknowledging the precariousness of individuals persons, but 
to show how the failures of these social, political, and economic institutions present the 
possibility of acting together.  
 On Butler’s view, a shared sense of precarity can go a long way in conditioning the 
possibility of political alliance or coalition building. Butler is clear this shared sense of precarity 
does not entail that precarity is evenly distributed across society, or that one person’s precarity is 
equal to, or equivalent with another person’s precarity.64 Butler is warry of building political 
alliances around a shared vulnerability, since it lends itself to the binary logic we saw above. 
 
63 Ibid., p. 21. 
64  Ibid., p. 17: “Of course we are right to distinguish among kind of protest, differentiating antimilitarization 
movements from precarity movements, Black Lives Matter from demands for public education. At the same time, 
precarity seems to run through a variety of such movements, whether it is the precarity of those killed in war, those 
who lack basic infrastructure, those who are exposed to disproportionate violence on the street, or those who seek to 
gain an education at the cost of unpayable debt.” 
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Nonetheless, she defends a position in which a shared condition of precarity can, at the very 
least, inform the way in which we form political alliances or build coalitions. “Perhaps we could 
say that the body is always exposed to people and impressions it does not have a say about, does 
not get to predict or fully control, and that these conditions of social embodiment are those we 
have not fully brokered. I want to suggest that solidarity emerges from this rather than from 
deliberate agreements we enter knowingly.”65 Here solidarity is not something that can be 
determined in advance of the mobilization of conditions of vulnerability or precarity. Solidarity 
is something that comes out of these political movements. It is something that is established by 
these political movements. Conditions of precarity – as that which brings people out and into the 
street – are thus at least partially responsible for the gathering itself. These conditions of 
precarity can constitute the reason we are all in the street, and thus constitute the reason for 
which an alliance is formed, or a coalition is built. 
 While Butler does not develop her own position in this direction, I argue that her implicit 
position with respect to the capacity of the group to act is itself based in this shared condition of 
precarity. She does argue that in her view, “…a shared condition of precarity situates our 
political lives, even as precarity is differentially distributed.”66 It is important to note here that 
she is not explicitly stating that a shared condition of precarity conditions the possibility of 
(collective, political) action. However, taking this position does not seem to require much 
explication. Insofar as our ‘political lives’ are situated by this shared condition of precarity, and 
that political action is always conditioned by our mutual interdependence (on one another, as 
well as the world in which we find ourselves), I argue that on her view, this shared condition of 
 
65 Ibid., p. 152. 
66 Ibid., p. 96. 
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precarity can constitute, at least in part, the collective agency of the group comprised of bodies in 
the street.  
 Butler certainly notes that precarity situates our lives despite the fact that it is distributed 
unevenly across society. This is just to say that different individuals and groups within society 
are not all precarious in the same way, or to the same degree. Following this logic, any alliance 
or coalition must take this differential distribution into account; otherwise we risk equivocating 
peoples experience of precarity. It seems safe to assume here that this is not Butler’s position – 
clearly her position on an account of the capacity for political action of a group should not be 
predicated on covering over the differences between conditions of precarity. Rather, the 
possibility of solidarity between people whose conditions of precarity differ may lie precisely in 
the fact that despite these differences, they have more in common than they might otherwise 
believe. Further, that conditions of extended precarity persist in our society grounds a shared 
experience that while experienced differently, can be related to across those differences.  
 This position comes into better relief in comparison to Dean’s account of the egalitarian 
discharge of the crowd above. Whereas Dean advocates for fidelity to the crowd event, Butler 
more suspicious. She is  
…quite suspicious of those political views that hold, for instance, that democracy 
has to be understood as the event of the surging multitude. I don’t think so. It 
seems to me that we have to ask what it is that hold such a group together, what 
demand is being shared, or what felt sense of injustice and unlivibility, what 
intimation of the possibility of change heightens the collective sense of things.67  
 
67 Ibid., p. 134-135. 
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Butler is most likely referencing Hardt and Negri’s account in Multitude, although it could also 
be taken as an implicit critique of Dean’s position of having fidelity to the crowd event.  
 While Dean distances her own account from positions like this,68 it still risks falling back 
into the problem Butler recognizes. It is not just that the crowd or assembly in the street 
constitute a political event – we must interrogate what, if any, collective sense of injustice is at 
play. Following Butler, we must ask what holds the group together. The reason for the crowd 
gathering in the street is crucial to understanding what that group can do. It is not enough to 
merely have fidelity to the egalitarian discharge of the crowd. Rather, we need a politics that 
takes into account the conditions of why people are in the street in the first place, why and how 
people understand their own conditions of precarity, before proclaiming fidelity to the 
psychodynamics of the crowd event. Perhaps ‘conditions of precarity’ is still too broad or vague 
and requires a more precise explanation in order to fully understand the capacity of the bodies 
assembled in the street, but I argue that it is the right place to start such an analysis.  
Conclusion 
 In this section, we saw how Butler’s account of embodiment, and the subsequent 
interdependency and precarity conditions political action in ways that cannot be isolated 
completely from the action itself. On her view, bodies do not appear in public spaces fully 
formed; rather, their mutual interdependence establishes a site of political struggle. For Butler, 
the space between bodies becomes just as important as the bodies themselves. Her account of 
 
68 For example, see Dean, Crowds and Party, p. 63: “Hardt and Negri are right to point to the changes in the settings 
that produced the bourgeois individual. Yet they underplay the emergent ferocity of commanded individuality. Their 
fluid, hybrid, and mobile subjectivities appear as loci of freedom, as if their singularity were a natural property 
rather than itself enjoined, inscribed, and technologically generated in the service of capitalism. As the decline of 




vulnerability, as the capacity to be affected, not only outlines the reason one assembles in the 
street in the first places, but also points toward the way in which a successful political action is 
carried out. The precarity of our collective lives indicates that exclusive focus on individual 
action misses the capacities of the group to act. As we saw above with Dean’s account, perhaps 
this kind of political action does not involve ‘agency’ narrowly defined. However, I argue that 
we risk missing the whole picture if we do not make our account of agency wider.  
  
Summary of Chapter 4 
 In this chapter, I outline an account of the capacity of a group that is not reducible to the 
capacities of its individual members. Both Dean and Butler provide accounts of group agency 
that does not rely on the atomistic account of the individual members who comprise it. From 
Dean, we saw that the individual was only understood as separated from the collective. From 
Butler, we saw that the plurality of the group was again foundational to her understanding of 
precarity. Consider, for example, the following account of alliance from Butler “What I am 
calling alliance is not only a future social form; sometimes it is latent, or sometimes it actually is 
the structure of our own subject-formation…”69  
 For Butler, an alliance is not just a group of individual human beings who come together 
to form a group. On her view, a single individual can be an alliance. Butler continues, “the ‘I’ in 
question refuses to background one minority status or lived site of precarity in favor of any other; 
it is a way of saying, ‘I am the complexity that I am, and this means that I am related to others in 
 
69 Butler, Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly p. 68. 
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ways that are essential to any invocation of this ‘I’.”70 Even in the form of the first person 
singular, the ‘I’ is not completely self-determining or self-sufficient. What it means for an I to be 
an I, is in part to be in relation with other Is, to be always already part of a group. For Butler, this 
essential inter-relationality and interdependence, “challenges us to grasp the insufficiency of 
identarian ontologies for thinking about the problem of alliance. For the point is not that I am a 
collection of identities, but that I am already an assembly, even a general assembly, or an 
assemblage”71 This language of ‘identitarian ontologies’ echoes Adorno’s critique of Hegelian 
dialectics that we saw in chapter 2. This critique of identitarian ontologies constitutes a critique 
not only of certain strains of identity politics, but also the atomistic, individualized account group 
formation in the social ontology literature. 
 Both Dean and Butler are theorists from the continental tradition who reject 
methodological individualism. For them, understanding the group means looking at the 
collective political subject as a whole. The nature of its agency is not reducible to its individual 
members and is different even than Gilbert’s account of plural subjects. What is important for the 
present discussion is that the agency (or capacity to effect change) of a group is not solely 
determined by its constituent members. Following Dean and Butler, the collective subjectivity of 
the group also plays a role. Putting the insights of this chapter together with those of chapter 3, I 
have hopefully provided an argument that defends an account of group agency that takes both the 
movement from individual to group and group to individual into account. This dialectical 
account of group agency focuses ultimately on the primacy of the mediation rather than one side 






class consciousness; therefore, in order to understand what class consciousness is and how it 







 This dissertation offers a sustained account of the political agency at work in the concept 
of class consciousness. Chapter 1 traces the development of the relationship between class 
consciousness and political agency in key early Marxists theorists. Chapter 2 outlines a critical 
intervention from Theodor Adorno on the relationship between social conditions and political 
agency. From building on the insights of these two chapters, I argue that the political agency 
involved in social transformation must be dialectical: it must incorporate both individualist and 
holist methodologies in order to avoid a one-sided analysis. Chapter 3 develops accounts of key 
groups in society – the vanguard, the party, and the proletariat – by showing how contemporary 
analytic accounts of group agency deepen our understanding of how this political agency works. 
Chapter 4 outlines how to widen our account of agency to include the collective capacities of 
groups that might not be considered as ‘agency’ narrowly defined. Taken as a whole, these two 
chapters offer an argument defending an approach to understand group agency as generated by 
thinking about how individuals come together to form a group, as well as how groups are divided 
up into individuals. While I have not offered an exhaustive account of these capacities, I hope to 
have provided the conceptual framework necessary to think more broadly and deeply about the 
kind of political agency at the heart of class consciousness.  
 In Chapter 1, I traced the development of the relationship between consciousness and 
agency from the early works of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, through the activist work of 
Rosa Luxemburg and V.I. Lenin, culminating in Georg Lukács’ account of class consciousness. 
In the section on Marx and Engels, I show how the capacity of the worker to act under capitalism 
is limited by alienation. Despite these limitations, the proletariat, as a class, is capable of coming 
together to fight for its own interest. I argue, through an analysis of Marx’s account of the class 
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struggle in France, he already has an account of group agency that goes beyond an individual, 
atomized understanding of human action. In the section on Rosa Luxemburg and V.I. Lenin, I 
show how this relationship between consciousness and agency is deepened by these two political 
activists. Lenin emphasizes the need for conscious intervention and organization, showing that 
embryonic, trade-unionist consciousness has not yet reached a political understanding of the task 
of revolutionary action. Luxemburg emphasizes attention to social conditions, warning that 
strong organizational structure risks reproducing existing relations between leaders and the 
masses. In the section on Lukács, I show how he takes the insights from both Luxemburg and 
Lenin in order to develop his own position on the standpoint of the proletariat and class 
consciousness. I defend the position that already in Lukács, class consciousness is not merely 
awareness of one’s own class position, but entails the political agency needed for social 
transformation.  
 In Chapter 2, I considered Adorno’s critique of Lukács’ account of class consciousness 
and reification not as rejection, but as a widening and deepening of a materialist account of 
social conditions and the possibility of transformative social action. I show that Adorno, far from 
giving up on the possibility of social transformation, maintains that society could be otherwise. 
On his view, the absence of the party is a barrier to changing society, but that a new Leninist 
Manifesto is needed. The ‘spell’ of ideology can indeed break; however total disaster as well as 
liberation is possible. Following Adorno, I argue that the political agency at work in class 
consciousness must be dialectical, and emphasize the negative, nonidentical, and unreconciled 
elements of society.  
 In Chapter 3, I turned to the contemporary analytic tradition in order to better understand 
the aspect of group agency understood as a combination of individuals. I look at the vanguard as 
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an example of a plural subject. The vanguard comes together voluntarily, with a shared goal and 
the capacity to act jointly. The party structure gives it group agency. Through its organizational 
structure and joint action, it should be thought of as a group agent. The proletariat, while not 
having group agency in a narrow sense, is still an important group in society, and can have a 
common class interest. I argue that with the use of we-narratives, one could develop a greater 
sense of togetherness and help organize social change. 
 In Chapter 4, I explore accounts in the contemporary continental tradition in order to 
better understand the aspect of group agency understood as political collectivity. I look at how 
accounts of the crowd resist a strict, individualist reduction, and how in fact the process of 
individualization arises from singling people out from the crowd. I show how the nonidentical 
nature of political groups open up gaps and splits within themselves, and how these gaps widen 
our understanding of the capacity of the group for transformative political action. While the 
crowd might not always act justly, it opens new possibilities that cannot be understood through 
reduction of the group to its component parts. I also show how embodiment and precarity are 
crucial elements in an account of group agency. The space between bodies, just as much as the 
bodies themselves, condition possibilities of political action. Interdependence and vulnerability 
are not only reasons why one engages in political struggle, but also important capacities to 
engage in strategic political action.  Together with Chapter 4, I have hoped to develop a 
dialectical understanding of group agency. Rather than emphasizing either the individual or the 
group, the part or the whole, I argue that the emphasis should rather be placed on the relation 






 The present work is far from an exhaustive study on class consciousness and political 
agency and offers many opportunities for future research. The present work has focused 
primarily on developing an account of political agency required for reconstructing a concept of 
class consciousness. As the discussion above has hopefully shown, agency is not the only aspect 
of class consciousness – a reworked concept of class consciousness would also need a developed 
account of social possibility, as well as an analysis of motivation for action. Chapter 2 discusses 
possibility, and touches on Adorno’s account of real possibility and Lukács’ account of objective 
possibility. The present work was unable to provide an in-depth look at these accounts of social 
possibility since such an investigation would go beyond the present scope. In order to understand 
how the political agency of class consciousness could in fact play out, an analysis of present 
social conditions, as well as the possibilities those conditions afford constitute another necessary 
dimension to the concept of class consciousness that I was unable to provide.  
 In addition, a concept of class consciousness would also require an understanding of why 
individuals and groups act. Broadly speaking, I maintain that far too much emphasis is placed on 
rational motivations for action. Individuals, just as much as groups, are often motivated by 
nonrational forces, emotion and affect being among the most common. One dimension I have 
neglected in the present work is the possibility of group emotion, and the role it might play in 
understanding how the concept of class consciousness might be a useful political tool. These two 
aspects – social possibility and motivation – constitute two other interconnected dimensions that, 
along with the present look into political agency, would go far in providing a more complete 
account of class consciousness. 
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 One aspect of group agency that I was unable to address adequately in the present work 
was the way in which new and emerging technological developments condition the possibility of 
group agency, as well as the possibility for class consciousness. Marx himself was attentive to 
the technological developments of his own time. Embedded in his account of alienation is a 
critique of modern forms of technology and argues not only that the mechanization of the factory 
is reproduced as the mechanization of the worker, but that new technologies such as the steam 
engine completely revolutionized socially possible forms of life. While Marx was critical of new 
forms of technology, he was not against the development of technology as such. Automation 
could also usher in a new age where human beings could be freed from the limiting constraints 
of work. In the spirit of this critique, I would argue that technological development today, 
especially developments in communication technologies such as the internet and cell phones, 
offer radically new ways of understanding what a group is and what it can do politically. I would 
argue that the present work sets up the conceptual tools necessary to engage thinkers interested 
in these emerging technologies in order to better understand the social possibilities for group 
political action.  
 In order to develop research in these directions, there are many contemporary and 
historical figures who offer opportunities to expand the argument of the present work. In addition 
to Adorno, other figures from the Frankfort School offer interesting possibilities for further 
research. Specifically, the work of Ernst Bloch or Herbert Marcuse speak to similar issues raised 
by Adorno. Engaging with these thinkers would offer new opportunities to continue to develop 
the arguments presented here, as well as offer different approaches to similar questions. Later 
thinkers from the Frankfort School, including Jürgen Habermas, Axel Honneth, and Rachel 
Jaeggi. From the tradition of Italian Marxism, Antonio Gramsci’s work on hegemony also offers 
  
 192 
interesting possibilities for developing a deeper account of political agency. Sartre’s later work 
on groups would also be an interesting comparison. There is also a tradition of Analytic 
Marxism, as well as thinkers today working in Critical Social Ontology, all of whom could offer 
insight to the current project.  
 In addition, there are interesting conversations to be had with thinkers who focus on other 
dimensions of oppression in contemporary society. It is my aim in the present work to give an 
account of class consciousness that is neither nor reductive nor deflationary with respect to class, 
or any other systemic account of human suffering. In the future I hope to develop a more 
nuanced account of political agency that takes engages advances in disability studies, critical 
feminisms, critical race studies, as well as others. Specifically, I am interested in looking at the 
intersection between Marxist thought and identity politics. The term identity politics covers a 
wide range of thought, but I worry that some contemporary work over emphasizes the concept of 
identity in the political sphere. Rather, the focus should be on the conditions of alliance and 
coalition building. In this political project, I argue that class often drops out of the analysis, even 
for those theorists who nominally agree that class is an important aspect of their political 
thought. It is my hope to develop a class forward, but not reductionist account that appeals not 
only to those in the Marxist tradition strictly speaking, but also to those working in other aspects 
of social domination.  
 Finally, I hope that the insights of the present work reach beyond the limits of academic 
thought narrowly construed. Returning the Marx’s eleventh thesis on Feuerbach, conceptual 
theorizing about the social, political, and economic problems, while I argue a necessary tool or 
component in the political struggle, does not by itself properly address these issues. Concrete 
political action is needed today, and this account of political agency and class consciousness 
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aims to provide the conceptual tools necessary to engage in effective political struggle. Today, 
now more than ever, I argue that an understanding of the political capacity of groups can help to 
bring about a better tomorrow.  
 
A Note on Social Conditions Today 
 Since starting this project, our own social conditions have transformed radically due to 
the COVID-19 pandemic. Despite difficult economic conditions for many working-class 
Americans for almost a decade after the 2009 recession and housing crash, we might not call 
social conditions during the last decade revolutionary. There have been mass populist 
movements across the political spectrum: from Occupy Wall Street on the left to the Unite the 
Right rally on the right. While these movements have certainly shifted the political landscape in 
the US considerably, none of them has been capable of generating the kind of revolutionary 
social transformation of the early 20th century. Certainly, established American political 
institutions have been forced to address these movements; however, they have at best 
precipitated political reform rather than social transformation. These are important, and often 
powerful movements, but they have not (yet) generated the political agency required to 
completely upend our way of life. 
 Over the past few months, we have seen social, political, and economic change on a 
historically unprecedented scale. We have witnessed extreme swings in the stock market, 
millions filling for unemployment, shelter in place orders requiring those who can work from 
home to do so. In short, we have seen the entirety of the capitalist economic system come to a 
grinding halt. Neoliberal capitalist institutions are not equipped to handle a global pandemic on 
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this scale. In a time of crisis such as the one we are currently in, the real motivations of the ruling 
elite become painstakingly clear: capitalism, as a system designed to generate surplus value cares 
more about profit than it does about people. I would argue that this has been true since Marx’s 
time; however, the system has devised more and more complex ideological systems to explain 
why suffering persists given the preponderance of technological advances. When the institutions 
begin to break down, and the system no longer functions as it once did, the values inherent in the 
exchange economy reveal themselves. The ruling class is scrambling to get things ‘back to 
normal’ and are clearly willing to sacrifice the lives of the elderly and immunocompromised in 
order to make this happen.  
 While it is too soon to understand completely how the coronavirus pandemic will affect 
the future of our society, it appears that a return to normal is, even given perfect conditions, 
nowhere in sight. We may never return to the way things had been. This crisis, however, also 
offers new possibilities concerning social organization. In a period of crisis, the ‘natural’ and 
‘immutable’ laws of capitalist economics no longer seem as unshakable as they do during 
periods of relative calm. Perhaps this ‘spell’ of capitalist ideology is in the process of breaking. 
Following Adorno, we should keep in mind that social transformation does not guarantee 
liberation or revolution, and always risks total disaster. No Marxist theory, no matter how 
complete, can determine or even predict where society is going. We can, however, learn from the 
periods of crisis in the past in order to better prepare for what is to come.  
 Given these unprecedented social changes, I argue that the concept of class 
consciousness, as well as a well-developed account of political agency is important now more 
than ever. As the working class comes to realize that the ruling class is willing to sacrifice their 
lives for the sake of profit, they will also recognize their power to change their own social 
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conditions. A reconstruction of the concept of class consciousness could be a helpful conceptual 
tool for political organizing. This concept must be able to account not only for awareness and 
agency aimed at a progressive, leftist politics, but also the mass movements of the right and alt-
right. That is to say, we must also be able to give an account of why the working class does not, 
or has not, come together as a class for the sake of overthrowing global capital. Such an account 
requires an account of political agency and action complex and nuanced enough to attend to the 
differences within the working class. It is my hope that the present work constitutes at least step 
in that direction. 
 We should not wait for social conditions to become revolutionary before we act. It is 
possible to begin and continue the work of establishing political organizations that maintain and 
develop progressive political energy and begin building alternative institutional structures that 
can outlast not only the present crisis, but also the global system of capitalism. While the future 
is always to some extent uncertain, today it is unclear if, or when, a return to normal will happen. 
Perhaps a return to normal is not what is needed. Perhaps we can imagine a different future – a 
future beyond the current system of exploitation and alienation. Conscious intervention, 
however, is a crucial factor in determining how the present crisis unfolds. While no single 
individual or group can guarantee what will happen, an understanding of the complex 
interrelated web of political agency is a crucial step towards whatever the future holds in store. 
The concept of class consciousness, reconstructed through the lens of political agency, offers 






Adorno, Theodor (2005). Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life. London: Verso. 
Adorno, Theodor (2007). Negative Dialectics. New York: The Continuum International 
Publishing Group.  
Adorno, Theodor (2000). Introduction to Sociology. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Adorno, Theodor and Herbert Marcuse (1999). “Correspondence on the German Student 
Movement.” New Left Review. 1/233, p. 123-136. 
Allen, Amy (2016). The End of Progress: Decolonizing the Normative Foundations of Critical 
Theory. New York: Columbia University Press.  
Andrew, Edward (1983). “Class in Itself and Class against Capital: Karl Marx and his 
Classifiers.” Canadian Journal of Political Science. Vol.16, No. 3, p. 577-584. 
Arendt, Hannah (1958). The Human Condition. Chicago: Chicago University Press.  
Butler, Judith (2015). Notes Toward a Performative of Assembly. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Canetti, Elias (1973). Crowds and Power. New York: Victor Gollancz Ltd.  
Dean, Jodi (2018). Crowds and Party. London: Verso.  
Dean, Jodi (2019). Comrades: An Essay on Political Belonging. London: Verso.  
Derrida, Jacques (2010). The Beast and the Sovereign, Volume 2. Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press.  
  
 197 
Feenberg, Andrew (2014). The Philosophy of Praxis: Marx, Lukács and the Frankfurt School. 
London, UK: Verso. 
Feenberg, Andrew (2017). “Why Students of the Frankfurt School Will Have to Read Lukács.” 
The Palgrave Handbook of Critical Theory. Ed Michael J. Thompson. Palgrave 
MacMillan. 
French, Peter A (1995). Corporate Ethics. Orlando, FL: Harcourt Brace & Company.  
Gallagher, Shaun and Deborah Perron Tollefsen (2017). “We-Narratives and the Stability and 
Depth of Shared Agency” Philosophy of the Social Sciences. Vol 47(2). 
Gilbert, Margaret (2008). A Theory of Political Obligation: Membership, Commitment, and the 
Bonds of Society. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press.  
Hegel, G.W.F. (1991). Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Hegel, G.W.F. (1952). Phenomenology of Spirit. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Hegel, G.W.F. (1997). Lectures on the Philosophy of History. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.  
Honneth, Axel (2008). Reification: A New Look at an Old Idea. Oxford, UK: Oxford University 
Press. 
Horkheimer, Max and Theodor Adorno (2002). Dialectic of Enlightenment. Stanford University 
Press. 
Horkheimer, Max and Theodor Adorno (2019). Towards a New Manifesto. London: Verso. 
Jaeggi, Rachel (2016). Alienation. New York: Columbia University Press.  
  
 198 
Jameson, F. (1988). “History and Class Consciousness as an ‘Unfinished Project’.” Rethinking 
Marxism, 1(1).  
Jay, Martin (1984). Marxism and Totality: The Adventures of a Concept from Lukacs to 
Habermas. California: University of California Press. 
Lasch, Christopher (1979). The Culture of Narcissism. New York: Norton.  
Lavin, Chad (2005). “Postliberal Agency in Marx’s Brumaire.” Rethinking Marxism. Vol 17, no. 
3. July. 
Le Bon, Gustave (2018). The Crowd: Study of the Popular Mind.  
Lenin, V.I. (1915). “The Collapse of the Second International.” Section 2. 
<https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1915/csi/ii.htm#v21pp74h-212> 
Lenin, V.I. (1975). What is to Be Done? Burning Questions of Our Movement. Peking: Foreign 
Languages Press.  
Lenin, V.I. (1993). State and Revolution. New York: Penguin Classics.  
List, Christian and Philip Pettit. Group Agency: The Possibility, Design, and Status of Corporate 
Agents. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.  
Lukács, Georg (1967). Lenin: A Study on the Unity of his Thought. Cambridge, MA: The MIT 
Press. 




Lukács, Georg (2010). History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics. Wales: 
The Merlin Press. 
Luxemburg, Rosa (1971). “Organizational Questions of Russian Social Democracy.” Selected 
Political Writings of Rosa Luxemburg. New York: Monthly Review Press.  
Luxemburg, Rosa (1971). “Reform or Revolution.” Selected Political Writings of Rosa 
Luxemburg. New York: Monthly Review Press.  
Luxemburg, Rosa (1971). “What does the Spartacus league want?” Selected Political Writings of 
Rosa Luxemburg. New York: Monthly Review Press.  
Macdonald, Iain (2019). What Would Be Different: Figures of Possibility in Adorno. Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press. 
Marx, Karl (1956). The Holy Family or Critique of Critical Critique. Moscow: Foreign 
Languages Publishing House.  
Marx, Karl (1975). “Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. Marx Engels Collected Works. Vol 
3. London, UK: Lawrence & Wishart. 
Marx, Karl (1976). Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Vol 1. London, UK: Penguin 
Books.  
Marx, Karl (1988). Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. New York: Prometheus 
Books.  
Marx, Karl (1998). The German Ideology. New York: Prometheus Books. 
Marx, Karl (2014). The Poverty of Philosophy. Mansfield Centre: Martino Publishing.  
  
 200 
Marx, Karl (2017). The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. New York: International Publishers.  
Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels (1978). The Marx-Engels Reader. New York: Norton & 
Company.  
Nelson, R. and S. Winter (1982). An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press.  
Nietzsche, Friedrich (1989). On the Genealogy of Morals. New York: Random House.  
Tollefsen, Deborah Perron (2015). Groups as Agents. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.  
Tollefsen, Deborah Perron (2018). “Collective Intentionality and Methodology in the Social 
Sciences.” The Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality. Routledge, New York: 
Routledge. 
Wood, Allen (2004). Karl Marx. 2nd Edition. New York: Routledge. 
Wright, Erik Olin (1985). Classes. London: Verso. 
 
